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Abstract 
Dialectic has been rejected or dogmatically accepted by many philosophers. The 
modern history of dialectic began with Kant who, however, regarded it as deceptive. 
Fichte and Schelling contributed to the formation of the theory of dialectic by 
developing the concepts such as the absolute, spirit, reason and speculation. Hegel did 
the further clarification of those concepts by exhibiting their necessary interconnection, 
which was systematically expounded in Science of Logic. Dialectic in Logic can be 
grasped with three key concepts: (1) the absolute, (2) contradiction and sublation, and 
(3) the identity of thought and being. In Logic, through the doctrines of being, essence 
and the concept, the necessary development of categories is expressed as the self- 
movement of the absolute, which culminates in the absolute idea. Logic is for Hegel 
the exposition of God as the thought which thinks of itself. Therefore the truth of logic 
is the thought's returning to itself as a full circle of the descriptions of thought itself. 
Dialectic is the activity of this self-thinking thought. Contradiction immanent in every 
category, and its sublation, is the generator of all the development of categories. Only 
through the whole process of logic can the identity of thought and being be known as 
the truth. However, as the later generations argued, Hegel's interpretations was biased 
as his emphasis was on the self-identity of thought to itself. Dialectic is to be re-grasped 
with the emphasis on the self-development of reality. This entails the cognition that the 
reality enforces the human mind to recognise the dynamism of ever-moving reality that 
is dialectical. However, dialectic is not to be regarded as the collection of principles, 
but to be re-conceptualised as the necessary development, and thus the explication, of 
reality through our thought. Dialectic is this truth as the identity of reality and thought. 
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This doctoral thesis is intended to be a brief odyssey. Its aim is the search for the truth 
of the objective material world, i. e. reality, and of our thought which knows it. 
Dialectic is the total naming of this truth. 
Dialectic has been variously treated by various thinkers: some have accepted it, 
but dogmatically, and the others have totally rejected it as false. In any sense, to know 
what dialectic is, we need to face the difficulties of complicated arguments 
accumulated on this controversial concept `dialectic'. 
The word `dialectic' can be traced back to an ancient Greek word dialegein, 
which means `speaking through' or `double-speak' - dia is `through' or `two' (dyad); 
legein is to `speak' and is related to logos. This will imply that `dia' (two) of dialectic 
would already be the prelude to the self-contradictory expression of the truth, i. e. the 
thought thinking of itself in the other. ' 
What I intend to clarify in this thesis is the core or essence of the meaning of 
dialectic. Therefore I will focus on the following three points: (1) historical and logical 
development of the theory of dialectic before, and towards, Hegel's dialectic; (2) 
Hegel's dialectic expressed in his Science of Logic, which is the systematic exposition 
of dialectic itself; and (3) the possibility of the materialist reconceptualisation of the 
theory of dialectic, which I think is not fully developed yet. To clarify these points, this 
thesis is divided into three parts, each of which corresponds to each of the above 
philosophical issues. 
Part One, which consists of three chapters on Kant, Fichte and Schelling, 
discusses the historical and logical background to the formation of Hegel's dialectic. I 
will focus on the categories which they introduce and develop - such as reason, 
antinomies (by Kant); 'the I' (das Ich, a precursory expression to Hegel's absolute 
1 Desmond, 'Thinking on the Double'. pp. 226.231-32. 
1) 
spirit), speculation (by Fichte); and the absolute (by Schelling). All these categories 
will be integrated into Hegel's system of Science of Logic. By discussing those 
categories, I will clarify how they contributed to the development of the theory of 
dialectic, and also at what points their own philosophical systems stopped. 
Part Two, in its five chapters, is entirely devoted to Hegel's Science of Logic. 
which is nothing but the explication of what dialectic is. Here I will focus on the 
clarification of the total movement of categories as the self-movement (self- 
development and self-explication) of the absolute. For Hegel the absolute, in the realm 
of logic, is the thought which thinks of itself, i. e. God. The absolute, as this self- 
thinking thought, goes through the three spheres in Logic - being (Sein), essence 
(Wesen) and the concept (Begriff). At the end of this whole process the self-thinking 
thought, as the absolute idea, finally (but atemporally) knows itself: it turns into nature. 
From a materialist point of view, Hegel's above description will be criticised as upside- 
down. However, Hegel's greatest contribution to the theory of dialectic consists in that 
he systematically clarified the self-movement of the real material world and of human 
thinking. The truth, i. e. the identity of thought and being, was firmly established by 
him. 
Part Three, in its three chapters, tries to clarify the possibilities of further 
development of the materialist theory of dialectic. However, as I will discuss in detail, 
materialist dialectic has been abused by dogmatism and axiomatisation. But the clue to 
solve this situation was already presented by the original dialectical thinkers, Marx, 
Engels and Lenin. What they suggest is to read Hegel materialistically, i. e. to embark 
on the serious and critical study of his Logic, and, on this basis, re-conceptualise what 
`dialectic' is, from a materialist view. In so doing, one will surely know that the truth of 
man's thinking, thought, is nothing but the truth of the objective material world, reality. 
What differentiates between Hegel's dialectic and materialist dialectic is that the former 
thinks of thought as the origin of reality, and the latter thinks of reality as the origin of 
thought. Therefore here I will firstly discuss: who actually thinks, i. e. magi thinks; 
Feuerbach's contribution to materialism; and the confusion by both idealists and 
dogmatic materialists on the relation between the ideal and the real. In so doing, I will 
clarify the materialist meaning of the identity of thought and being as the truth. 
Dialectic, as logic (and theory of knowledge. too), is also the science which explicates 
this truth. I will also discuss the problem of the axiomatic understanding of dialectic, 
which attributes its truth to `principles'. Although each of those `principles' actually 
I 
exists, they are to be grasped as the aspects of one and the same dialectic. Dialectic 
cannot be understood as the collection of separate principles, but as a single whole. 
which has a variety of aspects within it. To do so, I will briefly discuss Lenin's attempt 
to formulate dialectic, which is a good example of the possibility of further 
development of the theory of dialectic. 
4 
Part I 
Historical and Logical Background to Hegel's Dialectic in 
Classical German Philosophy: Kant, Fichte and Schelling 
5 
Chapter 1 
Towards Dialectic (1): Kant 
Preliminaries 
In this chapter I will discuss some of the important concepts of Kant only insofar as 
they are the materials for the formation of Hegel's dialectic, focusing on Critique o/ 
Pure Reason (1781), together with Hegel's critique of Kant, which appears in Lectures 
on the History of P ilosophy, Science of Logic, Enc clopaedia Logic, and other works. 
Section 1 
Judgement, Synthesis and the Understanding 
The modern history of dialectic began with Kant. He intended to establish the co\ cr-al l 
philosophical systems of nature and of morality. Three Critiques were originally written 
as prolegomena to them although they are too gigantic to be so called. To secure the 
soundness of his entire philosophical system, his enquiry had necessarily to be centred 
on what human knows lcd`, c is, or. on what our judgemeiit is. 
Judgement, when described in the most abstract \\a\,, is 'the faculty of thinking 
the particular als contained under the universal'. He also treats judgement as a middle 
term hct\\ ccn the undo rstanding, and reason. ' 
Judg, cmcnt, vv henn descrihcd in relation to objects, is 'the mediate knowlcdýýe of 
an object. that is, the representation oa representation of it [the objecty"2 
hint. Thy Critique (f`JuL . emenr. 1'. mrt I: l he Crnti.; uz of. \c'thcuc Jud,, cment. pp. 15. I 
6 
In a more detailed and concrete way, regarding its function of unity, judgement 
is also described as `the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the 
objective unity of apperception', and the copula `is' in our language shows this 
judgement. 3 
In the search for what judgement is, Kant makes a distinction between analytic 
judgement and synthetic judgement. In analytic judgement, identity is seen between 
subject and object, in which predicate can be logically drawn from the analysis of 
subject. In synthetic judgement, on the contrary, the predicate cannot be automatically 
drawn from the analysis of subject, but this synthetic judgement is as true as the 
analytic is; this judgement can be called `ampliative' since something new, unknown 
must be given, as predicate, to subject without previously known identity. 4 
A right judgement, if simplified, is for the knower to acquire the accurate 
knowledge of objects. Kant explains how synthesis and analysis work together in the 
process of acquiring this knowledge. Synthesis is `the act of putting different 
representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one act of 
knowledge'. But this knowledge may be at first `crude and confused', therefore 
analysis is needed. 5 
There is a widely accepted misunderstanding on the relation between synthesis 
and analysis, in which analyses are done first, and then syntheses of the results of 
analyses come later. Contrary to this commonsensical, superficial view, Kant clearly 
states that synthesis comes prior to analysis. Synthesis of a manifold is what first gives 
rise to knowledge, and, in regard to content, no concepts can first arise by way of 
analysis. To bring this synthesis to concepts is the function of the understanding. 6 That 
is, for Kant the understanding is closely connected to synthesis although analysis is 
never denied its relation to the understanding. 
In order to reach knowledge the understanding must be connected to sensibility 
(senses, sensations). The understanding and sensibility can determine objects only 
when they are employed in conjunction.? In this sense Kant states: `Without sensibility 
no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. 
2 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter abbreviated as Critique), A68=B93. 
Critique, B 141. 
4 Critique, A6=B 10. 
` Critique, A77= B 103, my italics. 
6 Critique, A77-78=B 103-04. 
7 Critique, A258=B314. 
7 
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. ' Only 
through the union of the understanding and senses can knowledge arise. 
8 
The meaning of intuition (Anschauung) should be noted here. Kant often uses 
this term in the meaning of the `awareness of individual entities' and never in the 
meaning of `a priori insight not based on reasoning' in ordinary English usage. 
9 Nor is 
it in the meaning of super-sensible or non-sensible intuition that is unaccompanied by 
the senses, which has been asserted by `intellectualists' who, Kant says, are represented 
by Plato. 10 
Section 2 
Categories 
The understanding works with sensibility, as stated above. But it cannot function 
without the pure concepts of the understanding which Kant names categories after 
Aristotle. Categories are the pure concepts of the understanding which apply a priori to 
objects of intuition in general. There are twelve categories, the list of which exhausts all 
original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within itself a 
priori. 11 
It can be seen here that Kant connects categories more closely to synthesis than 
to analysis. He even says that general logic - which, in order to transform 
representations into concepts, abstracts from all content of knowledge, and which must 
entirely rely upon analysis- cannot establish those pure concepts which are the 
transformed manifold of representations. It is transcendental logic, on the contrary, that 
does fulfil this requirement by synthesis, and thus can grasp a manifold of a priori 
sensibility as material for the concepts of pure understanding, i. e. categories . 
12 (Here 
lies the implicit resource of his talking of `synthetic a priori judgement'. ) Without the 
necessary connection between synthesis and categories no one can have the 
8 Critique, A51=B75. 
9 Ewing, A Short commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p. 18. 
'° Critique, A853-54=B881-82. 
11 Critique, A79-80=B 105-06. 
12 Critique, A76-77=B 102, A79=B 105. 
8 
understanding. Only when related to this higher connection with synthesis and 
categories can analysis fulfil its role of supporting the knower to reach the 
understanding. 
However, categories are not almighty. The thought of an object by means of a 
pure concept of understanding (category) can become knowledge only insofar as the 
concept (category) is related to objects of senses. To think an object is not the same as 
to know it. We need categories as well as empirical intuitions, i. e. experience, in order 
to reach the knowledge of things. Categories can be applied only in regard to things 
which may be objects of possible experience. 13 The section-title itself clearly states 
this: `§ 22 The Category has no other Application in Knowledge than to Objects of 
Experience' 
.14 
Kant is not bothered by the seemingly right, but in fact wrong, commonsensical 
view that the term `a priori' is not connected to any experience. He probes more deeply 
into the implicit and necessary relation between a priori and experience that is usually 
thought of only in its relation to a posteriori. 
However, Kant's philosophy has its own defects. There remain contradictory 
aspects in his system. One of these significant problems is as follows. Space and time, 
which are not themselves categories, but are necessary for us as the framework (or 
condition) of perceiving anything real, are considered by him to be valid no further than 
for objects of the senses, and therefore only for experience. That is, for Kant space and 
time represent nothing beyond the limit of the objects of senses and the limit of 
experience: space and time have no reality beyond them. Categories, i. e. the pure 
concepts of understanding, on the contrary, are free from this limitation which is the 
boundary of senses (or sensibility). But even the categories as concepts of objects, 
when they are extended beyond senses, become empty since they are mere forms of 
thought, without objective reality, and we cannot judge whether the objects are possible 
or not. ' 5 
This contradictory problem remaining in Kant's description of space and time 
and of categories (pure concepts of understanding) - i. e. that space and time are under 
the limitation of senses or experience and, on the other hand, categories are not under 
such limitation, and that, however, they are both under the limitation of sensibility of 
13 Critique, B 146-48. 
14 Critique, B 146. 
Critique. B 148. 
9 
objects - must have urged Fichte to reach the more consistent view of the perceiver and 
the perceived, through his epoch-making concept `the r (das Ich). 16 
Hegel explains Kant's categories as follows. Kant presents us twelve categories. 
which are a great contribution to philosophy. Categories fall into four classes, each of 
which constitutes a triad. Although the triad of the first positive, the second negative 
and the third synthesis of the former two, conceals within itself the absolute form, i. e. 
the concept (Begriff), yet for Kant the triad remains an external schema only. Kant 
asserts that categories, which bring the unity of thought into the content of senses, are 
the objective elements in experience, and that the categories therefore hold universality 
and necessity. However, he also asserts that experience, which cannot be separated 
from categories, can grasp only phenomena, and that we cannot know noumena by 
means of the knowledge we gain through experience. Thus Kant's contribution, i. e. his 
introducing categories into philosophy, loses its significant importance by this 
unphilosophic procedure which does not reach the necessity, the truth, the absolute. In 
this sense Kant's philosophy remains the metaphysics of the understanding. For 
example, in Kant's philosophy the two opposites - (1) pure conceptions of the 
understanding (or pure understanding) and (2) pure sensuous perceptions (or pure 
sensuousness) which were formerly considered by him to be separate from each other 
in the mind - are now united in knowledge in that the former determines the latter by 
categories, and this constitutes experience. Yet they are only united in an external, 
superficial way. '7 
Section 3 
Reason and the Understanding, Phenomena and Noumena, and 
Organic View 
Kant makes a first great contribution of clarifying reason in an appropriate manner. 
Reason is the faculty of principles, and is distinguished from the understanding. '8 More 
16 As for Fichte's dissatisfaction on Kant on this issue, see Chapter 2 Section 1; as for the elaboration of 
'the I', see Chap. 2 Sec. 2. 
17 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy (hereafter abbreviated as Hist. Phil. ), III. pp. 438-41. 
'8 Critique, A299=B356. 
10 
precisely, the understanding is the faculty which secures the unity of appearances by 
means of rules while reason is the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of 
understanding under principles. Reason never applies itself directly to experience, but 
applies to the understanding, giving it an a priori unity by means of concepts. 
19 He 
gives to reason a higher, more honourable status in philosophy than in previous 
philosophers' systems. But his contribution stops here as far as dialectic is concerned. 
For him the unity of reason is not the unity of possible experience which is that of the 
understanding. Reason does not know nor prescribe a principle that everything which 
happens has a cause. 20 This shows that Kant acknowledges the power of the faculty of 
reason only to a limited extent. This limitation of reason by him is closely connected 
with his statement that thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich) is unknowable since reason is 
associated with this unknowable thing-in-itself while the understanding is associated 
with knowable appearances or experience. 
However, Kant does not say that senses or appearances (phenomena) and 
things-in-themselves (noumena) are completely separated from each other. For him 
noumenon (thing-in-itself) is merely a limiting concept in the sense that we cannot 
reach it beyond senses (sensibility). The concept of noumenon is of negative 
employment only. 21 In this context Kant also says that all objects given to us can be 
interpreted in two ways - as appearances and as things-in-themselves (as absolutely 
unconditioned). 22 
Kant shows his rather organic view of the system as the whole. A system is the 
unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea which is the concept of the 
form of a whole that is provided by reason, and the scientific concept of reason 
contains the end and the form of that whole. A whole is an organised unity which may 
grow from within like an animal body. 23 His organic view of history also appears in 
Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784). Kant's organic view 
will be more precisely and vividly developed by a later generation, i. e. Schelling24 and 
Hegel. 
19 Critique, A302=B359. 
20 Critique, A307=B363-64. 
21 Critique, A255=B3 10-11. 
22 Kant, Correspondence, p. 199 (his letter to Christian Carve, 7th August 1783). cf. Scruton. Kant. p. 48. 
°; Critique, A832-33=B860-61. 
24 See Chap. 3 Sec. 6. 
11 
Hegel assesses Kant's important distinction between the understanding and 
reason. For Kant the understanding is the power of reaching the particular by means of 
perception (Anschauung). It deals with objects in finite and conditioned relations. 
Reason, on the contrary, is `the power of obtaining knowledge from principles, that is, 
the power of knowing the particular in the universal by means of Notions [concepts 
(Begriffe)]'. (This is Hegel's expression. Kant himself uses the term `idea' (Idee). ) 
Reason finds its object as the infinite and unconditioned. The principle of reason is `the 
universal, inasmuch as it finds the unconditioned involved in the conditioned 
knowledge of the understanding'. Kant gives to reason a higher position in philosophy 
than to the understanding. This becomes apparent when the product of reason is 
considered by him to be the idea (Idee) which is the unconditioned, the infinite. But in 
his philosophy reason loses its power. For him reason has the desire to know the 
infinite, but does not have such power. He ruins the importance of reason which he 
himself has found since in his philosophy the idea is merely the abstract universal, the 
indeterminate. In this context Hegel implies that Kant cannot reach the full grasp of the 
truth of knowledge, i. e. reason, the universal. For Kant the knowing subject does not 
really arrive at reason since it still remains the individual self-consciousness which is 
opposed to the universal. 25 
Hegel also describes reason in general. Reason includes within itself the 
understanding as its own necessary first moment. He apprehends the relation between 
the understanding and reason more dynamically than Kant does. For Hegel the 
understanding is that which determines and holds the determinations fixed. Reason, on 
the contrary, not only `resolves the determinations of the understanding into nothing' 
(in this sense reason is negative and dialectical), but also `generates the universal and 
comprehends the particular therein' (in this sense reason is positive). But Hegel does 
not stop at this point since for him reason is, in truth, `spirit which is higher than either 
merely positive reason, or merely intuitive understanding'. Reason at first negates what 
is simple, producing the difference of the understanding, then resolves the difference 
and is thus dialectical, and yet the result is that reason has restored what was at first 
simple which has now become the concrete universal . 
26 
Hegel says that reason affected by sensibility is `a culture (Kultur) of ordinary 
human intellect' which rises to the thinking of a universal. In other words, the 
'` Hegel, Mist. Phi.. III, pp. 443-44, my italics. 
26 Hegel, Science of Logic (hereafter abbreviated as Sci. Logic), p. 28. 
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philosophies of Kant, Jacobi and Fichte consist in `the culture (Kultur) of reflection 
raised to a system'. Here Hegel asserts what philosophy truly is, against their 
philosophies. Kant grasps the negative, abstractly idealistic side of cognition as 
positive, and he thinks that it alone is reason, and that what is beyond it is unknowable. 
Although Kant grasps that there is `the absolute', he does not clarify what the absolute 
truly is. Kant does not recognise reason as the one and only a priori. 27 Here Hegel 
seems to suggest that the absolute is reason, and reason is spirit; i. e. reason is that 
which discloses the absolute as spirit. 
Section 4 
Dialectic as Transcendental Illusion 
Kant is important in that he re-introduced dialectic to philosophy after the long absence 
of the discussions of dialectic in the modern philosophy since Descartes - although 
dialectic had been intensively discussed in ancient Greek and medieval philosophies. 
But Kant employed this term in rather a negative sense. He defines dialectic as the 
`logic of illusion (Schein)' . 
28 For him dialectic is the sophistry and the appearance of 
truth which conceals its emptiness by imitating logic's methodical thoroughness. 29 This 
logic of illusion, i. e. dialectic, is not `empirical (e. g. optical) illusion' but 
`transcendental illusion'. 30 Pure reason becomes dialectical, i. e. becomes deceptive 
illusion, only through heedlessness, misapprehension, or misemployment of reason. 31 
Kant states that transcendental and transcendent are not interchangeable terms. 
The term `transcendent' is used by him mainly in the meaning of passing beyond the 
empirical (or sensible) limits (i. e. the antonym of the `immanent' which means ̀ within 
the limits of possible experience'), thus passing beyond the limits of the pure 
27 Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, pp. 64,68,73. 
28 Critique. A61=B86, A293=B349. 
29 Critique, A61=B85. 
io Critique, A295-96=B351-53. 
31 Critique, A669=B 697, A680=B708. 
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understanding. 32 The term `transcendental' is used by him mainly in relation to 
knowledge, i. e. the way we know the objects, rather than to the objects themselves. 
" 
Hegel describes the difference between `transcendent' and `transcendental' in 
Kant's terminology. The transcendent is `whatever goes beyond the determinacy of the 
understanding', which occurs, for example, in mathematics. The transcendental is `the 
unity of self-consciousness that is self-identical and inwardly infinite, as distinct from 
the ordinary consciousness, that is determined by finite material', and is only 
subjective, and `does not also pertain to objects (Gegenstand) themselves as they are 
in-themselves'. 34 
However, the term `transcendental' is employed by Kant in two senses as 
follows. (1) The term `transcendental knowledge' is used in the sense of being not 
empirical but rather a priori. He explains that the term `transcendental' signifies `such 
knowledge as concerns the a priori knowledge, or its a priori employment'. 35 
Transcendental knowledge is distinct from the metaphysical or logical knowledge; 36 it 
designates the possibility of `a priori synthetic knowledge'. 37 (2) The term 
`transcendental' is also used, in a sharp contrast to `transcendent', even in the meaning 
of `misemployment' of categories and judgement, or rather, simply an `error' of 
judgement. 38 
In this context Kant's `transcendental dialectic' exposes the illusion of 
transcendent judgements and this is the maximum which it can achieve; and `logical 
dialectic', on the other hand, exposes the error of deceptive inferences. However, he 
states that there exists, beyond these limitations, a natural and unavoidable dialectic of 
pure reason (that is inseparable from human reason) which, `even after its 
deceptiveness has been exposed, will not cease to play tricks with reason and 
continually entrap it [reason] into momentary aberrations ever and again calling for 
correction' . 
39 
i` Critique, A295-96=B352. 
33 Caygill. A Kant Dictionary, pp. 399-400. 
34 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic (hereafter abbreviated as Enc. Logic). § 42 Addition 2, p. 85. 
35 Critique, A56=B80-81. 
36 Critique, A23=B38. 
37 Critique, A25=B40. 
38 Critique. A295-96=B352-53. 
39 Critique, A297-98=B354-55. 
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Contrary to Kant's own intention, this is the very point of dialectic of nature and 
of human cognition, in which negativity of error plays a crucial and essential role to 
attain the right, more appropriate judgement. This may appear to be a paradox, but it is 
not a paradox - in that only through negating the previous errors can one reach the 
truth, i. e. more appropriate cognition of the whole of the matter. There is no absolute 
discrepancy between error (partial truth) and truth (fuller truth). This is the very point 
Kant cannot acknowledge. That is, the recognition of negativity is crucial to reach the 
truth. Truth can be attained only by negating the error. Truth cannot be separated from 
error. The opposing concepts are the two aspects of the same matter in process. Truth is 
truth only insofar as it is related to error, its negative. Truth consists only in the total 
process from the lower truth (error) to the higher truth (truth). 40 
Kant does not reach the appropriate concept of dialectic in which dialectical 
opposition should be grasped as embracing within itself the analytical contradictory as 
its lower moment. 41 
Kant did not change his mind on the defect of dialectic even in his later years. 
For example, he talked of the natural dialectic which constitutes an unavoidable 
illusion that critical philosophy has to expose and resolve `lest it should deceive us'. 42 
He continued to think of dialectic as only defective. The positive aspect of dialectic, as 
stated above, is the very point which he could never acknowledge. 
Section 5 
The Problem of Kant's Dialectic: Hegel's Critique of Kant 
(a) Antinomies and Opposites 
The feature of Kant's dialectic clearly appears in the treatment of antinomies. Hegel 
says that antinomy is not that which can be confined to only four particular objects 
taken from cosmology as Kant describes, but is that which can be found in all objects, 
40 Cf. Hegel, Hist. Phi.. I. p. 19; Sci. Logic. p. 580; Royce, Lectures on Modern Idealism. pp. 79.86,215, 
217-18. 
+1 Critique, A504=B352. 
42 The Critique of Judgement. Part II: The Critique of Teleological Judgement, § 69, p. 36. 
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representations, concepts and ideas. To recognise this antinomic feature of objects is 
`the dialectical moment of logical thinking'. 43 As Hegel says, this point is what is 
missing in Kant's grasp of dialectic in the treatment of antinomies. 
However, Kant's treatment of antinomies cannot be simply discarded as 
insufficient. Hegel says that taking up the antinomies is an important advance for 
philosophical cognition, by which Kant sets aside the dogmatism of the metaphysics of 
the understanding and steps forward to the dialectical movement of thinking. But Kant 
stops at the merely negative result of the consideration of antinomic character of 
objects. On the contrary, that which is the true and positive significance of antinomies 
is that `everything actual contains opposed determinations within it', and consequently 
the comprehension of an object leads to the recognition of the object's being the 
concrete unity of opposed determinations. ̀ 
Hegel also says that Kant's assertion - that reason continues to be deceived on 
the ground of the natural illusion of antinomies, which grasps this antinomic character 
of perception as merely subjective - does not offer the resolution of antinomies. The 
only solution to antinomies is to recognise that `two opposed determinations which 
belong necessarily to one and the same concept (Begriff) cannot be valid each on its 
own in its one-sidedness; on the contrary, they are truly only as sublated, only in the 
unity of their concept'. Kantian antinomies contain merely `the quite simple categorical 
assertion of each of the two opposed moments of a determination, each being taken on 
45 its own in isolation from the other'. 
Therefore the true recognition should be described as follows: `Since each of 
the two opposed sides contains its other within itself and neither can be thought without 
the other, it follows that neither of these determinations, taken alone, has truth; this 
belongs only to their unity. This is the true dialectical consideration of them and also 
the true result. '46 
As clearly expressed above by Hegel, the main falsity of Kant's grasp of 
antinomies is that he takes the difference between opposites as fixed. In other words, 
for Kant the dichotomy between things-as-they-appear-to-us (appearances, phenomena) 
and things-in-themselves (noumena) is fixed. Therefore he must necessarily reach the 
°; Hegel, Enc. Logic, § 48 Remark, pp. 92-93. 
`d Eric. Logic, § 48 Addition, p. 93. 
's Hegel, Sci. Logic, pp. 191-92. trans. emended. 
46 Sci. Logic, p. 197. 
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unsatisfactory conclusion that things-in-themselves are unknowable to us. Contrary to 
his intention, the truth consists in that opposed determinations of all kinds are the two 
inseparable aspects of one and the same matter, object, conception, etc. However, that 
he grasped the antinomic character in objects, is a great step to reach the dialectical 
grasp of reality, although his grasp is rather negative in that he talks of dialectic as 
transcendental illusion which deceives reason. His insufficient grasp of dialectic is 
inseparably connected with his grasp of reason in separation from the understanding. 
To sum up: As stated by Hegel, what Kant cannot acknowledge is that 
everything actual contains opposed determinations within it, and that an object is the 
concrete unity of these opposed determinations. The only solution to antinomies is to 
recognise that the two opposed determinations associated with the concept should not 
be taken in the one-sidedness; they are to be sublated only in the unity of their concept. 
Truth belongs only to the unity of opposed determinations. 
(b) Kant's Contribution to Philosophy and Its Limit: Historical Assessment 
The unsatisfactory grasp of dialectic by Kant stems from the feature of the system of 
his philosophy. Hegel says that Kant's philosophy has a contradictory feature, which 
eventually denies the path to the absolute. For Kant `an absolute standpoint ... binds 
together the finite and leads up to the infinite'. Thought as reason grasps itself as the 
absolute ultimate in judgement. However, although this thought is grasped as the 
absolute in determining itself and as concrete, yet it is grasped by him as subjective. 
This self-contradictory standpoint that thought is absolute but subjective, in fact, denies 
the faculty to know the absolute since for him the understanding alone pertains to 
knowledge, and reason pertains only to ideas. 47 
Hegel explains the subjective defect of Kant's philosophy, in which the infinite 
idea as the truth of philosophy is lost. For Kant all reality is grasped within self- 
consciousness. Although Kant's philosophy apprehends that a simple though has 
difference within itself, yet it does not apprehend that this difference within itself is to 
be applied to all reality. Although his philosophy describes reason effectively, yet it 
does so in an unthinking empiric way' by which the truth attained in his philosophy is 
lost. In other words, although his philosophy `deals with the infinite idea, expressing its 
formal categories and arriving at its concrete claims, it yet again denies this to be the 
47 Hegel, Hist. Phil.. III, pp. 424-25. 
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truth, making it a simple subjective, because it has once for all accepted finite 
knowledge as the fixed and ultimate standpoint'. 48 Kant admits that the I is the unity, 
i. e. `the transcendental apperception, the pure apperception of self-consciousness'. Kant 
says that the `I think' must be able to accompany all our representations. Hegel 
criticises this statement as `a barbarous exposition of the matter' since `the fact that I 
am the one and, as thinking, the simplifier, is not by Kant satisfactorily set forth'. For 
Kant the unity simply means just the identity which has no distinction within itself. 
Kant forgets that the unity is also the relation. 49 
To explain this problem briefly: The unity (or identity) of something is the self- 
identity to itself, and the difference is the self-difference from itself. In this sense even 
the unity should be understood to be nothing but the self-relation. 
Hegel sums up: Kant sets forth, as a universal scheme, `the rhythm of 
knowledge, [the rhythm] of scientific movement', and exhibits, on all sides, `thesis, 
antithesis and synthesis, [i. e. ] modes of the mind by means of which it is mind, and thus 
consciously distinguishing itself'. 50 
However, Kant's `rhythm of knowledge' is still rather axiomatic, not 
completely organic - in that his grasp of logical thinking reveals that he still remains at 
the level of the axiomatic grasp of triplicity (thesis-antithesis-synthesis) although the 
use of these terms is itself not wrong. This triplicity should be recognised as the 
expression of the moments (aspects, phases) of the self-movement of the absolute. 
Hegel also describes Kant's philosophy as `authentic idealism' in `the principle 
of the deduction of the categories'. 51 What Hegel here describes as `the principle of the 
deduction of the categories' is what Kant names `the transcendental unity of 
apperception', which is for Kant `the highest principle in the whole sphere of human 
knowledge'. 52 ̀ The principle of speculation is the identity of subject and object, and 
this principle is most definitely articulated in the deduction of the forms of the intellect 
[the understanding (Verstand)]', the theory of which is baptised by reason (Vernunft). 
`However, Kant turns this identity itself, which is reason, into an object of 
philosophical reflection [i. e. subjectivity], and thus this identity vanishes from its home 
48 Hist. Phil., III, pp. 426-27, my italics. 
19 Hist. Phil., III. p. 437; cf. Critique, B59,97-104. 
S° Hist. Phil., III, pp. 476-77, my italics. 
s1 Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy (hereafter abbreviated 
as Difference). p. 79. 
52 Critique, B 135; cf. H. S. Harris. 'Introduction', in Hegel, Difference. p. 8. 
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ground'. This implies that, although reason used to handle the understanding, it is now 
handled by the understanding. Consequently the identity of subject and object, i. e. the 
principle of speculation, is limited to twelve acts of pure thought (categories). 
(However, Hegel points out that Kant has found only nine categories since inodality 
determines nothing objectively. ) Although Kant acknowledges that, outside the realm 
which is objectively determined by categories, there is an empirical realm of sensibility 
and perception (i. e. a posteriori realm), yet he finds, in this empirical realm, only the 
subjective maxim of the faculty of reflecting judgement. This shows that Kant's grasp 
of reason is not yet sufficient. 53 
Kant's great contribution to the development of philosophy is mainly his 
success in revealing what constitutes human knowledge and its relation to reality by 
presenting the categories as the knot which binds man and the world together. Kant 
teaches his successors, i. e. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, to seek the reality of the 
universe in the system of these conceptions, and in the unconditioned thought. 
However, as is widely known, Kant imposes a boundary for human knowledge which, 
he says, can apprehend appearances alone and cannot know things-in-themselves. This 
split has already been criticised by Fichte and Schelling before Hegel does. But it is 
Kant himself who implicitly and unwittingly offers a key for solving this split or 
antinomy by his very mode of statement, leading us beyond his own viewpoint. For 
Kant self-consciousness is `the representation of that which is the condition of all unity, 
and itself is unconditioned'. The thinking I `does not know itself through the 
categories, but knows the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity 
of apperception, and so through itself . 
54 These phrases by Kant unwittingly suggest the 
true nature of the universal I, which will be developed by his successors, particularly 
Fichte. 55 The analysis of the content of universal thought Hegel presents in Logic is 
nothing but Kant's list of categories, amended and unified, escaping the subjectivity 
remaining in Kant's philosophy. 56 
Therefore it is not that Hegel rejected Kant but that he succeeded Kant's great 
contribution to the more appropriate, higher level by unifying Kant's categories with 
his own dialectical method. 
53 Hegel, Diference, pp. 80-81, my italics. 
54 Critique, A401-02. italics in the original. 
SS As for Fichte's concept the 1', see Chap. 2 Sec. 2. 
56 Seth, The Development from Kant to Hegel. pp. 9,13,77. 
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Kant's categories are to develop to Hegel's categories in the more logically 
consistent manner. Kant's categories are fixed and static and thus cannot develop 
themselves to the satisfactory level on which reality can be grasped as a single unified 
whole. For Hegel reason is not a fixed, rigid something: it develops itself. Hegel's 
Logic shows that reason, in the whole sphere of its conceptions, is an organism. 57 
This point is the positive attainment of dialectic. Kant's important, yet still rigid 
system of categories is thus to be sublated to Hegel's more organic system of categories 
which culminates in the absolute idea. 
Kant's insufficient grasp of dialectic represents the over-all feature of his 
philosophy, i. e. the fixity of the oppositions - the separation of the opposites between 
phenomena and noumena, between the understanding and reason, etc. He is not yet 
completely free from dualism. But his greatness consists in the very feature which can 
also be taken as weakness. By exhibiting antinomies, categories, reason, etc., he clearly 
showed to later generations the possibility to solve this contradictory problem on what 
reason may be, and what dialectic truly is. 58 The more eagerly he endeavours to discard 
dialectic, the more important and illuminating dialectic becomes. It is Kant himself 
who, contrary to his own intention, opened the proper path toward the new, more 
advanced viewpoint, i. e. the recognition of what dialectic truly is, for later 
philosophers, i. e. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. 
This point can be stated as follows. Every epoch-making mind has two sides. 
Like Janus, Kant looks two ways; one face is turned to the past, the other to the future, 
closing the old age and opening the new. No one can read Kant intelligently without 
perceiving two tendencies that strive for the mastery. 59 
Kant's system of philosophy is thus to be succeeded, at first, to the hands of 
Fichte. 
57 Seth, pp. 80-81. 
58 Cf. Hegel, Sci. Logic, p. 831. 
59 Seth, p. 95. 
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Chapter 2 
Towards Dialectic (2): Fichte 
Preliminaries 
In this chapter I will discuss Fichte's philosophy as far as it is related to the formation 
of Hegel's dialectic, focusing on The Science of Knowledge (1794), together with 
Hegel's critique of Fichte which appears in The Difference Between Fichte's and 
ScIu'llint''s Syste/ii of Philosophy, Faith and Knowledge, and Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy. 
Section 1 
The Development from Kant: What Fichte Aims to Achieve 
Fichte says that the system of his philosophy is nothing other than the Kantian: his 
system contains the same view of things as Kant's, but it is in method quite 
independent of the Kantian presentation. I This corresponds to Hegel's explanation of 
Fichte's philosophy as the Kantian philosophy in its completion which is set forth in a 
more logical way. In He`el's Difference Kant's philosophy is described as retlccti\c 
and Fichte's as shcclilativ e while in Faith (111(1 h"ýtýýýý lýd c Fichte's philosophy is 
described as the logical culmination of Kant's philosophy, i. c. as the reflective ýOlution 
1} ichtc. The . ti. irfr('c cO/'kno wledgc, (hcrcafter abbreviated as 
Sei. k, lO%t led 'C). p. 4. 
lc,, cl, 1/isr. Phil., 111, p. 47O 
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of the problems left behind by Kant. 3 In the assessment of the relation between Kant 
and Fichte, as stated above, Hegel's emphasis differs from Difference (his first major 
work in 1801 when he was thirty-one) to Faith and Knowledge (a work in 1802. written 
a year after Difference) and Lectures on the History of Philosophy (a collection of 
materials from the lectures in his mature years from 1805 to 1831, which has a more 
similar stance to Faith and Knowledge than to Difference). This shows that Hegel's 
own view develops year by year. 
Fichte says that the task of philosophy is to furnish the ground of all experience. 
Experience, which is both internal and external, is the system of presentations 
accompanied by the feeling of necessity. 4 He is clearly aware of this task as he 
proclaims: `A philosophy whose results do not agree with experience is surely false, for 
it has not fulfilled its promise to deduce the entirety of experience and to explain it on 
the basis of the necessary action of the intellect. '5 
The relation between experience and intellect (the understanding, or self- 
consciousness) is that which both Kant and Fichte endeavour to explicate. However, 
Fichte demands us to examine his philosophy on its own basis alone, not on the 
presupposition of some other philosophy, even of Kant's philosophy. The system of 
Fichte's philosophy is `to agree only with itself, it can be explained, proved, or refuted 
in its own terms alone; one must accept or reject it as a whole'. 6 
What does Fichte have in common with Kant, and what is Fichte's advance 
from Kant's position? The aim of Fichte's enterprise in his philosophy is to present the 
nature of man which is also the nature of reality. Fichte attempts to establish a tenable 
idealism as a natural outgrowth of the Kantian critical philosophy. This tenable 
idealism is nothing but critical idealism, which shows not only that not-1 is opposed to 
the I on the level of conscious experience, but also that this not-1 has its source in the I 
on a deeper level. In other words, for critical idealism the world of objects is 
empirically real and transcendentally ideal. The correctness of critical philosophy 
consists in whether that which the absolute 1 grasps as the a priori is identical with the 
real experience as the a posteriori. That which guarantees the correctness of critical 
idealism is deduction. For Fichte deduction is the transcendental method of Kant. This 
3 H. S. Harris, `Introduction', in Hegel. Faith and Knowledge, p. 5. 
° Sci. Knowledge, p. 6. 
S Sri. Knowledge, p. 27. 
6 Sci. Knowledge. p. 5. 
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transcendental deduction must have our immediate but nonsensible acquaintance 
('intellectual intuition' in Fichte's words) with an absolute and infinite I. The activity 
designated by the deduction is a necessary prerequisite for having the sort of experience 
we in fact have. Fichte tries to prove both the thesis that the 1 is simple and 
unconditioned, and the thesis that the I is the most dispersed and highly conditioned of 
realities. This proving both is possible because an absolute I limits (or determines) 
itself at once. This necessary and immediate self-determination (or self-limitation) of 
the I gives rise both to the finite, conditioned I and to its counterpart, the objective 
world of the not-I. 7 
For Fichte `intellectual intuition' is the philosopher's intuiting of himself in 
performing the act whereby the I arises for him. He says: `It is the immediate 
consciousness that I act, and what I enact: it is that whereby I know something because 
I do it. We cannot prove from concepts that this power of intellectual intuition exists, 
nor evolve from them what it may be. Everyone must discover it immediately in 
himself, or he will never make its acquaintance. '8 This passage is a typical example of 
the above stated stance of Fichte which imposes on us either total acceptance, or total 
rejection, of his philosophical system. 
What is Fichte's term `intellectual intuition'? It designates the act 
(Tathandlung) of pure self-consciousness which constitutes itself as an I by letting the I 
be immediately present to itself. At the same time this act distinguishes itself as an 
object of consciousness from itself as the subject. Because the object of consciousness 
is here immediately present, this act of consciousness can be called an intuition in 
Kantian sense. But since the object of this act, i. e. the I itself, is not here given to 
consciousness, but is produced by this act, this intuition should be rather called 
`intellectual intuition' than sensory intuition. 10 
Hegel says that the foundation of Fichte's system is intellectual intuition, pure 
thinking of itself, pure consciousness, I=I, I am. The absolute is subject-object, and the 
1 is this identity of subject and object. 11 
7 Heath and Lachs, 'Preface'. in Fichte, Sci. Knowledge, pp. viii-xii. As for Fichte's 'I', see Sec. 2 below. 
8 Sci. Knowledge, p. 38. 
9 Cf. Sci. Knowledge, p. 5. 
10 Breazeale, 'Fichte and Schelling'. p. 152. 
11 Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Sývstem of Philosophy (hereafter abbreviated 
as Difference), p. 119. 
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Hegel's above explanation of `intellectual intuition' designates the identity of 
thought and being. Therefore Cogito ergo sum of Descartes is understood to mean in 
fact the following: that which is aware of itself as thinking or (thought), knows itself as 
being. In other words, in the thinking (thought), this thinking thinks of itself; and 
furthermore, in this thinking of itself as thinking, the thinking knows itself as being. 
Since thought (Denken) is for the subject, being is for the object. Hence the identity of 
thought and being is expressed also as the identity of subject and object. ' 2 
This will then lead to the necessary procedure of Fichte's argument toward the 
concept of `the 1' which is the absolute as the identity of subject and object as stated 
above by Hegel. But Kant and Fichte fail to achieve what they aim at; i. e. they do not 
succeed in explicating the necessity of the identity of thought and being. 
Fichte endeavours to found and furnish out the system which Kant `envisaged' 
but could not establish. Kant prepared the materials for Fichte's system `the science of 
knowledge' (Wissenschaftslehre), but Kant set them in a very arbitrary order. For 
example, Fichte says, Kant merely asserted that categories are conditions of self- 
consciousness, and that space and time are inseparable conditions of categories, but did 
not prove why and how they are so. 13 
What Fichte aims to explicate is, as aforementioned, the relation between self- 
consciousness (or intellect, the understanding) and the world (or nature, objects, 
experience), both of which are closely connected to each other. Fichte is not satisfied 
with Kant's inconsistent, problematic treatment of this issue. In order to solve this 
problem, Fichte necessarily proceeds to propound his important concept `the I'. 
Section 2 
The I 
Das Ich has been variously translated, mainly into `ego' or `self', which might have led 
many readers in English to some confusion. Therefore when I refer to das Ich, I will 
consistently use the term `the I' since it is literally what Fichte intends to designate. I 
12 H. S. Harris and Cerf, Note 1, in Hegel, Difference, p. 119. As for the thought which thinks of itself. 
see Chap. 4 Sec. 3(b); as for the identity of thought and being, see Chap. 8. Sec. ?. 
13 Sci. Knowledge, p. 51. As for Fichte's dissatisfaction on Kant. see Chap. 1 Sec. 2. 
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will also modify the related terms, if necessary; e. g. non-ego or not-self to not-I (nicht- 
Ich), egoism to I-ness (Ichheit). 
Fichte's explanation of `the I' (das Ich) is as follows. The proposition A=A is 
absolutely certain without any other ground. By this proposition we are absolutely 
asserting something. A=A is not asserting that A is the case, but is asserting that if A 
exists, then A exists. Thus there is simply no question as to whether A actually exists or 
not. The question is not of the content of the proposition, but simply of its form. 
Therefore between if and then there is a necessary connection posited absolutely 
without any other ground. To this necessary connection Fichte gives `the preliminary 
designation V. Then the I asserts, by means of X, that A absolutely exists for the 
judging I simply in virtue of being posited in the I. Hence the X is expressed by the 
axiom `I am I', 1=1. (Here Fichte introduces, rather forcefully, his axiom 1=1. This in 
fact means that the I ought to be the I. Here is a leap of logic as Hegel will criticise it. )14 
Then we reach the proposition `I am' as the expression of a fact, not of an act. 
However, A=A is not the same as 1=1 in that A=A has content only under a certain 
condition while 1=1 always has content unconditionally. `I am I' (1=1) means that the I 
exists because it has posited itself, or rather, that the I posits itself simply because it 
exists. In other words, the I posits itself by merely existing and exists by merely being 
posited. What does `the I' mean, then? The answer is: That whose being or essence 
consists simply in the fact that it posits itself as existing, is `the I' as the absolute 
subject. In other words, as the I posits itself, so it is; and as it is, so it posits itself. The I 
exists for the I in the sense that the I posits itself as necessary and is necessary for the 1. 
In other words, 1 exist only for myself, but for myself I am necessary. Therefore to 
posit oneself and to be are perfectly identical. Hence the proposition `I am, because I 
have posited myself' can also be expressed as `I am absolutely, because I am'. In other 
words, I am absolutely what I am since the self-positing I and the existing I are 
perfectly identical, one and the same. That is, Fichte reaches the over-all formula `I am 
absolutely'; i. e. I am absolutely because I am; and I am absolutely what I am. The I 
begins by an absolute positing of its own existence. '5 
Fichte criticises Descartes' philosophy, in which thinking is primary, as 
superfluous since `we do not necessarily think when we exist, but we necessarily exist 
"See Sec. 4(a)(i) below. 
15 Sci. Knowledge, pp. 94-99. 
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whenever we think. Thinking is by no means the essence, but merely a specific 
determination of existence'. ' 6 
Briefly, Fichte starts from the proposition A=A and reaches the proposition 'I 
am'. However, A=A is based on this `I am'. The whole process of Fichte's argument 
constitutes a large self-circulation of the I. 
Fichte's important term setzen (posit or positing), which he introduces into 
philosophy and often uses throughout his system, literally means `to put, place, set up, 
or establish'. It implies creative causal endeavour. When this word is used in the 
context of the assertion of propositions, it is associated with the intellect (the 
understanding), but also with the will. Positing is a nontemporal, causal activity that can 
be performed only by minds. Reason is the faculty for positing, through which 
everything positive is needed to be real. Positing is a primordial act, in which the 
theoretical and the practical coincide, regarding to the realm of will, as stated above, 
and in which an undivided I is totally engaged in a single creative, all-encompassing 
enterprise. This `I' is not personal. The absolute 1 is unitary and singular, and its 
operation is both necessary and free. The I acts by the necessity of its own nature 
independently of any external influence. '7 
Fichte explains what is `the I' in another context on the knowledge of the 
practical. Insofar as the 1 is absolute, it is infinite and unbounded. The I posits 
everything that exists and what it does not posit, does not exist. But everything the I 
posits is posited as the I; and the I posits it as everything it posits. Thus the I includes 
everything, i. e. an infinite, unbounded reality. '8 
Therefore for Fichte the I creates the world. There can be no answer to the 
question on why the I creates the world. The creation cannot be explained by causality 
since the creation is infinite - in that the creation (as the infinite) produces the finite 
world which has, as its essential feature, causality; hence causality, as the finite, cannot 
explain the creation, the infinite. If we dare to have an answer to this, it should be that 
the ultimate I is free and this free 1 creates, by its own necessity, the world, i. e. 
everything real and everything ideal. When the I creates the world, practical drive and 
theoretical drive (reflection) presuppose each other from opposite directions. The 
practical drive fills out the infinity, and the reflection (the theoretical drive) assimilates 
16 Sci. Knowledge. pp. 100-01. 
17 Heath and Lachs, pp. xiv-xvi. 
18 Sci. Knowledge, p. 225. 
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itself to the autonomous law of the world. By reflection the activity of creation reverts 
back toward the I. However, the practical drive and the theoretical drive cannot be 
satisfied and there is wavering or oscillation (Schweben) between them, and this makes 
the foundation of feeling of necessity. Thus the creation has its ultimate value in 
making it possible for the I to do its duty. 19 
Therefore although Fichte endeavours to avoid the problematic Kantian dualism 
which sets the difference between thing-in-itself (which is closely related to the infinite, 
i. e. the moral sphere) and appearance (which is closely related to the finite), yet Fichte 
himself also sets the division between the practical (which is in fact the moral sphere 
which refers to the words `ought' or `duty') and the theoretical. This indicates that, 
although Fichte's concept of `the I' is supposed by himself to be all-embracing, 
creating everything (practical and theoretical; real and ideal), yet the 1- which is the 
starting-point, and also the destination, of the whole process of his philosophical 
argument - does unwittingly conceive an also problematic Kantian terminology, which 
necessarily leads to dualism since the clear-cut distinction (between the practical and 
the theoretical, in this case) is the feature of dualism. Fichte is serious about getting 
away from Kantian dualism, but he falls into it again, in fact. 20 
Section 3 
Fichte's Dialectic: Three Logical Principles 
Fichte answers Kant's question `How are synthetic judgements a priori possible? '. 
They are possible since we have established a synthesis between the two opposites, i. e. 
the 1 and not-I, by postulating them each to be divisible, and since they are nonetheless 
also inseparably united with each other and can be distinguished only in reflection. 
Reflection dwells solely on the opposition between thesis and antithesis, thus reflection 
in this sense is necessarily synthetic, and so is judgement. There are no purely analytic 
judgements although Kant and Fichte do not neglect the importance of analysis, 
without which there is no synthesis. We need not find any further ground than the 
19 Heath and Lachs, pp. xvii-xviii. 
20 As for Hegel's critique of Fichtean dualism centred on the 'productive imagination' which sets the 
distinction between the practical and the theoretical. see Sec. 4(b) below. 
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synthesis of the I and not-I since all other syntheses must be rooted in this one 
synthesis. For Fichte this is the sole and ultimate proof. There is no antithesis without 
synthesis, and no synthesis without antithesis. Both antithesis and synthesis presuppose 
the thesis, i. e. the absolute positing, and this is the one, and this is a system. The form of 
the system is based on the highest synthesis. Judgement cannot but be synthetic since 
judgement is nothing but that which partakes of this highest synthesis. 2' 
Fichte's above answer to Kant is a further step of dialectic from its Kantian 
stage although it is to be furnished out by a younger generation, i. e. Schelling and 
Hegel. That is, the advance of Fichte over Kant consists in that, while in Kant's 
dialectic the axiomatic grasp (as thesis-antithesis-synthesis) is prevailing, in Fichte's 
system, on the other hand, it is clarified that the I is the primordial act, i. e. all- 
encompassing thesis, from which both antithesis and synthesis stem, and to which they 
also return. This `I' is the precursory expression of the absolute of Schelling, or 
absolute spirit of Hegel. 
The dialectical process in Fichte's system centred on `the 1'22 can also be 
expressed as `three logical principles'; i. e. identity (thesis), opposition (antithesis) and 
grounding (synthesis). The I posits the not-I as limited by the I, and the I posits itself as 
limited by the not-I. Thus from the combination of these two propositions, we get the 
synthetic proposition that not-1 actively determines the 1 which is in turn passive, and 
the I determines itself by an absolute activity. Not-I has reality (activity) for the I only 
insofar as the I is passively affected. 23 
The above means that Fichte grasps the dialectical process of three logical 
principles as the process of the absolute activity of the I. But his synthesis here remains 
at the level of the expression of I+not-I. The true synthesis, the absolute grounding for 
both I and not-I, is not yet attained. He merely asserts the absolute activity of the I. This 
point will be criticised by Hegel. ̀ '` 
Hegel elaborates the above Fichtean dialectical process of the I as follows. 
Fichte sets forth the analysis of the I which is to be reduced to three principles from 
which the whole of knowledge has to be evolved. They are: (1) the simple I which can 
be axiomatised as A=A, in which the 1 is identical to itself as predicate and subject 
21 Sci. Knowledge, pp. 112-14. 
22 See Sec. 2 above. 
'; Sci. Knowledge, pp. 120.122-24,130. 
24 See Sec. 4(b) below. 
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must be alike - in this there is no difference and thus no content (this 
is identity, i. e. 
thesis, as stated above by Fichte); (2) the negation of the simple I, thus not-1 is here set 
forth in opposition to the I- in this the difference between the form as the 
unconditioned and the content as the conditioned does appear in order that 
determination as the content and difference should emerge (this is antithesis, i. e. 
opposition); and (3) the dynamic relation between the I and not-I is set forth as the 
determination of both I and not-I through one another, i. e. the limitation through and by 
one another - in this the difference is for the first time significantly re-united (this is 
synthesis, i. e. grounding). 25 
This unification is a great step from Kantian dualism. Fichte's 1 aims at the 
totality of human knowledge through this unification. Kantian split between subject and 
object seems to be solved by Fichte. But it will be revealed by Hegel that Fichte does 
not succeed in overcoming the dualism. 26 
Fichte's principles (A=A, A#A, A=B) are to be more fully developed by Hegel. 
Fichte's A=A is merely a subjective abstraction from the self-positing of the I. Hegel 
treats this A=A as the absolute activity of reason, whose object is knowledge, i. e. self- 
knowing. For Hegel the first A expresses the truth for the subject, and the second A 
expresses the corresponding objects. A=A is the Parmenidean identity of thought and 
being. But we must also assert A#A because the thought (A in the mind) is different 
from what is thought (A in the world). To attain the validity of the identity of thought 
and being, the formula A=B is necessary; i. e. the object of my thought (A) is this real 
being (B). However, we must not forget that this does not deny nor neglect the 
difference between thought and being since there can be no more absolute and 
necessary difference than that between thought and being. 27 
Fichte advances Kant's dialectic, which was rather negative, to a positive point. 
The transcendental deduction28 proceeds dialectically. The first moment of dialectic is 
the analysis of a given concept until contradictory conclusions are attained by the 
analysis. These contradictions will destroy the unity of consciousness or of the 1, 
therefore the contradictions have to be reconciled or synthesised. A clear example of 
this dialectical procedure is that the I develops to the opposition between the I and not-I 
25 Hegel, Hist. Phil., III, pp. 487-90. 
26 See Sec. 4(b) below. 
`7 H. S. Harris, 'Introduction', in Hegel. Difference, pp. 28-29. 
28 See Sec. 1 above. 
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when a new concept of divisibility, which unites those incompatible concepts, is 
introduced. Fichte even proceeds further beyond the theoretical realm, even to the 
realm of will, in which we may finally reach and possess the complete and adequate 
system of universal reason. 29 
This seems to be the very point which inspires younger philosophers, Schelling 
and Hegel, to develop their more sufficiently dialectical philosophies, which envisage 
the dynamism of reason. However, Fichte's dialectic is not complete, nor sufficient at 
the very point where he introduces a division of the theoretical from the practical 
(centred on the will, in this case). 30 
Section 4 
The Limits of Fichte's Dialectic: Hegel's Critique of Fichte 
Here I will discuss Hegel's critique of Fichte's philosophy, mainly on the limits of 
Fichte's dialectic. However, Hegel often intends to express his own ideas rather than to 
accurately paraphrase previous philosophers' systems when he is engaged in critiques, 
which are sometimes unfair or biased, sometimes entailing the twists of logical 
explanation. His critique of Fichte's system is not an exception. Therefore there should 
be some reservations about his critique, which is, however, deep and thought- 
provoking. 
(a) The Truth of the I 
(i) The Self-Identity of the I as a Demand 
Hegel at first gives a brief account of Fichte's theory. The identity of subject and object 
is expressed by Fichte in the form I=I, i. e. on its subjective side. Thus Fichte's 
speculation abandons itself and its principle, and does not come back to it again since 
the absolute is apprehended by Fichte only in the form in which it appears to 
philosophical reflection (i. e. at the level of the understanding), not to speculation (i. e. at 
29 Heath and Lachs, p. xiii. 
30 See Sec. 4 below. 
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the level of reason). Thus finitude and opposition are not removed, and the subject- 
object becomes a subjective subject-object. Here transcendental intuition, i. e. the very 
principle of speculation, loses itself. The I fails to constitute itself as absolute self- 
intuition. Therefore 1=1 is transformed into the principle `The I ought to equal the I'. In 
Fichte's system reason is placed in absolute opposition. In other words, the reason 
which is degraded to the level of intellect (the understanding) becomes the principle as 
which the absolute must appear. 31 
The above shows that young Hegel already has in mind the relations of infinity- 
speculation-reason-the absolute, in contrast to finitude-reflection-the understanding 
(intellect). 32 
Hegel then explains Fichte's transcendental deduction of the objective world. 
The theorem 1=1 as the principle of speculation or of subjective philosophical reflection 
must prove itself objective as the principle of philosophy, and its proof consists in 
suspending its opposition to empirical consciousness. There must occur this suspension 
when pure consciousness produces out of itself the activities which are identical with 
empirical consciousness. The I on the subjective side as pure consciousness is supposed 
to produce out of itself, or to advance to, another I on the objective side as empirical 
consciousness. In other words, the theorem I=I is presupposed. However, in empirical 
consciousness there is an X (an opposite); and pure consciousness (positing of itself) 
can neither produce this X from itself nor conquer it; pure consciousness merely 
presupposes X. (This is Hegel's paraphrasing of Fichte's theory. Fichte himself 
describes this X as `I am I'. )33 Therefore although the theorem 1=1 is supposed to show 
itself to be the immanent real ground of the totality of objects in their externality to one 
another, yet the I which posits itself as the I determined by the not-I, is not a purely 
immanent sphere. Fichte fails to show the proof he has promised to show, i. e. the 
necessity of the advancement from the subjective, self-positing I (as pure 
consciousness) to the objective I (as empirical consciousness). Pure consciousness and 
empirical consciousness remain absolutely opposed to each other. Fichte merely 
proclaims the theorem I=I (The 1 equals the I, i. e. the identity of both 1's). This identity 
he proclaims is incomplete and superficial. Another identity, which grasps both pure 
31 Hegel, Difference. pp. 81-82. 
32 As for the problems of Fichte's reason, speculation and the absolute, see Sec. 4(c) and (d) below. 
33 See Sec. 2 above. 
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and empirical consciousness within itself and yet suspends them both as what they are, 
should necessarily come about. 34 
Here Hegel is implicitly moving toward his own concept of the absolute as the 
complete and all-embracing identity which Fichte cannot reach. 
Hegel then elaborates that, because Fichte's I on the subjective side cannot 
produce the objective I, the identity 1=1 has necessarily to be a demand. The I cannot 
succeed in positing itself as 1=1, nor succeed in intuiting itself as subject-object through 
its non-conscious production. Here the synthesis of opposites as subject-object is made 
impossible. Therefore the I should produce itself practically as identity as subject- 
object; i. e. the I as subject should metamorphose itself into the object. In other words, 
`The I equals the I' turns into `The I ought to equal the I'. The identity of subject and 
object as I=I remains a demand. Fichte's ought expresses the non-existence of the 
absolute identity. 35 
Hence Fichte's theorem 1=1 is not proved by himself to be necessary. 36 
(ii) The I, Anstoß and Categories 
Fichte tries to explicate the origin of Kant's categories by the principles of the I. The 
self-positing I is `the primordial, absolutely unconditioned first principle of all human 
knowledge', and the initial description of it is that the act (Tathandlung) `does not and 
cannot appear among the empirical states of our consciousness, but rather lies at the 
basis of all consciousness and alone makes it possible'. 37 Fichte endeavours to prove 
how Kantian categories can be deduced from the above Fichtean principle, avoiding the 
use of Kantian concept of thing-in-itself. Only in this way would the theory of 
knowledge be established on a truly scientific basis. However, Fichte wrongly treated 
Spinoza's and his own highest unity not as something that exists, but as something that 
we ought to, and yet cannot achieve. 38 
Hegel assesses the principle of self-determination of thinking, on the account of 
the development from Kant's categories to Fichte's I with the concept Anstoß as 
34 Difference, pp. 129-30. 
;5 Difference, pp. 132-33. 
36 As for Fichte's dualism, see Sec. 4(b) below. 
37 Sci. Knowledge, p. 93. 
38 Cf. Harris, 'Introduction', in Hegel, Difference, pp. 8-9. 
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follows. The principle of self-determination of thinking, i. e. the principle that thinking 
determines itself from within (aus sich selbst) was established by Kant. But Kant 
established it in a merely formal way; he did not demonstrate how (Wie) and to what 
extent (Inwiefern) thinking determines itself. Fichte aims to conquer this defect and 
explicate the deduction of the categories. Thus Fichte makes the 1 the starting point for 
his philosophy, and Kant's categories are supposed to result from the I's activity. But 
the 1 does not genuinely appear as free, spontaneous activity since the 1 is supposed to 
react to Anstoß (shock, check, impulse, impact), i. e. not-I, in fact. The nature of Anstoß 
is outside of cognition, and the 1 remains conditioned by an other, Anstoß. Therefore 
Fichte falls on the same problematic conclusion as Kant's - that there is cognition only 
of the finite, and the infinite transcends thinking. Hence thinking cannot reach the 
infinite. 39 
This leads to the result that in Fichte's system, as in Kant's system, Ding-an- 
sich (thing-in-itself, i. e. the infinite sphere) is thinkable only negatively, not 
positively. 40 
(b) Fichte's Dualism: The Failure of Synthesis 
Hegel points out Fichte's dualism. Fichte's absolute opposition is the very condition 
which alone makes `productive imagination' possible. Productive imagination is the I 
only as theoretical faculty which cannot raise itself above the opposition. The practical 
faculty alone suspends the opposition. But even in the practical faculty the I does not 
posit itself as the I; and the objective I is still expressed as I+not-I, and the practical 
faculty does not penetrate to 1=1. In other words, the incompleteness of the highest 
synthesis entails the absoluteness of opposition which still exists within this synthesis. ̀' 
Hegel then refers to why and how Fichte propounds the concept `productive 
imagination'. Not-I's negativity is only through the rs own positing itself as not-I. The 
I's positing of the opposite is itself a positing of, and by, the I itself. The immanence of 
the I can be asserted only in respect of its being conditioned by the opposite, X. In other 
words, the 1 posits itself as not posited. Thus the I's positing of itself and of its opposite 
contradict each other. This contradictory opposition, which remains absolute, cannot be 
39 Hegel, Enc. Logic, § 60 Addition 2. p. 108. 
40 Geraets et al., Note 81, in Enc. Logic, § 60, Addition 2. p. 319; cf. Sci. Knowledge, pp. 245-47. 
41 Difference, p. 126. 
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dissolved by the theoretical faculty in Fichte's system. In order to solve this 
contradiction, he propounds the productive imagination, which is a hovering between 
absolute opposites and which is supposed to synthesise those absolute opposites at the 
boundary where they meet, yet in fact cannot unite their opposite ends that contradict 
each other. That Fichte has to propound the concept `productive imagination', clearly 
indicates that the theoretical faculty in his system fails to show that the I becomes 
objective itself. The theoretical faculty cannot show the necessity of the theorem 1=1 in 
that the objective I has to be expressed as I+not-I. In other words, pure consciousness 
(as subjective I) is not shown to be equal to empirical consciousness (as objective I). In 
Fichte's system, as stated above, the split between pure consciousness (the subjective I) 
and empirical consciousness (the objective I) remains absolute, fixed. 42 
Therefore dualism is not yet completely overcome by Fichte. Fichte's failure to 
show the necessity of 1=1, i. e. his dualism, is also the main reason for his demand that 
the I ought to be the 1.43 
Fichte's solution expressed as the unification in three logical principles is 
unsatisfactory. Hegel says that Fichte's solution as expressed in three logical principles 
- thesis (the simple I), antithesis (its negation, not-I) and synthesis (affirmation or 
unification of the I and not-I) - is unable to overcome Kantian dualism. ' The I is 
considered by Fichte to be not only infinite, i. e. identical with itself, but also 
determined, which implies that the I is finite, externally dependent. This contradiction 
is never solved by Fichte himself although he endeavours to reconcile the contradiction 
by destroying the barriers. However, he does so by finding the next barrier (limit) 
beyond the previous barrier which prevents the I from reaching infinitude. Fichte's I 
thus moves back and forth reciprocally between negation which stems from the 
barriers, and affirmation which aims at infinitude, but in fact never reaches it. Kantian 
as dualism is left undisturbed. 
Hegel explains Fichte's dualism in another context. `The reality that is not 
dualistic exists for Fichte only in faith'. Fichte's system lacks the true synthesis as the 
third that is truly the first and the only one (das Erste und Einzige), and it lacks the 
genuine, non-dualistic negativity, i. e. infinity, the nothing. In Fichte's dualistic system 
'` Difference, pp. 128-29. 
43 See Sec. 4(a)(i) above. 
'A As for Hegel's explanation of Fichte's three logical principles, see Sec. 3 above. 
45 Hegel, His:. Phil., III, p. 494. 
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pure reason is in sharp contrast to empirical reality. This is closely connected to the fact 
that sense-world (nature), for the I as the absolute thinking, is recognised by Fichte as 
something absolutely bad, something to be negated. " 
Therefore for Fichte nature remains an absolute object. Nature never attains an 
independent status at which it posits itself like a subject. Fichte does not analyse nature, 
but analyses only self-knowledge. For him nature is only the stage for moral activity, 
i. e. the place where the I ought to be equal to the I itself, but cannot be so since the I 
always needs the tension of this ought in order for itself to be existing. 47 
That is, for Fichte nature remains an absolute object. Nature is merely for the 
moral activity. Nature remains unexplained by him. Fichte's degrading, or neglect, of 
nature is untenable to younger philosophers, Schelling and Hegel. Therefore Schelling 
will at first endeavour to establish his more satisfactory, i. e. more non-dualistic, 
Philosophy of Nature. 48 
(c) Reason and Speculation 
The main merit of Fichte's system consists in that he upgrades reason and speculation, 
but he remains on the finite sphere. Hegel says that Fichte's system has two sides: (1) 
As a plausible side, it establishes the pure concept of reason and of speculation, and 
philosophy is thus made possible. (2) As an implausible side, it equates reason with 
pure consciousness, and apprehends reason in a finite shape as the principle. 49 
Hegel interprets that Kant was unaware that he was thinking at the level of 
reason, not at that of the understanding. Kant was very close to the speculative stance 
which partakes of the unconditioned necessity that is the starting point of truly 
speculative philosophy. Speculative philosophy is always with universal reason, and 
proponents of this philosophy in a new era are those who can recognise `the organic 
shape that reason has built for itself out of the material of a particular age'. 5° In this 
sense one becomes the mouthpiece of one's time even when, or rather, only because, 
the speculative philosopher speaks with the voice of universal reason. Philosophy is 
°b Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, pp. 170.174-75. 
47 Harris, `Introduction', in Difference, p. 44. 
48 See Chap. 3. 
"Difference, p. 82. 
50 Difference, p. 88. 
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needed and given birth when mankind loses the totality he had and feels that he has lost 
the life (Leben). Hegel says: `When life as reason steps away into the distance, the 
totality of limitations is at the same time nullified, and connected with the absolute in 
this nullification, and hence conceived and posited as mere appearance. ' 
51 This is the 
philosophical stance which Kant finally reaches. Experience, which is to be conceived 
in the form of categories of the understanding, is phenomenal. Thus experience 
presupposes its own noumenal foundation, i. e. thing-in-itself (Ding-all-sich), in order 
for itself to be its appearance. Fichte's merit over Kant consists in that Fichte has found 
the above mentioned `unconditioned necessity', to which Kant was merely close, in the 
principle of pure thinking. But Fichte is not faithful to the principle he himself has 
found out since he lets nature (or natural phenomena), which is given in experience (or 
5' empirical intuition), be separate from the pure thinking. 
Fichte's unfaithfulness to his own principle is closely related to the 
aforementioned Fichte's dualism and to his failure in the proper grasp of nature. 53 
However, Fichte brilliantly advances the proper grasp of reason, which is found 
by himself to be always self-positing and self-actualising. We have to re-examine the 
absolutely unconditioned principle, which is self-knowledge, i. e. Cogito of Descartes 
and `I think' (Ich denke) of Kant. Fichte's brilliance consists in that this principle is for 
him not a dogmatic conclusion from thinking being to substantial being by Descartes, 
nor a necessary form critically cleansed of all ontic commitment by Kant. The brilliance 
of Fichte consists in that his I is a primordial act (Tathandlung), the self-positing of 
reason. For him reason is always positing itself, which entails that self-actualisation of 
reason, as intellectual intuition, is the basis of experience . 
54 
However, Fichte ruins his speculative thought he himself has found. Fichte falls 
on dualism by analytically separating the acts of the I. The identity of, and the 
difference between, pure and empirical consciousness, is grasped by him merely as 
causal relationship, and the meaning of necessity is not deeply probed. Fichte's system, 
despite its genuinely speculative impulse, remains at the level of intellect (the 
understanding). 55 
5! Difference, p. 90. 
52 Cf. Harris, 'Introduction', in Difference, pp. 17,19-20. 
53 See Sec. 4(b) above. 
54 Harris, in Difference. p. 11. 
55 Harris, in Difference, p. 40. 
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The task of speculative thought is to let the abstractions go back into the living 
unity of the whole. Kant and Fichte cannot fulfil this task although they endeavour to 
do so, since their achievement remained at the level of the making of an abstraction 
which completed the pattern of previous abstractions. 56 
Hegel assesses Critical Philosophy not as a speculative philosophy, but as a 
systematic exposition of the highest reflective position that is achievable. If knowledge 
merely deals with the objective (what is) as that which is far from our consciousness or 
awareness of the objective, then the knowledge is degraded to a kind of faith. Kant's 
genius was thus needed in order to systematise the position of those who developed the 
critical theory of knowledge so that the real relation of their finite knowledge to faith 
could become visible. However, Critical Philosophy is at least the immediate precursor 
to Identity Philosophy - in that Critical Philosophy marked the moment of rebirth of 
speculation. The rational justification of this issue is based on the two grounds: (1) The 
speculative principle of Kant, Fichte and Jacobi, is not `a limited expression of the 
spirit of a brief epoch or of a small group' since the Enlightenment is neither a brief 
epoch nor a small group. Hence Kant's philosophy, which is a philosophical expression 
of the Enlightenment, is not for a particular era nor for a limited number of people. (2) 
The mighty spiritual form as the principle in the philosophies of Kant, Jacobi and 
Fichte, achieved the `perfect self-consciousness, perfect philosophical formation and 
definitive self-expression as cognition' . 
57 
(d) The Absolute 
An important point of Hegel's critique of Fichte is that Fichte cannot reach a proper 
grasp of the absolute. 
Hegel says that for Fichte the pure, free and empty activity alone is primordially 
certain. There is only pure knowing, pure intuiting and sensing, which is to be 
formalised as 1=1. But even Fichte's formalism, which can be axiomatised as `knowing 
only the knowing' and as `knowing only the bare identity', does open a way to grasp 
what the particular truly is. But he himself merely opens it and cannot extend and 
develop it because he acknowledges that the absolute of the system is not absolute, and 
that for this reason we must go on to something else in an infinite, objective world. 
`6 Harris, 'Introduction', in Hegel. Faith and Knowledge, pp. 16-17. 
57 Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, p. 57; cf. Harris. 'Introduction', in Faith and Knowledge, pp. 7,11-12. 
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Fichte cannot reach the totality. Hegel asks whether we can reach the totality by 
proceeding from one part to another in the form of pure knowing. It seems possible at a 
glance. But it is impossible in truth since in cognition the parts must be absolutely 
determined by the whole; and the whole must be the first of cognition. And Fichte's 
formal cognition cannot reach the totality since he is confined to the fixity of the finite. 
This completely destroys any true idea of totality. In other words, Fichte's starting 
point is absolute, yet finite; its finitude cannot lead to the cognition of a genuine 
whole. 58 
Fichte fails in the grasp of the absolute although he removes the shortcoming of 
Kant, i. e. the `unthinking inconsistency' of Kant's whole system which lacks the 
speculative unity. Fichte establishes the absolute form, i. e. the absolute being-for-itself, 
absolute negativity, which is not individuality but the concept of individuality, and thus 
the concept of actuality. Fichte's philosophy is in this sense the development of form in 
itself, i. e. `the absolute form' stated above. In Fichte's philosophy the I is the absolute 
principle, according to which reason is in itself a synthesis of the concept and actuality. 
The I is the self-distinction of opposites within itself. Fichte's philosophy at least 
succeeds in uniting what is subjective knowledge with what is actual, by establishing 
the I which is all-embracing. But he does so in an equally one-sided manner as in 
Kant's. That is, Fichte's 1, like in Kant's system, remains subjective and merely that 
which realises finitude. 59 
This entails that the concept of the I in the Fichtean form cannot develop to the 
absolute. This point will be solved by Schelling, at first. 60 
Fichte's I, with merely reciprocal motion, cannot reach the spirit, i. e. the 
objective that embraces within itself the subjective. Hegel says that Fichte's I is 
absolutely determined in opposition only, i. e. only as self-consciousness which does not 
go beyond the opposition, and which does not reach the spirit. The 1 in Fichte's system 
is in truth the absolute concept only insofar as it does not reach the unity of thought, nor 
the difference, and nor does it have rest in motion. In other words, the I does not 
comprehend the infinite repulsion, i. e. the not-I. In Fichte's system self-consciousness 
determines the not-I, but does not know how to make this beyond (not-I) its own. 
Hence the deficiency of Fichte's system can be detected in three points: (1) The I still 
58 Faith and Knowledge. pp. 156-57,160-62. 
S4 Hegel. Hist. Phil.. III, pp. 481-82. 
60 See Chap. 3. 
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retains the significance of the individual, actual self-consciousness, as opposed to that 
which is universal or absolute, or to the spirit in which it is itself merely a moment. (2) 
Fichte does not attain to the idea of reason as the perfected, real unity of subject and 
object, i. e. the unity of the I and not-1. (3) Therefore the whole process of Fichte's 
system, in which the I is fixed in its one-sidedness, making this process in the content 
of knowledge, merely progresses from certain determinations to other ones which do 
not turn back into unity, or successively proceeds through finitenesses which do not 
embrace within themselves the absolute. 61 
Therefore Hegel implies that the concept of the I must necessarily develop to 
the concept of the absolute, which, however, Fichte cannot reach nor acknowledge. 
Here lies the next task of Schelling and Hegel in philosophy, i. e. the task of deeper and 
higher investigation into reason, speculation, and the absolute (Schelling) or absolute 
spirit (Hegel). 
(e) Historical Assessment: Concluding Remarks 
The historical assessment of Kant and Fichte by Hegel is as follows. Philosophy, since 
Locke and Hume, had tried to compute and explain the world from the standpoint of 
subject. Kant wanted to supersede it, but for him the world was split into the ideal side 
and the real side. As a result the objective universal aspect of the real was searched for 
by him within what belongs to the ideal side, and there remains an impassable 
discrepancy between subject and object. For Fichte, on the other hand, the universal 
aspect of the world that is opposed to the subject, is posited as the I because it is posited 
as universal, as ideal, as thought. But Fichte's philosophy has a defect in that the 
particular is therefore necessarily left behind, and in that the reality of the objective 
world remains unexplained. Sensation was for Kant merely empirical, and for Fichte 
merely subjective. Their grasp of sensation was both unsatisfactory. 62 
Kant's philosophy sets forth the formal aspect of the task of modem German 
philosophy as taking as its objects the unity of thought and being in laying hold of the 
inmost significance of necessity, i. e. the concept. But Kant's philosophy has the 
abstract absoluteness of reason in self-consciousness as its sole result, and it also has a 
feature in which a mere critical and negative attitude (not a positive and constructive 
61 Hist. Phil., III. pp. 498-501. 
62 Faith and Knowledge, p. 154. 
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attitude) is seen; and, in other words, it sticks to the facts of consciousness and to mere 
conjecture while, at the same time, it in fact renounces thought and returns to 
sensibility. However, from Kant's philosophy there emerges Fichte's philosophy, 
which speculatively grasps the essence of self-consciousness as concrete I-ness 
(Ichheit), but which does not go beyond this subjective form pertaining to the absolute. 
Then, from Fichte's philosophy there appears Schelling's philosophy, which 
subsequently rejects Fichte's teaching and sets forth the idea of the absolute, i. e. the 
truth in-and-for-itself. G3 
However, Fichte's contribution to philosophy also consists in that he clarified 
that the thought-determination (Denkbestimmung) is exhibited in its necessity and is 
deduced from the `thinking' itself. Thinking must be capable of proving its own 
peculiar content, and able to gain insight into the necessity of this content. 64 
To conclude: Fichte effectively points out the defect of Kant's dualism by 
positing his own all-embracing concept `the I' as the absolute subject and its three 
logical principles which are, to some extent, dialectical. However, he himself is not yet 
free from dualism itself in that he leans on the subjectivity of the I by retaining the 
impassable split between subject and object, or between the theoretical and the 
practical, which entails that the objective as nature remains unexplained by him. But 
Fichte greatly contributes to philosophy by bringing the concept of reason, speculation 
and the absolute to the centre of philosophy in a more dialectical form than in Kant's 
system. All these points are to be succeeded to, and surpassed by, a younger, brilliant 
philosopher who will explicate and develop the concepts of reason, speculation, the 
organic, nature, and above all, the absolute. This philosopher is Schelling. 
63 Hist. Phil. , 
III, pp. 409-10. 
64 Hegel, Enc. Logic, § 42 Remark, p. 84. 
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Chapter 3 
The Search for the Absolute: Schelling 
Preliminaries 
In this chapter I will discuss Schelling's philosophy only as far as his philosophy 
directly influenced the formation of Hegel's dialectic, focusing on the two major works 
of his youth, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1797) and System of Transcendental 
Idealism (1800). 
To explicate his influence on Hegel, I will also refer to Hegel's related 
comments in Difference Essay (1801) and History of Philosophy. Although Hegel 1) s 
comments are ambivalent in both praising and criticising Schelling's philosophy, yet 
his great influence on Hegel should not be neglected - not only because, as is well- 
known, Schelling, Hölderlin and Hegel were close friends in their student days at the 
Lutheran Theological Institute (Stift) at Tübingen University and influenced one 
another, but also because Schelling, the youngest of the three, five years younger than 
Hegel, was the very person who introduced Hegel into the kingdom of philosophy and 
even recommended him to write Difference Essay, Faith and Knowledge and other 
works which document the developing phases of the young Hegel's thoughts. Critical 
Journal of Philosophy (1801-03), for which Schelling and Hegel were co-editors and 
main writers, was the main stage of their co-operation for a short period. 
Although the whole of Schelling's philosophy - which continuously changed its 
stance as his thoughts deepened along with his maturity, namely his later proclamation 
of Positive Philosophy - is truly ambitious, and he surely surpasses the status of a 
merely precursory figure to Hegel, yet in this chapter I will almost exclude the 
arguments related to mature Schelling since they are not directly related to the 
formation of Hegel's dialectic. 
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Schelling might have influenced later generations, namely young Marx and 
Heidegger. ' However, Schelling's influence on the philosophical ideas of those writers 
should not be overemphasised although it is surely fair for one to re-recognise 
Schelling's contribution to philosophy, namely the development of dialectic, which has 
been largely neglected in both German and English-speaking philosophical scholarship. 
Section 1 
Beyond Fichte 
Schelling at first started as a Fichtean philosopher. But his departure from Fichtean 
philosophy can be traced even in his very early writings. In the logical development of 
philosophy Schelling reaches his own principle of philosophy as freedom, and thus he 
departs from Fichte. Already in 1795 when Schelling was only twenty years old, in 
From the 1 as Principle of Philosophy, or On the Unconditioned in Human 
Knowledge, 2 he rather characterises the relation between being (as nature) and thought 
(as idea) as the fundamental principle of philosophy, than the Fichtean relation between 
the I and its activity. Schelling's philosophical analysis starts from his contention that 
the positing itself of an absolutely unconditioned I must be found in the freedom of the 
I. If the I is truly unconditioned (unbedingt), then it cannot be a thing (Ding). This is 
possible only if the ground of its being is freedom. This is equal to saying that the 
principle of philosophy is likewise freedom; i. e. the beginning and end of all 
philosophy is freedom. Hence he could surpass the grasp of Fichte's I (as the 
primordial act of self-consciousness) and reach the grasp of freedom and nonsensuous 
intuition as some sort of spiritual being. 3 
This stance of Schelling will lead to the concept of the absolute in his future 
work, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, since freedom is the unconditioned, and then 
the unconditioned is the absolute. 
1 Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy (hereafter abbreviated as Schelling), on Marx, pp. 
39.58,148; on Heidegger. pp. 39,64. 
2 Von Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie, oder Über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen. 
3 Esposito, Schelling's Idealism and Philosophy of Nature, pp. 37-38. 
42 
For Schelling the I without a world is impossible. Fichte's I had nothing to 
posit, and thus had no content. Schelling's view is no longer the simple positing I, but 
is what he will later name variously as the absolute, spirit, the world soul, or the world 
system. The I itself is constituted out of a primordial activity (eine urspriingliche 
Tätigkeit) that lies beyond the represented 1.4 
For Schelling nature is no longer dismissed as Fichte's not-1, i. e. an obstacle to 
the I's realisation in the practical sphere. Nature is itself a magazine of intelligible 
forms. For Schelling, to work out the intelligible system of nature, exhibiting its 
essential oneness with the intelligent nature of the I, is a truer idealism. 5 
Therefore Schelling proceeds to establish his own system of philosophy based 
on more subtle account of being, or rather, nature. He has to write Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature as a necessary step to develop his overall system of philosophy as 
idealism. 
Section 2 
Philosophy of Nature: The Organic View of Nature and Reason 
Here" I will mainly discuss how Schelling develops the organic, unified and dialectical 
view of nature in his system which centres around the concept `the absolute'. 
In Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature Schelling tries to find the law of nature 
within nature itself. He opposes and criticises the method which tries to apply 
philosophy to natural science. His purpose is not to apply philosophy to natural science, 
but to allow natural science itself to arise philosophically. He describes his Philosophy 
of Nature as nothing else than natural science. 7 Here Schelling shows his seemingly 
scientific approach (or at least his endeavour toward that stance) to the lawfulness of 
nature. It will implicitly lead to the concept of dialectic as the truth of reality. 8 
° Esposito, p. 56. 
5 Seth, The Development from Kant to Hegel, p. 53. 
6 In Sections from 2 to 4 below. 
7 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (hereafter abbreviated as Phil. Nature), p. 5. 
8 See Chapters 9-11. 
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Schelling expresses his organic, not mechanistic. view of nature and its relation 
to philosophy. For him philosophy is a natural history of our mind. The system of ideas 
is not in its being but in its becoming. In the realm of organic nature all mechanical 
linkage of cause and effect ceases. Every organic product exists for itself. The organic 
`produces itself, arises out of itself; every single plant is the product only of an 
individual of its own kind, and so every single organism endlessly produces and 
reproduces only its own species. Hence no organisation progresses forward, but is 
forever turning back always into itself'. (This is an Aristotelian and pre-Darwinian 
view in which the universe, or the world-system, is eternal and unchanging. This 
passage is also a precursory expression to Hegelian view of nature. ) Therefore an 
organisation is neither cause nor effect of anything outside it. It is not in the nexus of 
mechanism. The unity of every organisation, which is itself a whole, lies in itself. Cause 
and effect is something transitory, mere appearance. However, the organism is not 
mere appearance, but is itself `an object subsisting through itself, in itself whole and 
indivisible, and because in it the form is inseparable from the matter, the origin of an 
organism ... can no more 
be explained mechanically than the origin of matter itself'. 
The matter (the first thing) and the concept (the second) are connected by the mind (the 
third). The form and matter cannot be separated; both come into being only together 
and reciprocally, each through the other. 9 
If we consider nature to be a universal organism, we can rather reach the more 
appropriate explanations of more sophisticated interactions of events and subsume 
mechanistic laws under organic laws, than remain at the level of the explanation of 
simple, mechanical cause-effect between two single and isolated events. Mechanical 
explanations are based on the assumption that nature can only be understood as a 
succession of individual events. 10 
Schelling's organic view is not confined to nature; it is also extended even to 
ideas. For him the relationship of ideas, whose centre is the absolute, is analogous to 
procreation. 11 This is closely related to his organic view of reason. 
If we divide the intuitive knowledge of ourselves asunder between rational and 
animal, this would cause a problem which Fichte could not resolve - i. e. the problem of 
being unable to clarify the relationship between sensible and intellectual intuition - 
9 Phil. Nature, pp. 30-33. 
10 Esposito, p. 100. 
11 Phil. Nature. p. 151. 
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when we think of our inner world as a composite of both types of intuition. This 
problem is to be solved by Schelling. Our self-awareness is in the fullest sense organic 
and thus grows. A philosopher's view based on an intuition of a special kind is only the 
culminating phase of its perfect maturity. Therefore the role of reason is organic - both 
constitutive and regulative. Kant's Critique of Judgement, especially its second part, 
Critique of Teleological Judgement, was a first footstep toward genuinely speculative 
philosophy. Hegel and Schelling have some reservations about Fichte. That is, although 
Fichte started a new speculative philosophy upon critical foundations, yet his 
endeavour was to accomplish this speculative philosophy by systematising the most 
problematic aspect of Kant's theory; i. e. he tried to systematise the sundering of human 
nature into reason and senses, of human experience into phenomenal and noumenal 
ones, and of reason into pure reason and practical reason. Schelling's system of two 
philosophical sciences (philosophy of nature and transcendental idealism) is the effort 
in the right direction although his system is rather a program than a reality. The 
difference between Fichte and Schelling consists in that Fichte considers the re- 
construction of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason to be sufficient while Schelling thinks 
that he has to set out the whole of Critical Philosophy again. 12 
Schelling's (and Hegel's) organic view of reason is a definite advance from the 
dualistic view of reason firmly retained in the philosophical systems of Kant and 
Fichte, which is expressed by the clear distinction between the pairs of concepts 
mentioned above. ' 3 
For Schelling spirit (Geist) is the culmination of the organically viewed nature. 
Nature is visible spirit, and spirit is invisible nature. Nature is not the mechanically 
ordered, lifeless realm of not-I. Nature is a living, self-organising system of dynamic 
relations between forces. Nature is a self-developing, organic whole; it contains within 
itself its own purpose, producing higher natural forms, and culminating in spirit. 14 
12 H. S. Harris, `Introduction', in Hegel. Difference. pp. 9,13-15. 
1' As for Kant's both dualistic and organic view, see Chap. 2 Sections 3 and 5(a); as for Fichte's dualistic 
view, see Chap. 2 Sec. 4(b). 




Schelling describes what his concept `the absolute' is. The absolute is pure identity and 
this absoluteness is only to itself. This pure identity, independent of subjectivity and 
objectivity, is itself matter and form, subject and object since the absolute alone is the 
absolute-ideal, and vice-versa. It is not the knowing of a kind in which the subjective 
and the objective are united as opposites. In this sense the absolute is an eternal 
cognition, itself matter and form, i. e. producing, in which it converts itself (in its 
totality as idea as sheer identity) into the real, into the form, and conversely resolves 
itself (as form and as object) into the essence or subject. This conversion and resolution 
is eternal. 15 (This shows that Schelling's view on this point is also Aristotelian - in the 
sense of not having the concept of evolution. ) In brief, the absolute is itself the pure 
identity as the eternal activity, eternal cognition, absolute knowing in which, through 
idea, form is essence, and vice-versa. 
Schelling then describes what philosophy is, in relation to the absolute: 
`Philosophy is the science of the absolute, but as the absolute in its eternal activity 
necessarily grasps two sides in one, one real and the other ideal, so philosophy, seen in 
its formal aspect, necessarily has to divide itself in accordance with the two sides, 
although its essence consists just in seeing both sides as one in the absolute act of 
cognition. ' 6 
In this context of the absolute as eternal cognition, or rather, eternal absolute 
knowing, thought and being are united in the organic but idealistic grasp of nature in 
Schelling's philosophy of nature. The absolute is the identity of thought and being. The 
absolute is the idealistically grasped truth of reality and of thought. '7 
The `absolute-ideal', above mentioned, is in contrast to Fichte's `relative-ideal' 
(Schelling's expression). Schelling explains the absolute idealism as the development 
from Fichte's system. For Schelling his own absolute idealism is the whole of 
philosophy and comprehends within itself both realism and idealism. He argues that 
Fichte's Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre) sets the relative-ideal over the real 
15 Phil. Nature, pp. 46-47. 
16 Plhil. Nature, p. 50. 
17 See Chapters 9-11. 
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and also apprehends the relative idealism as the absolute philosophy. Schelling's own 
Philosophy of Nature as the absolute idealism is in sharp contrast to Fichte's defective 
system. 18 
The absolute is also the identity of thought and being, as stated above. 
Schelling's system of identity asserts the unity of thought and being, i. e. as the idea of 
the absolute or of reason. For Schelling the idea is also being, and the absolute is the 
first presupposition of knowing and is itself the knowledge. This clearly indicates that 
the unity of thought and being, or the idea of absolute identity, is simply presupposed. 19 
Hegel says that one must admit separation just as he admits identity. Philosophy 
posits separation only conditionally just as an identity is also only relative. The 
absolute is therefore the identity of identity and non-identity; being opposed and being 
one are both in the absolute as this identity. 2° 
The absolute is the identity of identity and non-identity (difference, separation), 
as stated above by Hegel. This identity can be explained as the original unity. This 
original unity has within itself three levels of potency. The first potency is the relative 
identity as the transition of unity to difference. The second potency is the relative 
difference as the opposite and complementary movement of difference into unity. The 
third, in fact primary, potency is the absolute identity as the identity of identity and 
difference. The reason why the third potency is primary consists in that the first and the 
second emerge from the third only after the eternal self-division of the absolute into 
subject and object, which brings about the introduction of difference into this unity. 
Hence the absolute is the unity of the twofold movement as (1) unity into difference (or 
universal into particular, or infinite into finite) and also as (2) difference into unity (or 
particular into universal, or finite into infinite). The absolute is the original unity in this 
sense. Therefore the three levels of potency of the absolute as the original unity appear 
as follows. The first potency appears as the movement of the infinite into the finite. The 
second is that in which the unity of the infinite gives rise to the spatially differentiated 
material bodies that make up the world. It is the unity of the reverse embodiment of the 
particular into the universal or essence. The expression of this universal is `light'. The 
third and primary potency (as stated above), as the original unity, is represented in the 
18 Phil. Nature, pp. 50-5 1. 
19 Breazeale, pp. 169-70. 
20 Hegel, Difference, p. 156. 
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natural world by the organism as the perfect mirror-image of the absolute in nature and 
for nature. 21 
What is Schelling's influence on Hegel in the context of the absolute identity? 
Schelling's `system of absolute identity' shows to Hegel a parallel between philosophy 
of nature (as the non-conscious production of objective reality by reason) and 
transcendental philosophy (as the absolute subject). That which is `intellectually 
intuited' is an infinite life (as substance and subject). But it is to be also noted that for 
Schelling, unlike for Hegel, intuition is still confined to finite categories: for Schelling 
the categories of finite experience are exhibited merely as a chain of successive 
`powers' of the absolute identity, and therefore Schelling himself in fact does not reach 
the full grasp of the infinite (for example, life as both substance and subject, as stated 
above). 22 
That which so-called German Idealism, including Schelling's philosophy, 
sought to find was the unconditioned, i. e. `the absolute' as it is usually named. For the 
absolute cannot be grasped as in its relation to something else; the absolute is that 
which conditions the objects. 23 
Section 4 
What Philosophy of Nature Aims At 
What is the basic tenet of Schelling's Philosophy of Nature? His fundamental idea is 
that the organised character of spirit (Geist) and the organised character of nature 
cannot be absolutely separate. Philosophy of nature articulates the system of nature on 
the basis of a fundamental principle of difference within identity. He is not a nave 
thinker who simply advocates identity. His conception of natural science may even be 
considered to be precursory to that held by the early Marx, Heidegger and the first- 
24 generation Frankfurt School: 
21 Phil. Nature, pp. 51.150,180-81; cf. Stern. 'Introduction'. in Phil. Nature, pp. xxi-xxii. 
22 Harris, p. 5. 
23 Bowie, 'Rethinking the History of the Subject', p. 112; Bowie, Schelling, p. 20. 
24 Bowie, Schelling, pp. 38-40. 
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Schelling's task in philosophy of nature is to bring metaphysics back to its 
earlier unity of mythological era, but now including the hard-won advances in human 
freedom and knowledge which includes the scientific knowledge. 25 
Schelling describes what his system of Philosophy of Nature aims at. The 
beginning of philosophy of nature is no longer the finite or human I as in Fichte's 
system, but the absolute and infinite subject. It is the absolute subject since it is also 
immediately certain, and it is the infinite subject since it can never stop being subject, 
can never be lost in the object, and can never become mere object as in Spinoza's 
system. In this sense Schelling's philosophy of nature is a definite step beyond Fichte's 
still finite I. But Schelling is also aware that philosophy of nature is only the first part 
or the foundation of the whole. For him nature is `only one side of the universe or of 
the absolute totality in which the absolute subject is first completely realised; nature is 
the relatively ideal world. The world of spirit was the other side. Philosophy had to 
descend into the depths of nature in order to raise itself from there to the heights of 
spirit'. 26 These expressions by Schelling clearly indicate that philosophy of nature 
necessarily has to proceed to transcendental philosophy, i. e. transcendental idealism. 
The above mentioned merit of Schelling over Fichte and Spinoza is explained 
by Hegel: `in the philosophy of nature Schelling sets the objective subject-object beside 




Transcendental Idealism: Toward What Philosophy Truly Is 
Schelling then proceeds to his next major work, System of Transcendental Idealism. 28 It 
was written as the logical, necessary development from Ideas for a Philosophy of 
Nature. 29 That which both Schelling and Hegel seriously endeavour to explicate 
'` Esposito, p. 33. 
26Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, pp. 114,120. 
27 Hegel. Difference, p. 82. 
'" I will discuss System of Transcendental Idealism in Sections 5 and 6 below. 
29 See Sec. 4 above. 
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throughout their whole lives is what is the dynamism of the absolute, or absolute 
identity. Therefore it is necessary for Schelling to proceed to his next step, i. e. to write 
System of Transcendental Idealism. 
Schelling at first explains the relation between transcendental philosophy and 
philosophy of nature. Transcendental Philosophy is that which endeavours to move 
from the subjective (as primary and absolute) to the objective while Philosophy of 
Nature (Naturphilosophie) is that which moves from the objective to the subjective. 
Both philosophies are possible in that philosophy has divided itself into two directions 
which are necessary for philosophy to grasp the absolute and the primary. 
Transcendental philosophy is thus the necessary basic science of philosophy, together 
with philosophy of nature as another basic science of philosophy. 30 
Hegel summarises the above view of Schelling on the division of philosophy, 
saying that the science of the subject, i. e. the subjective subject-object, has been called 
transcendental philosophy, and the science of the object, i. e. the objective subject- 
object, has been called philosophy of nature. 31 
Schelling then emphasises, like Fichte, that one must start from the immediately 
certain proposition `I exist'. Only with this certain proposition can the other proposition 
`there are things outside us' be certain. Only interpreted in this way can the certainty of 
both propositions be equal. Transcendental philosophy proceeds with inner sense as its 
sole organ. 32 
Schelling then explains what philosophy truly is. The resolution of `what 
philosophy may be' can only be the outcome of philosophy itself. Whether the 
accomplishment of the task of clarifying what philosophy is, is philosophy, can be 
known only in that `by achieving this task we simultaneously solve all the problems 
whose solution has hitherto been sought in philosophy'. Therefore the so-called 
`philosophy' as previously regarded was merely a science of knowledge which has, as 
its object, only knowledge and its own principle; it could not become a science of 
being. 33 He seems to suggest that even Kant's and Fichte's philosophical systems are 
not exceptions to this. 
10 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (hereafter abbreviated as Trans. Idealism), pp. 5-7. 
31 Hegel, Difference, pp. 161-62. 
32 Trans. Idealism, pp. 8,13. 
33 Traits. Idealism, pp. 18-19. 
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Section 6 
Toward Dialectical View of History: History of Human Mind 
Schelling describes the history of the development of the human mind although Hegel 
is usually considered to be the first person who did this. Schelling rightly interprets the 
myth as the important first step of human mind, which at first transcends the level of the 
instinct and will finally upgrade to freedom, although his explanation is only 
germinative when compared to Hegel's. 34 
Kant's influence on Schelling on this issue can be traced from Kant, Idea for a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784). This work of Kant is an 
important step to the organic grasp of history. Kant's organic view on the philosophical 
system (i. e. the system of ideas) as the whole could be already seen in Critique of Pure 
Reason (178 1). 35 
Schelling then describes the three stages of the history of mankind and the 
ruling power of each stage. (1) The first stage was ruled by destiny, (2) the second was 
ruled by nature (or natural law), and (3) the third stage, which is yet to come, will be 
ruled by providence. Destiny and nature in the previous stages of history will be known 
to have been providence imperfectly revealing itself. Only through this whole process 
of the history of mankind can the presence of God be known. `History as a whole is a 
progressive, gradually self-disclosing revelation of the absolute'. 36 
The originality of System of Transcendental Idealism consists in that philosophy 
becomes a history of self-consciousness. This history of self-consciousness retraces the 
path that leads to the point at which self-consciousness finally becomes able to write 
the history by seeing what stages it itself has experienced to reach that point. Hegel will 
adopt this model of Schelling in Phenomenology of Spirit. 37 
-'4 Trans. Idealism, p. 200. 
35 See Chap. 1 Sec. 3 above. 
36 Trans. Idealism, pp. 211-12 
;7 Bowie, Schell ing. p. 47. 
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Section 7 
Hegel's Critique of Schelling 
Hegel's critique of other philosophies than his own, although deep and thought- 
provoking, is sometimes unfair, with his typically biased paraphrasing. Therefore when 
we read his critique, we have to have some reservations. His critique of Schelling is not 
any exception. 38 
(a) Schelling's Contribution to Philosophy 
Hegel says that Schelling's great achievement mainly consists in perceiving the 
seemingly separate (or independent) moments in their truly necessary unity. 39 
One of the main characters of Schelling's philosophy is expressed in the 
possibility of a knowledge of God through the principle of the unity of thought and 
being. Schelling also finds the concrete unity - of thought and being, subjectivity and 
objectivity, the infinite and the finite - as the process and as the living movement in a 
proposition. In God alone they are inseparable. The finite, on the other hand, has 
separability within it. Only insofar as it is a truth, the finite is likewise the unity. But 
this unity is in a limited sphere, and for this very reason it is in the separability of both 
moments. 40 
Schelling finds this `concrete unity' in nature, which is the concrete unity of 
subjectivity and objectivity, and this is the great merit of Schelling. First, Schelling 
grasps the true as the concrete, as the unity of the subjective and the objective. 
Therefore the interest of Schelling's philosophy centres round the deep, speculative 
content with which Philosophy in its entire history has had to do. The thought (as free, 
independent, not abstract, but concrete) comprehends itself as an intellectually actual 
world. This is the truth of nature. Second, Schelling points out in nature the form of 
spirit. For him electricity, magnetism, etc., are thus only external modes of the idea. 4' 
38 As for the same problem on his critique of Fichte, see Chap. 2 Sec. 4. 
39 Hegel, Hist. Phil., III, p. 516. 
40 Hist. Phil., III, p. 512. 
d1 Hist. Phil., III, pp. 541-42. 
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Schelling's contribution to Philosophy therefore consists in that he alters the 
categories by which thought applies itself to nature, by introducing the forms of reason 
instead of the ordinary categories of the understanding. 42 
(b) Hegel's Criticisms of Schelling 
Schelling's contribution, however, stops here. Although his philosophy has a great 
merit, namely in that he grasps the idea as the form of spirit in nature, as stated above, 
yet he does not proceed further. Schelling's defect consists in that (1) the idea in 
general, (2) its distinction into the ideal and the natural world, and also (3) the totality 
of these determinations, are not necessitated by the concept. For Hegel the idea is the 
truth, and all that is true is the idea. The systematising of the idea into the world must 
be proved to be a necessary revelation. For Schelling, on the other hand, form is an 
external scheme, and his method is the artificial application of this scheme to external 
objects. 43 
Although Schelling succeeds in grasping the contradiction of the I and not-I as 
being dissolved as infinite becoming, yet his defect may be also explained as the 
abstraction in which he cannot solve this contradiction. For Schelling the I is unlimited 
as the I only insofar as it is limited in its relation to the not-I. This contradiction is to be 
dissolved by the I's becoming infinite to itself in its finitude, i. e. infinite becoming. On 
the other hand, for Schelling the I is also limited only insofar as it is unlimited in order 
for itself to be able to get beyond it. This contradiction between limitedness and 
unlimitedness remains if the I always limits the not-I. They presuppose each other, yet 
they cannot be dissolved by Schelling. In other words, this contradiction, as the process 
(development) of spirit necessitating both the affirmative (the 1) and the negative (not- 
1) in their unity, is not to be solved by Schelling. 44 
Hegel also accuses Schelling of borrowing the principle of his philosophy from 
other sciences. Schelling employs the method of geometry in that he lays down axioms 
and proves them by means of propositions, then proceeds to deduce other propositions 
from them. Hegel firmly asserts that philosophy must not take any forms from other 
'` Hist. Phil., III, pp. 535-36. 
" Hist. Phil.. III, p. 542. 
4' Hist. Phil., III. p. 522. 
53 
sciences, as here from mathematics. Hegel points out Kant's influence on Schelling - in 
the form of triplicity, as the first, second, and third potency. 45 
Although both the process from nature to the subject and the process from the I 
to the object, are firmly found by Schelling, and this is the very merit with which he 
surpasses Fichte, yet he still cannot find the logical necessity of this process, and with 
46 him this process remains merely the aesthetic act of imagination. 
The next, difficult task in philosophy is to grasp the truth of nature as the unity 
of subjectivity and objectivity in the forms of spirit which necessarily culminates the 
highest at the concept. In other words, the task is to systematically clarify how subject 
(reason, the I, intelligence, etc. ) has its own relation to object (nature, world, universe, 
etc. ), i. e. to clarify the self-relation of reason as the absolute. This task is to be handed 
over to, and taken up by, Hegel. 
41 Hist. Phil., III, p. 529. 
46 Hist. Phil., III, p. 518. 
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Part II 
Dialectic in Hegel's Logic 
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Chapter 4 
Preliminary Remarks on Hegel's Dialectic in Logic 
Preliminaries 
The dialectic of Hegel can be described variously. But I will discuss it by focusing on 
his Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik) since his conception of dialectic is 
described most precisely and systematically in his Logic, without the accurate grasp of 
which one cannot adequately grasp what he means by the term `dialectic'. 
As is well-known, Hegel wrote two versions of Logic. The larger one, as three 
books in two volumes, which appeared earlier (1812-16), 1 develops the most systematic 
exposition of his logical thought (in the deepest sense which I will elaborate later) in 
the whole of his philosophy. Another, shorter version has also the same title. It is Part 
One of Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences (1818-30). 2 This shorter version is 
also important to grasp what the logical is, together with its Additions (Zusätze). These 
additions are based on his spoken words in lectures (although some are from his own 
lecture manuscripts), but they are significantly useful to grasp his thought - in that they 
illuminate the deep meaning of his often difficult (in Larger Logic) or brief (in Shorter 
Logic) expressions, even if their authenticity is less certain than his own writings in 
both versions. I will discuss what dialectic is by focusing on the content of both 
versions of Logic. 
The word `dialectic' (Dialektik) can be traced back to an ancient Greek word 
dialegein, which means `speaking through' or `double-speak' - dia is `through' or 
1 Book One was revised in 1831. I will call this version Larger Logic or Science of Logic (Sci. Logic). 
2 There appeared three editions in his life time. I will call this version Shorter Logic or Encyclopaedia 
Logic (Enc. Logic). 
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`two' (dyad); legein is `to speak' and is related to logos (word, language, speech, etc. ). 
In other words, the `dia' (two) of dialectic would already be the prelude to the self- 
contradictory expression of the truth, i. e. to the thought thinking of itself in the other. ' 
`What dialectic is' cannot be prescribed nor defined beforehand. `What logic 
is', by the same token, cannot be stated in advance, either. They will be explicated only 
in the sequel, as Hegel says: `what logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this 
knowledge of what it is first emerge as the final outcome and consummation of the 
whole exposition'. 4 This seems to be an echo of Schelling's description of philosophy. 
Section 1 
Three Moments of the Logical 
At first, dialectic in the phase of logic can be stated in the following context. The 
logical can be expressed as three sides, as three moments of everything logically real. 
They are (1) the side of abstraction, or of the understanding, (2) the dialectical side, or 
negatively rational (vernünftig) side, and (3) the speculative side, or positively rational 
side. All these moments are to be put under the first moment, the understanding, which 
has the main character of separation, fixity and abstraction. These three moments are 
thus often considered as separate from one another; but this consideration does not have 
a truth in it. 6 
Briefly, the logical can be divided into two aspects, i. e. between the 
understanding and reason. The latter, reason, can be further divided into two phases, 
the dialectical moment and the speculative moment. 
These three moments, which are necessarily related to, or rather, inseparable 
from, one another, yet should be elaborated one by one. 
Desmond, `Thinking on the Double', pp. 226,231-32. I have already referred to this point in 
Introduction. But at the beginning of the discussion of Hegel's dialectic, this etymological origin should 
be clearly reminded. 
4 Sci. Logic, p. 43. 
S See Chap. 3 Sec. 5 above; cf. Schelling, Trans. Idealism, pp. 18-19. 
6 Enc. Logic. § 79 and Remark, p. 125. 
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(a) The Understanding 
The first moment, the understanding (Verstand) has the main feature of fixed 
determinacy and distinctness, i. e. abstraction and separation. 7 On the relationship 
between the understanding and reason, Hegel says: `The understanding determines, and 
holds the determinations fixed; reason is negative and dialectical, because it resolves 
the determinations of the understanding into nothing; it [reason] is [also] positive [i. e. 
positively rational, speculative] because it generates the universal and comprehends the 
particular therein. '8 The understanding certainly has the above limit. Yet this is also a 
great merit. Without the fixed determinacy of the understanding, other two moments 
(dialectical and speculative) cannot even emerge. Those two moments merely (in a 
sense) negate and sublate the former limitations of the first form of logical thinking. 
The understanding is the beginning from which the living, mature conception of reason 
stems and grows. This point is surely the positive feature of the understanding. 
However, the understanding must not go too far; it is not the last word. It is only finite, 
and when the understanding is pushed to an extreme, it overturns into its opposite. 
Hegel associates the character of the understanding, i. e. abstractions or abstract either- 
or, with the limitation of youth. 9 Reason is the more mature phase of logical thinking. 
(b) The Dialectical Moment 
The second, dialectical moment (the first phase of reason, i. e. the negatively rational 
moment) is the self-sublation of finite determinations which are grasped by the 
understanding, and is their passing into their opposites. This dialectical moment, if it is 
taken separately on its own by the understanding, constitutes scepticism. But scepticism 
is limited; it only contains the mere negation which results from the dialectic; i. e. it 
does not reach the sublation of the negation, i. e. speculation. 
1° In this context 
philosophy contains within itself the sceptical as its moment, i. e. as the dialectical 
Eric. Logic, § 80 and Addition, pp. 125-26. 
8 Sci. Logic, p. 28. 
9 Enc. Logic, § 80 Addition, p. 128. 
10 Enc. Logic, § 81 and Remark, p. 128. 
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moment in the sense of the negatively rational. Scepticism is at least valid in pointing 
out the nullity of everything finite. " 
A common misunderstanding should be pointed out. Dialectic is often 
considered to mean the negation of, or to neglect, the validity of the understanding. But, 
on the contrary, dialectic is `the genuine nature that properly belongs to the 
determinations of the understanding, to things, and to the finite in general' .'2 
Dialectic and reflection (reflective understanding) share one thing in common. 
Both are the transcending. But reflection is the transcending of the isolated 
determinacy and a relating of the determinacy, by which the determinacy is posited in 
relationship, but only in isolation. Reflection is rather an extenially grasped 
transcending whereas dialectic is the immanent transcending. This immanent 
transcending is the negation of the one-sidedness and restrictedness of the 
determinations of the understanding. This character of dialectic as the immanent 
transcending, as their negation, is what everything finite is, i. e. its own sublation. 
Dialectic, as the immanent transcending, negation, sublation, thus constitutes the 
moving soul of scientific progression. 13 In this context dialectic can be described as `the 
principle of all motion, of all life, and of all activation in the actual world'. '` 
Hegel suggests the importance of Kant in the development of the conception of 
dialectic although Kant himself discarded dialectic after all. 15 Kant's contribution 
mainly consists in pointing out the antinomies of reason (i. e. contradictions), which 
show how abstract determination of the understanding overturns immediately into its 
opposite. 16 
(c) The Speculative Moment 
The third, the highest phase of logical thinking is the speculative moment (the second 
phase of reason, i. e. the positively rational moment). The speculative apprehends the 
unity of the determinations even in their opposition; i. e. it apprehends the affirmative in 
their dissolution and transition. In this context speculation is to be considered as the 
11 Enc. Logic, § 81 Addition 2. pp. 130-31. 
12 Enc. Logic. § 81 Remark, p. 128. 
1' Enc. Logic, § 81 Remark, p. 128. 
Enc. Logic, § 81 Addition 1, pp. 128-29. 
See Chap. 1 Sec. 5. 
16 Einc. Logic. § 81 Addition 1. p. 130; § 48 Addition. p. 93. 
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result of dialectic. In other words, the positive (the positively rational) is the negation 
of the negative (the negatively rational, i. e. the dialectical); this is sublation. This result 
of dialectic is not empty, abstract nothing; it is rather the negation of certain 
determinations; and it also has a determinate content. Hence this rational result of 
dialectic, as speculation, is concrete since it is not a formal unity but a unity of distinct 
determinations. '7 
Hegel also points out that logic is in truth the descriptive collection of 
determinations of thought which, although being in their finitude, count for the 
infinite. '8 This seems to suggest that the truth of logic is the returning unto itself, i. e. 
becoming infinite. The understanding should be apprehended as the necessary path 
toward the dialectical and rational, i. e. reason as both dialectical and speculative (in 
Hegel's terminology) - since dialectic (as the immanent transcending of the 
understanding confined to finitude) is the negation of the one-sided abstraction of the 
understanding. 19 That is, the logical thinking, as stated above, contains both the 
understanding and reason (as dialectical and speculative). Any expression of logical 
thought has the feature of both reason and understanding. In other words, the truth of 
logical thought consists in the unity of the understanding and reason. Any expression of 
the logical is the self-explication of the absolute - in that the self-movement (as self- 
development and self-explication) means that it departs from itself and returns to itself; 
i. e. this movement is infinite. In this sense the truth of logic consists in being infinite. ̀ . 
Section 2 
The Features of Dialectic and Thought 
Then, there have to be the descriptions of some of the features of dialectic and thought 
which are expressed in Hegel's Logic. 
17 Enc. Logic, § 82 and Remark, p. 131. 
18 Enc. Logic. § 82 Remark, p. 132. 
19 Cf. Eric. Logic, § 81 Remark. 
201 will elaborate this issue in Chap. 8. 
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(a) What Thinking Is 
Granted that the nature of thinking (or thought) is dialectic, 2' then, what thinking is 
should be stated. Thinking (Denken) at first appears in the ordinary, subjective way, as 
one spiritual activity or faculty, with sensation, intuition, volition, etc. The determinacy 
or form of thought which the thought produces is the universal, the abstract in general. 
Therefore thinking, as an activity (Tätigkeit), is the active universal, or more precisely, 
the self-actuating universal. Thinking, when represented as a subject, is that which 
thinks, i. e. the 1.22 Hegel explains further. (1) Thinking or cognition (Erkennen). at the 
preliminary level, starts from senses (or sensibility). (2) Thinking, then, proceeds to 
representations (Vorstellung). At this stage it has the features of universality, self- 
relation, simplicity, and isolation (e. g. God is God; right is right). Here thinking is at 
the level of the understanding, which posits the relationship of the universal and the 
particular, of cause and effect, etc. (3) Then, thinking must appear as philosophy. 
Philosophy is that which transforms such representations into thoughts; or more 
precisely, philosophy transforms the mere thought into the concept (Begriff). 2' Hence 
genuine philosophy is the stage of reason. Both the representation (the phase of the 
understanding) and philosophy are the stages of the logical. '` The term `thinking' has a 
broader application than `the logical' since thinking includes the thinking with senses, 
as stated above. 
(b) Thought Is Objective 
Contrary to the commonsensical misconception of thought as only subjective, thought 
is objective - although this does not mean the denial of the subjective. 
25 Hegel even 
says that the logical should be `sought in a system of thought-determinations in which 
the antithesis between subjective and objective (in its usual meaning) disappears'. 
Hegel here uses the term `thought-determination' (Denkbestimmung) in the sense of 
thought. 26 
21 See Sec. 1 above. 
22 Enc. Logic, § 20, p. 49. 
23 Enc. Logic, § 20 Remark, pp. 49-50. 
24 See Sec. 1 above. 
2-` Enc. Logic. § 24 and Remark, p. 56. 
`6 Epic. Logic, § 24 Addition 1. p. 56. 
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There is an interesting description by Hegel of the difference between the 
objective and the subjective in three senses. (1) In the common terminology. the 
objective is what is externally present (outside us) whereas the subjective is only 
subjective (meant, dreamed, etc. ). (2) Kant differentiates between what is universal and 
necessary (the objective as thought-product (das Gedachte)) and what is sensed (the 
subjective, or the contingent, particular). Kant's terminology does not coincide with the 
ordinary, commonsensical distinction between the objective and the subjective, and he 
has been actually accused by many as confused. But Kant's merit consists in that he 
suggests that thinking is rather objective than subjective. Kant endeavours to step 
beyond subjective scepticism. But he is not so successful at this point. He is still 
doubtful on the issue of whether the concept is objective. Kant's defect on this issue 
stems from his position that `thoughts, although they are universal and necessary 
determinations, are still only our thoughts, and are cut off from what the thing is in- 
itself by an impassable gulf'. (3) Much higher conception of the objective and the 
subjective is as follows. The objective is `the in-itself as thought-product' (gedachtem 
Ansich) as `what is there' (was da ist) whereas the subjective is `what is only thought 
by us' (nur durch uns Gedachten). The objective is thus distinct from the `matter itself' 
(Sache selbst) or the `matter in-itself (an sich Unterschiedenen). 27 Hegel, of course, 
does not think that this expression is the final word to describe what the objective is. 28 
(c) Dialectic and the Truth: The Identity of Thought and Being 
Truth, in the ordinary sense, is the agreement between an object and our representation 
of it - whereas in Hegel's philosophical sense the truth is the self-identity of the 
content itself. In this sense God alone is the genuine agreement between the concept 
and reality. 29 This would suggest the identity of thought and being, which is the crucial 
point to grasp what dialectic is. 30 
27 Enc. Logic, § 41 Addition 2. pp. 82-83. cf. de Vries. 'Hegel's Logic and Philosophy of Mind'. p. 226. 
28 I will elaborate this issue in Chap. 7. 
29 Enc. Logic, § 24 Addition 2, pp. 59-60. 
10 1 will discuss this issue in Chap. 8 Sections 2 and 3. 
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(d) Reason, the Infinite and the Absolute 
Reason is the faculty of the unconditioned. (This is the continuation of Kant's theme in 
Hegel's system. ) Reason itself sees the conditioned in the awareness of things, i. e. in 
Kantian intuition. The unconditioned, the infinite, is the original identity of the 1 in 
things. This is reason. 31 The unconditioned can be grasped as the absolute. 
Reason is also infinite thinking while the understanding is finite thinking. As the 
infinite, `thinking is at home with itself, it relates itself to itself'. 32 Hence reason is to be 
grasped as the absolute thinking since it is the self-returning thought (thinking). Reason 
is thus closely associated with sublation (Aufhebung), which means the self-returning 
process, or the negation of the negative, or the resolution of the contradiction, which is 
a key concept in dialectic. 33 
(e) The Limits of the Understanding 
Hegel explains that the speculative thought consists in the dialectic; i. e. it consists in 
the grasp of opposites in their unity or of the positive in the negative. This is `the most 
important aspect of dialectic', but it is `the most difficult' for those whose thinking is 
`as yet unpractised and unfree', i. e. for those whose thinking remains at the level of the 
abstraction, the understanding, and does not reach the level of reason. 34 
In the dogmatism of the metaphysics of the understanding, if one is true, then 
the other is false; or an assertion can be either true or false. This is the dogmatism of 
either-or (Entweder-Oder). Contrary to this dogma, the truth, or what is genuine and 
speculative, as totality, goes beyond such one-sidedness and contains the 
determinations (held by dogmatism as fixed in separation) as united within itself. The 
one-sidedness is, in truth, contained within the whole as sublated. -15 
11 Enc. Logic, § 45, p. 87. 
32 Enc. Logic, § 28 Addition, pp. 66-67. 
33 1 will elaborate the contradiction in Chap. 6. and will discuss the relations among dialectic, reason and 
the absolute in Chap. 8. 
34 Sci. Logic. p. 56. 
's Enc. Logic, § 32 and Addition, pp. 69-70. 
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Section 3 
Logic as the System of the Truth: Preliminary Remarks 
(a) Three Key Concepts of Hegel's Dialectic 
Dialectic in Hegel's Logic can be grasped with three key concepts: (1) the absolute. (2) 
sublation and contradiction, and (3) the identity of thought and being. 
Dialectic is the truth, the self-movement (as self-departing and self-returning, 
and also as self-developing and self-explicating) of the absolute. The absolute is the 
unconditioned and thus free (since it is only of its own necessity), and thus necessary. 
The absolute is also infinite since it returns to itself - through the sublation of 
contradictions immanent in every category in the whole system of logic. That is, the 
absolute starts to develop from pure being, then essence, and reaches the concept, the 
culmination of which is the idea that is its truth itself. This whole process of logic is the 
infinite process - as the unity of unities, as the double-movement of opposites, as self- 
returning, as the affirmation (as the negation of the negative). The driving force of this 
infinite process of the system of logic is sublation and contradiction. As the infinite 
process the end of logic returns again to the beginning, but not temporally - since there 
is no temporality in the system of logic, which is the sphere before the creation of 
nature that has time. (Hence when I render the German term zugleich, I will mostly 
avoid the use of `at the same time', but will prefer the use of `also'. ) Only in the above 
context, i. e. only by going through the whole process of the system of logic, can the 
identity of thought and being which is the truth as the self-thinking thought, be grasped 
as the infinite process of the absolute self-identity. Dialectic is hence the exposition of 
the absolute as the identity of thought and being as the truth. 
The above descriptions of dialectic and logic can only be explicated in the 
sequel, in the following chapters. 
(b) God as the Self-Thinking Thought 
The content of logic, says Hegel, is `the exposition (Darstellung) of God as he is in 
eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite spirit'. 
36 Here `God' can be 
36 Sci. Logic, p. 50, trans. emended. 
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grasped in Aristotle's sense as the thought which thinks of itself, i. e. the self-thinking 
thought. God, says Aristotle, is `a mover which moves without being moved, being 
eternal, substance, and actuality (energeia)' which is without matter. 37 God is the 
unmoved mover in this sense. Then, thought thinks that which is the most divine, 
precious, and eternal; and thought itself cannot but be the most excellent in this sense. 
Hence the object of thought is the same as the thought itself. That is, `thought thinks 
itself'. Then, God is in the best state, and it has life since `the actuality (energeia) of 
thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's essential actuality is life [which is 
the] most good and eternal'. 38 And thought is the most excellent and eternal without 
matter, as stated above. Therefore, in Hegel's view, Aristotle's God and thought. which 
thinks itself, are identical. God is the thought which thinks of itself. God, as the 
unmoved mover, is to be grasped as the self-thinking thought in this sense. 
Hegel, in describing Aristotle's Metaphysics, designates Aristotle's God as the 
concept (Begriff) which causes movement, and also designates the thought, which is 
identical to the object of thought, as the absolute idea regarded as in-itself the Father, 
God. God is the absolute being as the circle of reason which returns to itself. That is, 
the unmoved which causes movement, is the self-identical idea. In thinking, that which 
is moved and that which moves are identical. Thought is to think itself - since the 
thought is itself the most excellent; hence the thought is the thinking which is the 
thinking of thinking; and this `most excellent' is God. Hegel, here in describing 
Aristotle's philosophy, suggests the identity of this self-thinking thought and God in 
this context. 39 
However, it is Hegel himself who combines the unmoved mover, God, with the 
self-thinking thought (noesis noeseos). Aristotle does not explicitly identify these two 
concepts. 40 However, Hegel's identification of God and the self-thinking thought 
cannot be considered as arbitrary nor biased. For Hegel correctly translated 
Metaphysics from the Erasmus edition, which has the structure that implicitly suggests 
the identity of the unmoved mover, God, and the self-thinking thought - not from the 
37 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 107 1 b-72a. 
38 Metaphysics, 1072b. 
39 Hegel. Hist. Phil., II, pp. 146-49,15 1. 
40 Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle. pp. 115-28. Ferrarin refers to Norman's interpretation of Aristotle's God 
as 'strikingly similar to Hegel's', Ferrarin, p. 128: cf. Norman. 'Aristotle's philosopher-God', pp. 67-73. 
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Jaeger edition, which was published long after Hegel's death, and has been accepted as 
the more authentic version. 41 
Having described it thus, then, Hegel's dialectic is to be discussed precisely in 
the whole system of Logic, which starts from the sphere of being. 
°ý Ferrarin, pp. 120-25. 
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Chapter 5 
Dialectic in the Doctrine of Being 
Preliminaries 
In this chapter I will describe the development of categories and their moments in the 
realm of being, only through which can one clearly grasp the typically `Hegelian' 
terminology and conception that are nothing but dialectical. To explicate the basic tenet 
of his manner of description of dialectic which is necessarily also dialectical, I will 
follow the precise details of his argument rather meticulously. Therefore this chapter 
will be the most descriptive and the least argumentative in the whole of this thesis. 
(a) Pure Being as the Beginning of Logic 
Hegel's Logic starts from the doctrine of being, the beginning of which is pure being. 
For him phenomenology is the science of consciousness, i. e. the science of manifested 
spirit, and logic is pure science, i. e. the science of pure knowledge in the entire range of 
its development. The relation between these two sciences is that phenomenology is the 
presupposition of logic, and logic is the result of such phenomenological consideration. 
Pure knowing - which, as the absolute knowing, is the final point phenomenology 
reaches and is thus the starting point of logic - sublates all reference to an other and to 
mediation. As a result, what is present is only simple inmmediacy. But `simple 
immediacy' is itself an expression of reflection and thus contains a reference to its 
distinction from what is mediated. Therefore in its true expression the simple 
immediacy is pure being, i. e. being in general. The beginning (Anfang) of the science 
of logic cannot possess or contain any determination and content related to anything 
else beforehand. Therefore the beginning of the science must be pure being. i. e. the 
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simple immediacy. In the science of logic, however, what is more important than 
having its beginning in pure being as pure immediacy, is that the whole of this science 
must be a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also the first. In this 
circle of the science the advance is a retreat into ground (Grund), i. e. into what is 
primary and true. Ground is that into which the advance is made and from that which 
philosophy or logic starts. The beginning must be pure being, as stated above. This 
beginning necessarily has only the one-sidedness which lets the beginning itself be pure 
immediacy. This entails that the beginning also contains nothing as non-being which is 
also being; and being is also non-being. In other words, the beginning is the unity of 
identity (non-differentiatedness) and non-identity (differentiatedness). I 
The above pure knowing can be considered as a mode of being, i. e. a being in a 
position to know. That is, the identity of thought and being (in general terminology) is 
already expressed here. 2 
Hegel describes the confusion or miscomprehension held by those who grasp 
the pure knowing as only the I. This probably includes an indirect criticism of Fichte's 
1. Their misconception consists in that they try to find the I's development in ordinary 
consciousness. This becomes an unsolvable task when they try to find pure knowing in 
appearance. The truth, on the contrary, is that the mere simple being, i. e. the simple 
determination, must be the beginning. 3 
Being in general is described as `the absolute' as its first, preliminary 
description. That is, being (Sein) itself and the logical determinations in general can be 
also grasped as the `definitions of the absolute, as the metaphysical definitions of 
God'. 4 The absolute, in Hegel's terminology, should be understood as the unbounded 
and unconditioned by anything else; and, to be so, what is absolute must logically 
contain or comprehend all finite relations and necessities. 5 
1 Sci. Logic, pp. 68-74. 
2 Sci. Logic, pp. 69-70; cf. de Vries, 'Hegel's Logic and Philosophy of Mind', p. 237. 
Sci. Logic, pp. 76-77. 
Enc. Logic, § 85, p. 135. As for Hegel's conception of God as the self-thinking thought, see Chap. 4 
Sec. 3(b). 
5 Geraets et al., Note 3 to Enc. Logic § 85. p. 324. 
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(b) General Division of Being 
Being is to be grasped in the following considerations. First, being (Sein) is determined 
as against another in general. Being is thus distinct from essence (Wesen) since being is 
only one sphere of the concept (Begriff) and since being opposes another sphere, 
essence. 
Second, being is also determined as immanently self-determining. Being thus 
posits itself in three dimensions as (1) determinateness as such, i. e. quality, (2) sublated 
determinateness, i. e. magnitude, i. e. quantity, and (3) qualitatively determined quantity, 
i. e. measure. Contrary to the commonsensical conception in which quantity is prior to 
quality, Hegel clearly states that quality is logically prior to quantity since quantity is 
already negative; quantity as magnitude is already sublated quality. Hence quality, as 
the immediate determinateness, is primary, i. e. prior to quantity, and thus the 
description of being necessarily starts with that of quality. 7 
Third, setting aside the above stated character of the division between the first 
as against essence and the second as being posited as three determinations (quality, 
quantity and measure), being must be stated as quality since being is reduced to a single 
determinateness as abstract immediacy. 8 
The being which is indeterminate lacks all quality. But this indeterminateness of 
being in general constitutes the quality of this being. Hence (1) being in general (which 
includes being, nothing and becoming) passes over into (2) being-there (Dasein), which 
is finite being. Then this being-there passes over into (3) being-for- itself (Fürsichsein), 
which is the infinite relation of being into its own self. These are the three stages of the 
progress of being in the realm of quality, and they must be elaborated one by one. 
6 Sci. Logic, p. 79. 
7 Sci. Logic, pp. 79-80. 
8 Sci. Logic, pp. 79-80. 




(a) Being, Nothing and Becoming 
Being (Sein), as pure being, is the beginning since it is the pure thought and the 
undetermined, i. e. the simple immediate, and since the beginning cannot be mediated 
nor further determined. 10 But this pure being, which is without any further 
determination, is in fact equal to nothing because of this indeterminateness. But this 
nothing (Nichts), as pure nothing, is in fact also the same as pure being because of this 
complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content. However, pure being and 
pure nothing are not only the same but also not the same. Yet they are also inseparable 
in that each of them immediately vanishes in its opposite. ' 1 
This seems to suggest that pure being and pure nothing are distinguishable in 
thought, and they transit into each other, i. e. into their own opposites, vanishing. Only 
because of this distinction in thought, they are also inseparable. 
Therefore the truth of being and nothing is becoming (Werden). Becoming is the 
movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other, i. e. the movement in 
which both being and nothing are distinguished by a difference which has equally 
immediately resolved itself. 12 
It is to be pointed out here that the absolute can be defined firstly as being. But 
this definition, an Eleatic one, is the most abstract, the poorest definition of the 
absolute. 13 The absolute is secondly nothing because of its sameness as being and 
because of its pure indeterminacy. 14 (The description of `the absolute' will be further 
upgraded along with the absolute's self-development in the realm of being in this 
chapter, and also in essence and the concept in the following chapters. ) 
The proposition that being and nothing are one and the same, is true but is 
incomplete since in this expression their sameness or identity alone is emphasised, and 
10 Enc. Logic, § 86, p. 136. 
u Sci. Logic, pp. 82-83. 
12 Sci. Logic, p. 83. 
13 Eric. Logic, § 86 Remark, p. 137. 
14 Enc. Logic, § 87. p. 139. 
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their difference or distinguishedness is likely to be neglected. This self-contradiction, 
i. e. the identity-difference between being and nothing, cancels itself out. This is a 
moment which involves the vanishing of the above proposition itself. In this very 
vanishing does emerge becoming. Although the above proposition does in fact contain 
its result, i. e. becoming, yet that this point is not clearly expressed in this proposition, is 
surely a defect. ' 5 
The basic tenet of Hegel's dialectical terminology is clearly expressed in the 
above description of the self-contradiction as the identity-difference between being and 
nothing, and in the resulting emergence of becoming. The further explication of 
dialectic of the absolute (at first in being, then in essence and in the concept) will be 
found in more developed forms in the sequel throughout the whole of Logic. 
The term Werden (becoming) can be also expressed as Übergehen which 
translates into `transition' 16 or 'passing-over'. 17 The only difference between these two 
terms is that with Übergehen one is more clearly reminded of the movement between 
being and nothing. '8 
Hegel shows an example of his own definition of dialectic, in stating the 
contrast between sophistry and dialectic. Sophistry is an argument which uncritically 
and unthinkingly adopts a baseless presupposition. Dialectic, on the contrary, is the 
higher movement of reason in which seemingly utterly separate terms pass over into 
each other. In other words, dialectic is a movement in which the presupposition of such 
separation sublates itself. The dialectical immanent nature of being and nothing 
manifests their unity as becoming, which, through this passing-over, is the truth of 
being and nothing. 19 
The above is the clear description of dialectic by Hegel himself in that he refers 
to passing-over into opposites (here as being and nothing) and their sublation into a 
higher category (here as becoming), and in that dialectic is described as the movement 
of reason. However, this is not all the descriptions of dialectic as will be shown in the 
upgrading of these descriptions in the sequel. 
'5 Sci. Logic, p. 90. 
16 Often in Miller's Larger Logic. 
17 Often in Geraets et al. 's Shorter Logic, but sometimes also in Miller. 
18 Sci. Logic, p. 93. 
19 Sci. Logic, p. 105. 
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(b) Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be 
Being and nothing, in becoming as the unseparatedness of themselves, are only the 
vanishing, sublated moments. They are still distinct moments, but also the sublated 
moments of becoming. This means that becoming contains being and nothing as two 
unities, each of which is itself a unity of being and nothing. One of the unities is being 
as immediate and relation to nothing, and the other is nothing as immediate and relation 
to being. In each of these two unities the emphasis is on either being or nothing. 
Becoming is a double determination in this way. This double determination is 
expressed as a double movement. In it nothing passes over into being - this is coming- 
to-be (Entstehen); and being turns into nothing - this is ceasing-to-be (Vergehen). In 
this double movement being and nothing do not reciprocally or externally sublate each 
other. Instead each of them sublates itself in itself and is the opposite of itself. `0 
The above is the further description of dialectic of the absolute - in that 
becoming is expressed as a double movement of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be 
between being and nothing, and in that only in this double movement do being and 
nothing sublate themselves into becoming. 
(c) Sublation of Becoming into Being-there 
The result of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be is becoming. But this becoming also 
settles into a stable unity. In this unity being and nothing are only the vanishing 
moments of becoming, and yet becoming as such is possible only through the 
distinguishedness between being and nothing. This means that the vanishing of being 
and nothing is the vanishing of becoming or `the vanishing of the vanishing itself' .21 
The above stated can be also expressed as follows. Becoming is the vanishing of 
being and nothing generally, but becoming also rests on the distinction between being 
and nothing. Therefore becoming is to be grasped as inherently self-contradictory since 
the determinations, as coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, which becoming unites within 
itself, are opposed to each other. This unity destroys itself. The result, as such a unity, 
is the vanishedness of becoming. This is the unity of being and nothing which has 
settled into a stable oneness, which was expressed as the above `stable unity'. This 
20 Sci. Logic, pp. 105-06. 
21 Sci. Logic, p. 106. 
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`stable oneness' is not nothing but being. Becoming is now known to be this being as a 
stable oneness, i. e. being-there (Dasein). Being-there is the becoming which has now 
passed over into the stable oneness, i. e. into the one-sided immediate unity of being and 
nothing as in the form of being. Being-there is the sublation of becoming in this way. ,, 
(d) Sublation 
The concept `to sublate' (aufheben) or `sublation' (Aufhebung) must be explained here. 
`To sublate' has a twofold or speculative meaning: one is (1) `to preserve' 
(aufbewahren) or `to maintain' (erhalten); the other is (2) `to cause to cease' (aufhören 
lassen) or `to put an end to' (ein Ende machen). What-is-sublated or the sublated (das 
Aufgehobene) cannot be reduced to, and is thus different from, nothing. What-is- 
sublated is the result of mediation whereas nothing is immediate. Although the sublated 
has lost its immediacy, yet it is not annihilated. The sublated still preserves or maintains 
the determinateness from which it originates, through the non-temporal process of 
causing-to-cease or putting-an-end-to the becoming which is a double movement of 
coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, and the vanishing moments of which are being and 
nothing. The result of this sublation of becoming is being-there, as stated above. Being- 
there is the unity in which being and nothing are preserved as its own determined 
moments; they are preserved through the mediation or sublation. In being-there, 
however, being and nothing do no longer have the abstract significance which they 
used to have in becoming. 23 
It is to be also pointed out that sublation, as a result of the above stated `put an 
end to' (cancel, cease) and `preserve' (retain), does necessarily also mean (3) `raising 
up to a higher level', i. e. upgrading. That is, `What is aufgehoben [sublated] is held in 
suspension, thus cancelled yet preserved; the inadequacies are superseded, and the 
contradictions resolved, yet the differences prompting them are retained, although what 
is sustained is nevertheless (in the new context) transformed [i. e. raised up to a higher 
level]. ' ̀ 4 In this way the concept `the absolute' will develop itself as the succession of 
the sublation of previous categories one after another into higher and higher 
descriptions which will finally be explicated as the absolute idea in the realm of the 
?. 2 Sci. Logic, p. 106. 
23 Sci. Logic, pp. 106-08. 
24 E. E. Harris, An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel, p. 31. my italics. 
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concept. This process of the self-development as the self-sublation of the absolute %%'ill 
be shown throughout all the sections of the Logic, '' therefore also in all the pages of 
this thesis related to Logic. 
Section 2 
Being-there: Quality (1) 
(a) Being-there 
Dasein has been variously translated into `determinate being' 26 or `a being' 27 or 'there- 
being' 28 or `thereness', etc. To designate Dasein I will consistently use the term `being- 
there' which is its literal translation. 29 However, although it includes the word `there' 
(da), this does not connote anything related to place or spatial entity. 30 
Being-there (Dasein) is the result of the sublation or mediation of becoming, as 
stated above. Being-there is thus the simple oneness (Einsein) of being and nothing. It 
has the form of immediacy, but becoming lies behind it as mediation. Through the 
sublation of becoming which results in being-there, being has become more concrete; 
i. e. more determinations and the more distinct relation of its moments have emerged. 
Being is now quality (Qualität). Quality is the determinateness (Bestimmtheit) which is 
isolated by itself in the form of being. Quality is here wholly simple and immediate. 31 
(b) Negation and Reality 
Being-there as quality can appear as both negation and reality. Negation is posited in 
the determination of nothing; or, in other words, negation is the immediate quality of 
25 Cf. Harris, p. 32. 
26 In Miller's Larger Logic. 
27 In Burbidge's commentary. 
`8 By J. H. Stirling. 
29 I follow the usage employed by Geraets er al. in the Shorter Logic. 
30 Cf. Geraets et al., Note 10 to Glossary, Enc. Logic, p. 348; and its Introduction, pp. xx-xxi. 
31 Sci. Logic. pp. 109-11. 
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nothing. With nothing, the immediate or the determinateness is posited as distinguished 
and reflected. The negative is the determinate element of a determinateness. Although, 
taken as deficiency, negation is equivalent to nothing, yet it has determinateness as 
being-there, as a quality. 32 
Here one can detect Spinoza's influence on Hegel in that everything 
determinate is negation (omnis determinatio est negatio). However, this is the 
compressed and biased interpretation of Spinoza by Hegel, and may be even a 
misquotation. 33 
Reality (Realität) is the quality as in the distinct character of being. Reality, as 
burdened with a negative, is negation in general. This negation as deficiency is 
determined as limit or restriction (limitation). 34 Limit (Grenze), in its progress toward 
the ought (Sollen), becomes restriction or limitation (Schranke). 35 
Reality, however, in contrast to negation, has the emphasis in being positive. 
That is, although, to be positive or determinate, reality also has negation within it, yet 
this is hidden. Reality and negation are opposed to each other - in that the positive, as 
reality reflecting the negation, is opposed to negation. In the reality the negative merely 
seems-to-be (scheint); i. e. negativity is still hidden in the reality. 36 
(c) Something 
The sublation of the distinction between reality and negation results in the being-there 
(Dasein) which has become more concrete as what-is-there (Daseiendes). This is 
something (Etwas). Something is the negation of negation as simple self-relation in the 
form of being. It is the restoring of the simple relation to itself. The negation of 
negation is the concrete, absolute negativity whereas the negation in general (the first 
negation) is only abstract negativity. Yet it cannot be denied that something still 
remains to be quite abstract determination. 
37 
However, having said this, the being of something is already determinate: 
something is a determined and limited quality; something is an of nnative, stable 
12 Sci. Logic, p. 111. 
33 Enc. Logic, § 91 and Addition, p. 147; cf. Geraets et al.. Note 15 to Enc. Logic. p. 326. 
4 Sci. Logic, p. 111. 
'S Geraets et a!.. Note 28 to Glossary, Enc. Logic, p. 350. 
36 Sci. Logic, p. 111.114. 
37 Sci. Logic, pp. 115-16. 
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being. Something is now known to be the finite or fnitude. 38 Finitude, as affirmative, is 
the negation of the first negation. Finitude is therefore the identity with itself. This self- 
identity supposes the other of the finite. That is, finitude supposes, as its own other, the 
above first negation in order for itself to be determinate. This other of finitude is the 
infinite or infinity. 39 
(d) Infinity 
The category of infinity (Unendlichkeit) is crucial for the appropriate grasp of Hegel's 
dialectic. He emphasises the importance of distinguishing the genuine concept of 
infinity from the spurious infinity (the so-called `bad infinity'), i. e. distinguishing the 
infinite of reason from that of the understanding. 40 
The infinite can be grasped as its three stages. At first it is the affirmative as the 
negation of the finite in its simple determination, as simple non-finite. Secondly it is in 
alternating determination with the finite and is thus the abstract, one-sided infinite. 
Thirdly it is the self-sublation of this second infinite and of the finite, as a single 
process; only here is it the true or genuine infinite. 41 These three stages of infinity 
should be further elaborated as follows. 
(i) The Infinite in General 
The infinite in general is the negation of the negation, i. e. the affirmation as being 
which has restored itself out of the limitedness of the finite. The finite is raised up to the 
infinite by its own nature which relates itself to itself as restriction (limitation) 
(Schranke) and negates this limitation and goes beyond it. That is, the finite transcends 
itself: the finite has the nature to become the infinite. The infinite is the affirmative 
determination of the finite. The finite vanishes in the infinite, and `what is, is only the 
infinite'. 42 
8 Sci. Logic, p. 129. 
39 Sci. Logic, pp. 136-37. 
40 Sci. Logic, p. 137. 
41 SCi. Logic, p. 137. 
42 Sci. Logic, pp. 137-38. 
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(ii) Alternating Determination of the Finite and the Infinite 
At the second phase of infinity the infinite emerges as `the nothing of the finite'. Here 
the infinite is what the finite is in itself, i. e. what the finite ought to be, and the infinite 
is also the realised ought (ausgeführte Sollen). Finitude (Endlichkeit) is `the limitation 
posited as limitation'. The infinite here still remains the spurious infinite. i. e. the 
infinite of the understanding, since it is entangled in an unsolvable contradiction in 
which the finite and the infinite are opposed to each other, and here the infinite is only 
the limit of the finite and is thus only a determinate infinite, i. e. an infinite which is 
itself finite. Here the finite is finite only in its relation to the ought or to the infinite, and 
the infinite is only infinite in its relation to the finite. This is the alternating 
determination of the finite and the infinite. Here they are inseparable, yet they are also 
mutually related as sheer others. Each of them arises immediately and independently in 
the other; i. e. the infinite emerges in the finite, and vice versa, externally. Each of the 
finite and the infinite has the other of itself in its own self. Therefore each of them is 
the unity of itself and its own other; i. e. the infinite is the unity of the infinite and the 
finitude, and the finite is the unity of the finite and the infinite. Each is, in its 
determinateness, not what it itself truly is, nor what its other truly is. Here the infinite 
still remains to be the beyond of the finite (as against the finite), and thus remains to be 
finite. 43 
(iii) Affirmative Infinity as True Infinity 
In the infinity as stated to this point, the content of the concept (Begriff) was in fact 
posited, but it was posited as merely external, as the separation between the finite and 
the infinite. The infinite and the finite were not yet in their ultimate truth. At the third, 
ultimate phase of infinity, both the finite and the infinite are the movement (Bewegung) 
in which each of them returns to itself through its negation. That is, the infinite and the 
finite are only as the mediation (Vermittlung) within themselves, and the affirmative of 
each of themselves contains the negative of each and is thus the negation of the 
negation. °4 
43 Sci. Logic, pp. 139-42. 
" Sci. Logic, pp. 143.146-47. 
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In the true infinite, in my view, both the infinite and the finite together 
constitute a double circle (Kreis) in which each of them mutually penetrates into its 
own other; they become the moments of a singular double-movement. 45 This movement 
was in fact already shown in the unity of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be as 
becoming. 46 
True infinity is this movement as becoming. But becoming is now fiirtlier 
determined in its moments (the infinite and the finite). Becoming at first had its abstract 
determination as being and nothing as its moments, and then had what-is-there 
(Daseiend) as something (Etwas). All those determinations are now expressed as the 
finite and the infinite. They are now known to be the moments within the non-temporal 
process of becoming. The infinite has now returned to itself, and is thus as self-relating 
being. But this being is no longer indeterminate, abstract being since it is now posited 
as negating the negation. Hence the infinite is also being-there (Dasein) since it 
contains negation in general and thus also determinateness. Now the infinite `is and is 
there (ist da)' 47 . 
(e) Reality and Ideality, and Transition to Being-for-itself 
The infinite alone is the real - in that the true infinity as being-there posited as 
affirmative contra the abstract negation, is reality which has become concrete by 
negating the first abstract negation, the ideal. In this sense reality is to be further 
determined as essence, then as the concept. Ideality (das Ideelle) is the negation, and 
reality is the negation of this first negation and is thus affirmative. Only through the 
procession to infinity, i. e. through the negation of negation, do the ideal and the real 
proceed from its finite, spurious stage (as das Ideelle and as das Reelle) to the infinite, 
true ideal and real (as das Ideale and as das Reale). However, Hegel himself describes 
that the differentiation between das Ideelle and das Ideale is important in that, until this 
point in Logic, the true ideal (i. e. das Ideale) has not emerged whereas there is not an 
importance in the differentiation between das Reelle and das Reale since they are 
almost synonymous. 48 
45 I will elaborate this issue in Sections 2(f) and 6 below. 
46See Sec. 1(b) above. 
47 Sci. Logic, pp. 148-49. 
48Sci. Logic, p. 149. 
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Ideality as negation is the quality of infinity which is essentially the process of 
becoming. Sublation of finitude and infinity, as stated above, is a return to being as self- 
relation. This being is being-there which has now become more determinate. This 
being-there contains within itself the negation of negation as self-related negation. In 
this sense being-there is now known to be being for-itself 49 
(f) The Character of the Development of Categories 
The character of Hegel's descriptions of the development of categories has to be 
described here briefly. It has been clarified, up to this point, that being-there, as the 
sublation of becoming, is now at the stage of quality. Being-there as quality is grasped 
as both negation and reality. The result of the sublation of this distinction between 
reality and negation is something, which is the negation of negation. This is the 
concrete negativity in contrast to the abstract negativity characteristic of the negation in 
general. 
Then, the category of infinity played an important role. True infinity consists in 
that both the finite and the infinite are in a double movement in that they are as the 
mediation within themselves. Only in this double movement does the affirmation of 
each of the finite and the infinite contain the negative of each and is thus the negation 
of negation. 
As shown above, the absolute has now, from the simple pure being, arrived at 
the stage of being-there which is going to pass over, through the categories of reality 
and ideality, into being-for-itself. What has been shown, up to this point, is the non- 
temporal self-movement (as both self-development and self-explication) of the absolute 
through the upgrading categories. But this progress is not a mechanical development. 
For it cannot be pictorially grasped, but is the organic development - in that a category 
departs from itself (i. e. negates itself) and returns to itself again (i. e. negates the first 
negation), but as a more developed, further enriched, more concrete, or more grown-up, 
category. That is, the absolute only organically self-develops and self-explicates itself 
as new, upgraded categories; and the movement as this organic self-development is a 
singular double-movement which contains both distinction and its sublation. 
This is the character of Hegel's dialectical descriptions of categories insofar as 
they have been expressed up to this point in the realm of being. However, the organic 
49 Sci. Logic, p. 150. 
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character of this self-development at the stage of being-there, is only implicit or in itself 
(an sich). This basic tenet of organic development of categories will be further enriched 
in the more concrete forms in the sequel. 5° 
Section 3 
Being-for-itself: Quality (2) 
To designate Fürsichsein I will consistently use the term `being-for-itself'. 51 Being-for- 
itself (Fürsichsein) falls into three stages. First, it is a being-for-itself; it is the one (das 
Eins). Secondly the one passes into a plurality of ones; it is repulsion which, as 
sublated in their ideality, is also attraction. Thirdly it passes over into quantity. 52 
(a) Being-for-itself and Being-for-one 
Being-for-itself is infinity as well as being-there insofar as the negative nature of 
infinity, i. e. the negation of negation, is in the explicit form of the immediacy of being, 
as only negation in general and as simple qualitative determinateness. In being-there 
the determinateness was an other, and thus a being-for-other. Therefore this 
determinateness of being-there is bent back into the infinite unity of being-for-itself; 
and the moment of being-there is present in being-for-itself as a being-for-one. 53 
The moment of being-for-one (Sein für-Eines) expresses the manner in which 
the finite is present in its unity with the infinite, or in which the finite is an ideal being 
(Ideelles). There is only one being-for-other, and this is equivalent to saying that there 
is only a being-for-one. This means that there is only one ideality which supposes a 
determination as moment in itself and which is itself a moment in itself. Therefore 
being-for-one and being-for-itself are not genuinely opposed determinations. A being- 
for-itself relates itself to itself as the sublated otherness and is thus for one (für Eines): 
`o I will elaborate this issue in Sec. 6 below. 
51 I follow the usage employed by Geraets et a/. in the Shorter Logic, Miller more often uses 'being-for- 
self than `being-for-itself' in the Larger Logic. 
52 Sci. Logic, p. 157. 
53 Sci. Logic, pp. 158-59. 
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in its own otherness it is related only to itself. Ideal being (das Ideelle) is necessarily 
for one, not for an other; the one, for which the ideal being is, is only itself. To-be-for- 
itself (Fürsichsein) and to-be-for-one (Für-Eines-Sein) are not different meaning of 
ideality. Rather, they are the essential, inseparable moments of ideality. 54 
Being-for-itself is therefore the simple unity of itself and its moment, i. e. being- 
for-one. The being-for-itself (F'ürsichsein) is thus a-being-for-itself (Fürsichseiendes). 
In the immediacy as identity or unity the inner meaning of being-for-itself vanishes. 
Therefore being-for-itself is known to be wholly abstract limit of itself. This is the 
one. 55 
(b) The One (as the One, the Void and Many Ones), and Transition to Quantity 
The one (das Eins) shows its own development (Entwicklung) as moments one after 
another as follows. They are (1) negation in general, (2) two negatives, (3) two that are 
therefore the same, (4) sheer opposites, (5) self-relation, identity as such, and (6) 
relation which is negative and yet to its own self. The reason why these moments are to 
be separated is that the immediacy of being enters into being-for-itself as a-being-for- 
itself (als Fürsichseiendem). But these moments are also inseparable. For each moment 
the opposite assertions, i. e. separation and inseparability, are possible. 56 This is a 
contradiction as Hegel affirms. This, in my view, is a typical example where the 
etymological origin of dialectic, dialegein (double-speak), illuminates its significance. 57 
The one is the simple self-relation of being-for-itself, as stated above. The 
ideality of being-for-itself as a totality reverts back to reality, as the one in its most 
fixed, abstract form. In the one, being-for-itself is the posited unity of simple being and 
58 being-there. 
The one in general is on its own; i. e. the one simply is. That the being of the one 
is neither being-there, nor a determinateness as a relation to an other, nor a constitution 
(Beschaffenheit), shows that this circle (Kreis) of categories is now negated. Therefore 
the one cannot become an other; the one is unalterable. The one returns to itself since it 
sa Sci. Logic, pp. 159-60. 
ss Sci. Logic, p. 163. 
56 Sci. Logic, pp. 163-64. 
57 1 discussed this etymological issue in Introduction and Chap. 4 Preliminaries, cf. 
Desmond, `Thinking 
on the Double', pp. 226,231-32. I will elaborate the contradiction in 
Chap. 6 Sections I (b)(111) and 2. 
58 Sci. Logic, p. 164. 
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has nowhere to go except to itself - in that the one is self-determining as self-related 
negation and therefore has a turning away from itself to an other, but this movement is 
immediately turned back on itself since there is no other to which it can go. 39 
In this simple immediacy of the one, the mediation of there-being and of 
ideality vanishes; and accordingly all the difference and manifoldness vanish. That is, 
there is nothing here. But this nothing is a posited nothing which is to be distinguished 
from the one as the being-within-itself, as the one's determination. This nothing, 
posited as in the one, is the nothing as the void (das Leere). This void is therefore the 
quality of the one in its immediacy. 60 
The one is the negation in the determination of being, and the void is the 
negation in the determination of non-being. But the one is equal to the void as the 
abstract relation of the negation to itself. Each of the one and the void has the negative 
relation to itself for their common base. This is parallel to the relation of simple being 
to nothing as each of them has its negative relation to itself. Each of the one and the 
void is the relation of negation as an other to its own other - in that the one is the 
negation in the determination of being, and the void is the negation in the determination 
of non-being. 6' However, the one is essentially the self-relation as related negation; and 
the void, outside the one, is supposed to be the one itself. However, each of the one and 
the void is also posited as an affirmative being-there - one as a being-for-itself as such, 
and the other as an unspecified being-there in general. Here each is related to its own 
other as to another being-there. However, the being-for-itself of the one is essentially 
the ideality of being-there and of other. Here the one relates itself not to an other, but 
only to itself. However, since being-for-itself is fixed as a one - as affirmatively for 
itself, and as immediately present -, the one as being-for-itself has its negative relation 
to itself as also a relation to an affirmative being. And since the relation is considered 
to be just as much negative, that which the one relates itself is determined as a being- 
there and an other. Here the other, as self-relation, is not a determinate negation as the 
void, but is likewise another one. Consequently the one is a becoming of many ones 
(Werden zu vielen Eins). However, strictly speaking, this is not a genuine becoming 
since, as stated before, becoming is a transition between being and nothing. 
62 
59 Sci. Logic, p. 165. 
60 Sci. Logic, p. 165. 
61 Sci. Logic, p. 165. 
62 Sci. Logic, p. 167. 
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The relation of the negative (i. e. the void as the other) to itself is negative 
relation, and it is thus the distinguishing of the one from itself. This is the repulsion of 
the one; i. e. this is the positing of many ones. 63 Each of the many is one. The relation of 
many ones to each other is repulsion as the negative behaviour (Verhalten) of the many 
ones against each other. That is, the one relates itself to itself because the one relates 
itself in its repelling to ones. Therefore repulsion is equal to its own other, attraction. In 
this way being-for-itself, as the excluding one, sublates itself. Quality as qualitative 
determinacy, here at the stage of the one, has reached the determinateness-in-and-for- 
itself (An-undfür-sich-Bestimmtsein). At this stage, being-for-itself (in the two sides, as 
repulsion and attraction) is now known to be the sublating of itself and is therefore the 
sublating of quality in the totality of all previous moments. However, this sublated 
quality is neither an abstract nothing nor the abstract being which lacks any 
determination, but is only a being which is indifferent with regard to determinacy. This 
is quantity. In quality the determinacy was identical with their being. In quantit . on the 
contrary, the determinacy is the indifferent, external determinacy - even when quantity 
alters (e. g. larger or smaller), a thing still remains what it is. 64 In other words, quantity 
is the determinateness which has become indifferent to being. In this sense quantity is 
being-for-itself which is absolutely identical with being-for-other. This is a repulsion of 
many ones which is at once the non-repulsion, the continuity of ones. 65 
Section 4 
Quantity 
(a) Pure Quantity 
Quantity (Quantität) is pure being in which determinacy is sublated (aufgehoben) or 
indifferent (gleichgültig). In quantity determinacy is no longer posited as one with 
being itself. The term `quantity' can be also expressed as magnitude (Größe). But 
`magnitude' is not always an appropriate term since it designates the already 
63 Enc. Logic, § 97, p. 154. 
64 Eric. Logic, § 98 Addition. p. 157. 
65 Sci. Logic, p. 185. 
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determinate quantity. Here, up to this point, quantity has not yet reached such 
determinacy. 
When matter (Materie) is taken as having form as an indifferent determination, 
`the absolute is pure quantity' is an appropriate expression. Distinctions of what is 
absolutely undifferentiated are only quantitative. In this sense, quantity is the 
fundamental determination of the absolute. 67 Even the quantity, as pure quantity, is a 
stage of the idea, as which the absolute will be ultimately expressed. Quantity is at first 
as a logical category, and then is in the world of both natural and spiritual objects, i. e. 
throughout the entire system of Encyclopaedia. However, as Hegel says, quantity has a 
more important meaning in nature than in the spiritual real M. 68 
Quantity is both continuous and discrete magnitude. In its immediate self- 
relation, or in the self-equivalence posited by the attraction, quantity is continuous 
magnitude. As discrete magnitude, on the other hand, quantity is the one. But both 
determinations, as continuity and discreteness, pass over into each other. As only the 
continuity of the many, continuous quantity is also discrete. Many ones, each of which 
is the one as discrete quantity, are known to be the same or unity. Hence the one is also 
the continuity of those many ones; i. e. discrete quantity as the one is also continuous. 
Therefore both continuous and discrete magnitudes should not be regarded as species 
(Arten). Rather, both magnitudes are distinguished only in that the same whole 
(dasselbe Ganze) is posited, first as one of them, and then in the other. In this sense the 
antinomy of space, of time, or of matter, is to be considered as the affirmative of 
quantity as continuous, then as discrete, quantity. 69 
(b) Quantum (as Number, Degree and Ratio), and Transition to Measure 
Quantum, or limited quantity, is the quantity which is posited with its own excluding 
determinacy. The structure of the progress in the realm of quantity is parallel to that in 
quality: pure quantity is parallel to pure being; quantum is parallel to being-there since 
quantum is the being-there (Dasein) of quantity; degree is parallel to being-for-itself. 
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66 Enc. Logic, § 99 and Remark, p. 157. 
67 Enc. Logic, § 99 Remark, p. 158. 
68 Enc. Logic, § 99 Addition, p. 159. 
69 Enc. Logic. § 100 and Remark, p. 160. 
70 Enc. Logic. § 101 and Addition. p. 161. 
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Quantum has its perfect determinacy in number (Zahl). Number contains within 
itself the one as its element. Number contains both enumeration (Anzahl) as 
discreteness and unit (Einheit) as continuity. Rather, number is the unity of these two 
qualitative moments. 7' 
The whole of quantum is the same as limit (Grenze). Limit, as multiple within 
itself, is extensive magnitude. Limit, on the other hand, as intensive magnitude, is 
degree (Grad). Degree is the determinacy which is simple (einfache) within itself. 
However, whatever has extensive magnitude has intensive magnitude as well, and vice 
versa. 72 
The concept of quantum is posited within that of degree. Degree is the 
magnitude as indifferent for itself (für sich) and simple - in that the magnitude has, 
outside of itself in other magnitudes, the determinacy through which alone it is 
quantum. In such contradiction - that although this magnitude is for itself 
(fürsichseiende), yet the indifferent limit is absolute externality (Äußerlichkeit) - the 
infinite quantitative progress is posited. This `progress' means that both immediacy and 
being mediated, i. e. a going-beyond (Hinausgehen) the quantum just posited, pass over 
into each other. 73 This contradiction is thus being resolved. 
Quantum, in its determinacy of being on its own account, is external to itself. 
But this self-externality (the quantitative feature) of quantum constitutes its quality. 
Quantum, in the very self-externality, is itself and is related to itself. In quantum the 
quantitative (as externality) and the quality (as the being-for-itself) are thus united. In 
this way, quantum is now quantitative relationship, ratio (Verhältnis). 74 But the sides 
(Seiten) of ratio, as both immediate quantum and mediation (viz. the relation of a 
quantum to another), are still immediate quanta, and the qualitative and quantitative 
determinations are still external to each other. But even in such externality the 
quantitative itself is relation to itself. Or rather, the being-for-itself and the indifference 
of the determinacy are united. 75 
Quantum, at this stage, is no longer an indifferent or external determination: 
quantum, the last stage of quantity, is here sublated and is quality. That is, quality and 
71 Enc. Logic, § 102 and Remark, pp. 161-62. 
72 Enc. Logic, § 103 and Remark, p. 163. 
73 Eric. Logic, § 104. p. 165. 
74 Enc. Logic, § 105, p. 168. 
75 Enc. Logic, § 106, p. 169. 
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quantity are to be united as something higher. Quantum - at its final stage, ratio - is 
now known to be the unity of quality and quantity, measure. 76 
Section 5 
Measure, and Transition to Essence 
Measure (Maf3) is the qualitative quantum. Measure, at first as immediate, is a 
quantum, with which being-there or quality is bound up. Measure is the complete being 
as the unity of quality and quantity. Hegel even says that measure can be the definition 
of the absolute - in that `God is the measure of all things'. 
77 
The measureless (Maßlose) occurs when a measure goes beyond its qualitative 
determinacy in virtue of its quantitative nature. But the measureless is also measure 
since the new quantitative ratio as the measureless is just as qualitative. That is, the 
transition from quality to quantity and conversely from quantity to quality, can be 
presented once more as infinite progress as the self-sublation and restoration of 
measure in the measureless. 78 
In this infinite progress the immediacy, which still belongs to measure as such, 
is sublated. That is, quality and quantity were initially as immediate in measure, which 
was only the relational identity of quality and quantity. But now in this infinite progress 
the measure sublates itself in the measureless. But measure is also only going together 
with itself in the measureless which is its own negation and is itself a unity of quantity 
and quality. 79 
The unity of measure and the measureless seems to be parallel to that of 
coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, and to that of the infinite and the finite - in that they 
are all likewise in a singular double-movement between opposed categories. 
80 
At this stage of measure the infinite, i. e. the affirmation as the negation of 
negation, has acquired both quality and quantity for its own sides. These sides have 
76 Sci. Logic, pp. 323-24. 
77 Enc. Logic, § 107 and Addition, p. 170. 
78 Enc. Logic. § 109, p. 172. 
79 Enc. Logic, § 110, pp. 172-73. 
80 See Sections 1(b) and 2(d)(iii) above. 
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passed over into each other, i. e. from quality to quantity, 8' and from quantity into 
quality; $2 these transitions are exhibited as negations. But these sides (quality and 
quantity), as in their unity in measure, appeared at first distinct and was only through 
the mediation (vermittels) of the other. After the immediacy of this unity has proven to 
be self-sublating, this unity of quality and quantity in measure is now posited as what it 
is in itself. This unity is now the simple self-relation (Beziehung-auf-sich) which 
contains being in general and its forms as sublated. Being or immediacy is mediation 
with itself and relation to itself, only through self-negation. Being is thus the mediation 
which sublates itself into immediacy. This being or immediacy as mediation is 
essence. 83 
In other words, although quality and quantity may have appeared as mutually 
confronting, they have passed over into each other through measure. The result of this 
dialectic is essence, i. e. the sublated being, in which being was negated in its 
determination. In the sphere of being, passing-over (Übergehen) was an important 
category in that one category became its own other. In the sphere of essence, on the 
other hand, passing-over is also not passing-over; it is to be considered as diversity 
(Verschiedenheit) which is the relation (Beziehung) between the one and its own other 
since there is no genuine other. That is, in the passing of what is diverse into another 
diversity the first one does not vanish in another but they both remain within their 
relation. In the sphere of being the relatedness (Bezogenheit) was only in itself (an sich) 
and everything was immediate (unmittelbar). In essence, on the other hand, the 
relatedness is posited and everything is relative or relational (relativ). This point is what 
distinguishes between being and essence. 84 
81 Cf. Enc. Logic, § 98. 
82 Cf. Eric. Logic, § 105. 
83 Eric. Logic, § 111, p. 173. 
84 Eric. Logic, § 111 Addition, pp. 173-74. 
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Section 6 
The Basic Tenet of Hegel's Dialectical Description of Categories 
The basic pattern or manner of Hegel's dialectical progress of the description of 
categories and their moments, which go up higher and higher and become more and 
more concrete, has to be clarified here. 85 
As aforementioned, measure, the qualitative quantum, is the complete being as 
the unity of quality and quantity and is thus the highest stage in the realm of being. 
Measure and its opposite, the measureless, pass over into each other - in that the 
transition from quality and quantity and its reverse (from quantity and quality) is 
presented as infinite progress as the self-sublation and the restoration of measure in the 
measureless. The unity of measure and the measureless is a singular double-movement 
between opposed categories, just as in previous examples of coming-to-be and ceasing- 
to-be and of infinity and finitude. At the stage of measure the infinite (the affirmation as 
the negation of negation) acquires both quality and quantity as its own sides which pass 
over into each other (from quality and quantity, and vice versa), and this movement as 
transition is negation, or negation of negation. This movement as negation is also a 
singular double-movement. At the stage of measure being or immediacy is mediation 
with itself and relation to itself through self-negation. Being has now arrived at the 
stage of the mediation which sublates itself into immediacy. Essence is this being which 
has arrived at the stage of immediacy as mediation. 
Here one can detect the basic pattern of Hegel's description of the development 
of categories. That is, each category has its own self-contradictory character in having 
an opposite (as its negative) which is also self-contradictory - in that the original 
category is also the negative to this opposite. In addition to this, each of the categories 
and their opposites (as their negative) is the unity of itself and its opposite. Or rather, 
the truth consists in that they are all likewise in a self-contradictory unity of unities 
between opposites. This unity has to be grasped as double-movement. But this `double- 
movement' does not mean that two separate movements are united in a unity. Instead it 
is a singular movement which is double-sided, having double-circulation. Hence it has 
to be expressed as a singular double-mnovernent. This may be a contradictory expression 
85 1 discussed this issue briefly in Sec. 2(f) above. This section is its continuation. 
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from an ordinary, commonsensical viewpoint. But this contradictory feature is the truth 
of the matter. Then the contradiction (i. e. the self-contradiction of the unity of unities) 
is to be considered as the self-movement which necessarily entails its own resolution as 
sublation (the negation of negation) into higher, enriched next category. This 
movement is infinite in that it is the affirmation, as the negation of negation. The 
sublation of the contradiction of previous categories into newer and higher categories is 
non-temporal singular double-movement, which is infinite in that it is self-circular 
(self-departing and self-returning). However, in this infinite self-circulation a category 
does not remain the same but turns into an enriched next category. This double 
movement of sublation as self-circulation is thus not mechanical nor external but 
organic and internal (or immanent). 
Then, whose self-development was this all self-growing development of 
categories? It was the self-development and thus the self-explication (one after another 
of categories) of the absolute. It at first started as simple pure being. Then it was 
disclosed that its truth is being a moment of becoming (together with its negative, 
nothing). But the result of becoming (through coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be) was the 
more determinate being, being-there. But even this being-there was still indeterminate 
and abstract. It had to be further sublated into a higher, more determinate and concrete 
category, being-for-itself 86 Then being-for-itself, the last stage of quality - through the 
process from being for-one, then the one, the void, and to many ones - sublated itself 
into quantity. Then the quantity, the sublated being, from the stage of pure quantity and 
through the sublation of continuity and discreteness, turned into quantum. The 
quantum, the being-there of quantity, through the stage of degree and ratio, developed 
to measure. Then the measure, the qualitative quantum, which has already reached the 
stage of the mediation sublated into immediacy, has finally turned into essence, the 
sublated being. 
Through this whole process of the development of the categories which have 
become more concrete and determinate, one can know that this is the self-circular (i. e. 
self-departing and self-returning) movement which is double-sided, having double 
circulation as the unity of unities, as stated above. All of this is the movement of the 
absolute. This movement will be further developed in the next phase of logic, essence. 
86 1 discussed the feature of the development of being-there through infinity in Sec. 2. esp. (f) above. 
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Chapter 6 
Dialectic in the Doctrine of Essence 
Preliminaries 
In this chapter on essence I will discuss Hegel's dialectic which has more developed 
features than in being, emphasising the three key-concepts in my interpretation, i. e. 
contradiction, the absolute and the identity of thought and being, along with the 
descriptions of the development of categories in the realm of essence. 
(a) What Essence Is 
Hegel's own preliminary remarks on essence are as follows. Knowledge or knowing 
(Wissen) aims at the true (die Wahre), i. e. what being is in-and-for-itself. Knowledge 
thus does not stop at the immediate, being. Knowledge, as a result of its own 
development, reaches a point at which there must be something other than being as its 
background which is the truth of being. This knowledge is a mediated knowing; it starts 
from the preliminary path which goes beyond being, or rather, penetrates into being. 
This mediated knowledge is that of essence (Wesen) which is the truth of being. Hence 
only after this knowledge (knowing) inwardises or recollects (erinnert) itself out of 
immediate being does the knowing find essence through this mediation. Hegel points 
out that in German the verb Sein (to be) has its past participle gewesen which leads to 
Wesen (essence); but essence is timelessly past being (zeitlos vergegangene Sein). ' 
(This would suggest that essence is sublated being. )'` Although the movement or path of 
Sci. Logic, p. 389. 
2 Cf. Enc. Logic, § 112 Addition, p. 176. 
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this mediated knowing, through the process of which it starts with being and sublates it 
and reaches essence as a mediated result, appears (erscheint) to be an activity of 
knowing that is external to being and irrelevant to being's own nature, yet this 
movement is that of being itself. Being inwardises (erinnert) itself through its own 
nature; and through this movement into itself, being becomes essence. But essence is 
what it is through its own negativity which is the infinite movement of being. Essence 
is being-in-and-for- itself (Anundfürsichsein) - in that essence is absolute being-in-itself 
(Ansichsein) since it is indifferent to every determinateness of being, and here otherness 
and relation-to-other have been completely sublated - and also in that essence is 
equally being-for-itself (Fürsichsein) since it is itself this negativity which is the self 
sublating of otherness and determinateness. Essence is in this sense being-in-and-for- 
itself. 
In other words, briefly, essence is the concept (Begrifft as posited concept. But 
it is not a complete concept, i. e. not yet for-itself (Fiirsich), since the concept is not yet 
as reflected strictly within the determinations in the realm of essence. Essence is the 
relation to itself only by being to an other. But this other is not as what is but as 
something posited and mediated. Being has not vanished in that essence is being which 
mediates itself through its own negativity. In essence, on the other hand, being is also 
degraded to something merely negative or to a mere semblance (zu einem Scheine). 
That is, essence is being as shining (Schein) within itself. 4 
(b) Remarks on Essence 
The absolute is now essence. Is this statement contradictory to the previous one that the 
absolute is being? The answer is no since this is the higher definition of the absolute. 
Essence is being which has gone into itself. The absolute has within itself negativity. 
But this negativity is not external to being but is being's own dialectic. Hence the truth 
of the absolute is essence, in this sense. 5 
Contradiction (Widerspruch), in the realm of being, was still implicit or in itself 
(an sich). In the doctrine of essence, on the other hand, contradiction is explicit - in that 
the sphere of essence is that of posited contradiction since essence is posited as a being 
3 Sci. Logic, pp. 389-90. 
4 Enc. Logic. § 112, p. 175. 
5 Eric. Logic, § 112 Remark. p. 175. 
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of reflection, i. e. a being within which an other shines and which shines within an 
other. 6 
It is to be noticed that being, nothing and becoming in the realm of being 
correspond to the positive, the negative and ground in the realm of essence: (1) The 
positive as identity, in the realm of essence, corresponds to the being which lacks 
antithesis. (2) The negative as shining within itself develops as distinction; i. e. nothing 
in the realm of being corresponds to distinction (difference) in the realm of essence. (3) 
Then becoming develops, in essence, to the ground of being-there, i. e. existence. 7 
The parallel positions of essence and quantity in the system of Logic are also to 
be recalled. Essence and quantity have the same absolute indifference to limit. In this 
sense essence, in the whole system of Logic (which starts from being, then passes over 
to essence, and reaches the concept), holds a parallel position to that which quantity, has 
in the doctrine of being (which starts from quality, then passes over to quantity, and 
reaches measure). 8 
(c) The Development of Essence in its Movement 
The development of essence in its movement is as follows. First, essence shines 
(scheint) within itself; it is reflection. Secondly essence appears (erscheint); it is 
appearance. Thirdly essence manifests itself (offenbart); it is actuality. 9 They will be 
explicated one by one in the following sections. 
Section 1 
Reflection and Schein 
yg, or even Schein can be variously translated as 'illusory bein ' 
I0 `seeming', 1 1 show', ' 
`shining' or `semblance'. Any English word to designate this term can be insufficient or 
6 Enc. Logic. § 114, p. 178. I will elaborate contradiction in Sections 1(b)(iii) and 2. 
7 Enc. Logic, § 114 Remark, p. 179. 
8 Sci. Logic, p. 391. 
9 Scl. Logic, p. 391. 
10 In the Larger Logic by Miller. 
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misleading since Schein does not necessarily have the negative meaning of `illusory' as 
the later descriptions will show. Essence shines (scheint), then shines-forth or appears 
(erscheint), and then reaches actuality in that it manifests itself. Therefore when I refer 
to this term, I will employ the most appropriate English term within the context, often 
adding the original Schein (noun) or scheinen (verb) in parentheses, or sometimes 
directly using the original German terms. 
In the realm of reflection (Reflexion) essence shines within itself (scheint in 
sich) or is pure reflection. Essence here as reflection is only relation to itself as 
reflected relation; it is identity with itself. But this identity is still formal identity, i. e. 
the identity-of-the-understanding (Verstandesidentität) which holds firmly to the 
impassable gulf between identity and distinction. In other words, this is only the 
abstract identity. 13 
(a) Reflection 
Schein is nothingness (das Nichtige) or the essenceless (das Wesenlos) whose being is 
equality with itself, i. e. not in an other. This equality with itself is the interchange of the 
negative with itself as the absolute reflection of essence. This reflection is thus the 
essence's own self-negation. Hence this is sublated negativity which is both the 
negative and the immediacy (simple equality with itself). Therefore this equality 
consists in a single unity of both being-itself and being-not-itself. '4 
Reflection is (a) self-coinciding negation, and then (b) simple equality-with- 
itself, i. e. immediacy, and (c) transition as the sublating of the transition - since the 
reflection is immediate coincidence of the negative with itself (as stated in (a) and (b) 
here). Here the self-relation of the negative is its return into itself; it is a self sublating 
immediacy which is the sublating of the negative in its self-relation or is a return from 
the negative. '5 
In other words, this immediacy, which is only a return of the negative into itself, 
is that which constitutes the determinateness of Schein and which previously seemed to 
11 In Burbidge's commentary. 
12 By Taylor, and in the Larger Logic by Struther and Johnston. 
13 Eric. Logic. § 115 and Remark, p. 179. The issue of abstract or concrete identity will be elaborated in 
See. 1(b)(i) below. 
14 Sci. Logic, p. 400. 
15 Sci. Logic, p. 401. 
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be the starting point of the reflective movement. Reflection is this movement which 
starts or returns only insofar as the negative has already returned into itself. In this 
sense reflection is a returning movement, or the negative of itself. Reflection is a 
positing (Setzen) insofar as it is immediacy as this returning movement. This is what (1) 
positing reflection (setzende Reflexion) is. Reflection determines the return-into-itself 
(Rückkehr in sich) as the negative of itself; and this sublating of reflection is essence. In 
other words, the immediacy, which reflection (as sublating) presupposes for itself, is a 
positedness, i. e. an immediacy which is in itself sublated and is not distinct from the 
return-into-itself and is itself only this returning movement. But this immediacy is also 
determined as negative, as immediately opposed to something, therefore to an other. 
Reflection is therefore determinate. Thus stated, reflection, as determinate, has a 
presupposition and starts from the immediate as its other. Reflection is therefore 
considered now as (2) external reflection (äußere Reflexion). External reflection is the 
reflection which presupposes itself as sublated, as the negative of itself. It is a positing 
of the immediate which becomes the negative or the determination; but it is also the 
sublating of this positing. Therefore although named `external', it is not external but the 
immanent reflection of immediacy. Positing reflection thus results in essence-in-and- 
for-itself. Hence reflection is to be considered now as (3) determining reflection 
(bestimmende Reflexion). Determining reflection is the unity of positing reflection and 
external reflection. The determination of reflection is the positedness (Gesetztsein) as 
. negation which bends back into itself the relation to other and as negation which is 
equal to itself (the unity of itself and its other), and is, only through this, an essentiality 
(Wesentheit). Therefore the determination of reflection is positedness, negation - in the 
sense that as reflection-into-itself it is also the sublatedness (Aufgehobensein) of this 
positedness, i. e. infinite self-relation. 16 
(b) Determinations of Reflection 
The explanation of the determinations of reflection (Reflexionsbestimmungen) is as 
follows. Reflection is determinate reflection, and essence is therefore determinate 
essence. Reflection is the showing or seeming (Schein) of essence within essence itself. 
Essence is infinite return-into-itself (Rückkehr-in-sich) and is negative simplicity. That 
is, essence reflects into its three moments which are determinations reflected into 
16 Sci. Logic, pp. 401-05,408. 
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themselves. Hence essence as reflection is firstly simple self-relation. i. e. pure identitý. 
Secondly it is distinction (or difference), which is opposition as opposed diversity. This 
opposition is reflected into itself and withdraws into its ground. That is, essence as 
reflection is thirdly contradiction. '7 
(i) Identity 
Essence shines within itself (scheint in sich) or is pure reflection. It is the relation to 
itself as reflected relation. That is, essence is in this sense identity with itself (Identität 
mit sich). However, identity is, in truth, that which presupposes distinction. The identity 
of the understanding (Verstandesidentität), i. e. the abstract identity, stubbornly sticks 
to the viewpoint of rigid separation between identity and distinction. In the viewpoint 
of the concrete identity, on the contrary, everything identical embraces within itself 
something distinctive, and vice versa. In the abstract understanding, the manifold for 
our cognition is not grasped as the concrete whole, but is severed into abstract, simple 
elements by so-called analysis. To elaborate: The so-called universal law of thought, as 
the principle of identity, can be expressed as `Everything is identical with itself, A=A', 
or negatively, `A cannot be both A and non-A at the same time'. But this law of 
thought, as the law of abstract understanding, cannot reach the proper grasp of the 
matter since this abstract understanding is not aware that this law contradicts itself as 
the above propositions themselves presuppose both distinction and identity between 
subject and predicate. That is, this law is to be sublated by the speculative insight into 
the concrete identity which presupposes distinction. Only by such speculative insight 
does the law of identity become meaningful and fulfil the completion of those 
proposition. But the abstract understanding can never grasp this truth. The proper grasp 
of the concrete identity, which can be fairly called genuine identity, is that which 
knows the above relationship of identity and distinction. They are distinguishable, but 
also inseparable. Or rather, identity can be the identity only insofar as it embraces 
within itself distinction, and vice versa. '8 
17 Sci. Logic, p. 409. 
18 Enc. Logic, § 115 and Remark, pp. 179-80; Sci. Logic. pp. 411-16. What I intend to emphasise in this 
subsection is the difference between the abstract understanding of the identity and the proper (or 
speculative) grasp of identity. which was clearly emphasised in Enc. Logic § 115 Remark. When there is 
a slight difference of emphasis between the Shorter Logic and the Larger Logic. I follow the Shorter 
Logic which was revised twice. 
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(ii) Distinction 
Essence is pure identity or shining within itself (Schein in sich selbst) only because 
essence is negatively relating itself to itself by being self-repulsion from itself. That is, 
essence thus essentially contains within itself distinction or difference. 19 (1) Distinction 
(Unterschied) is firstly the immediate distinction as diversity (Verschiedenheit). 
Distinction as diversity appears as comparison (Vergleichung) in which both equality 
(Gleichheit) and inequality (Ungleichheit) appear. Equality is an identity of the terms 
which are not identical with one another whereas inequality is the relation (Beziehung) 
between unequal terms. Each of both equality and inequality is a shining into the other 
(ein Scheinen in die Andere). Diversity is distinction of reflection. 20 (2) Distinction is 
secondly the essential distinction between the positive (i. e. the identical relation to 
itself) and the negative (i. e. what is distinct on its own account). Each of the positive 
and the negative is only in virtue of not being the other one. Distinction is therefore 
opposition (Entgegensetzung) through which what is distinct has its own other facing 
itself. In opposition each has its own determination only insofar as it is related to the 
other. In other words, each is the other's own other. 21 
(iii) Contradiction and Ground 
Both the positive and the negative are the posited contradiction. They are the same in 
themselves (an sich dasselbe); and they are also the same for themselves (für sich 
dasselbe) since each of the positive and the negative is the sublating of itself and its 
other. The result of this sublation is that the positive and the negative go to the ground. 
In other words, the essential distinction is only the distinction of itself from itself. The 
distinction thus contains the identical (das Identische). Essential distinction belongs, 
together with identity, to the whole distinction which is in-and-for-itself. Essential 
distinction is already expressed equally as what-is-identical-with-itself (das mit sich 
Identische); and what-is-opposed (das Entgegengesetzte) is precisely what contains the 
one and its own other. The being-within-itself (Insichsein) of essence is ground. 
22 
19 Enc. Logic, § 116, p. 181. 
20 Eric. Logic, §§ 117-18, pp. 182-84. 
21 Enc. Logic. § 119, pp. 184-85. 
22 Enc. Logic, § 120, p. 188. 
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Contradiction sublates itself by its own doing. The result of this sublation, i. e. the 
sublated contradiction, is no longer the abstract identity. The result of opposition 
posited as contradiction is ground, which contains within itself both identity and 
distinction as sublated and reduced to merely its own ideal moments. 23 In this context 
ground is the unity of identity and distinction. It is the truth of identity and distinction 
as the inward reflection (i. e. identity) which is also reflection-into-another (i. e. 
distinction), and vice versa. In this sense ground is essence as totality. 24 
The above stated can be also described as follows. The positive is the 
contradiction-in-itself whereas the negative is the positive contradiction. Each of the 
positive and the negative sublates itself; i. e. contradiction resolves itself. Contradiction 
(Widerspruch) withdraws to the ground (Grund); in other words, the resolved 
contradiction is ground, i. e. the essence as the unity of the positive and the negative. 
The infinite was in truth the contradiction as displayed in the sphere of being. External 
motion (movement) is the immediate being-there (Dasein) of contradiction; in other 
words, motion is existent (daseiende) contradiction itself. Contradiction is the root of 
all movement and life; only insofar as something has a contradiction within itself does 
it move and have urge and activity. Opposites (e. g. the positive and the negative) 
contain contradiction insofar as they are negatively related to one another or sublate 
each other and are indifferent (gleichgültige) to one another. 25 
(iv) Existence, Thing, and Transition to Appearance 
Essence is at first as shining and mediation within itself. But as totality of mediation the 
essence's unity with itself is now posited as the self-sublation of distinction and so of 
mediation. Therefore it is the restoration of immediacy or being as mediated through the 
sublation of mediation. Essence is now existence (Existenz). 
26 Existence is the 
immediate unity of inward reflection and reflection-into-another. The relation between 
ground and existence is that ground is itself existence and the existent is also ground as 
well as grounded . 
27 In other words, the ground is self-sublating: that toward which the 
23 Enc. Logic, § 119 Addition 2. p. 187. 
24 Enc. Logic, § 121. P. 188. 
2'S Sci. Logic, pp. 432-35,439-41. I will elaborate contradiction and ground in Sec. 2 below. 
26 Enc. Logic. § 122, p. 192. 
27 Enc. Logic, § 123, pp. 192-93. 
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ground sublates itself (i. e. the result of its negation), is existence. Therefore existence, 
although it emerges from the ground, contains within itself the ground. 28 What-exists or 
existents (das Existierende) contains relativity or relationality (Relativität) and its own 
manifold connectedness with other existents in itself. The existent is reflected within 
itself as ground. Therefore what-exists is thing. 29 
Thing (Ding) is the totality as the development of the determination of ground 
and of existence posited all in one. 30 Thing falls apart into matter (Materie) and form. 
each of which is the totality of thinghood (Dingheit) and is independent on its own 
account. Matter involves the reflection-into-another (Reflexion-in-Anderes) and being- 
within-itself (Insichsein). Matter is in this sense the totality of the form. On the other 
hand, form contains inward reflection and constitutes the determination of the matter. 
Form and matter are thus the same. The unity of matter and form, once posited, is the 
relation of matter and form as distinction. 31 Thing is hence this contradiction of form 
and matter. Therefore as the essential existence which sublates itself inwardly, thing is 
shining forth or appearance. 32 
Section 2 
Contradiction Further Described 
(a) The Fundamental Point of Contradiction 
The fundamental point of contradiction is to be recalled here. Although contradiction 
was described, together with ground, as an important category or moment in the realm 
of reflection, yet, as Hegel says, contradiction does not remain there alone but is also 
the generator of all movement and life, including nature, spirit and the logical, 33 and is 
thus the generating force of the self-movement of logical thinking or logic. Therefore 
28 Enc. Logic, § 123 Addition, p. 193. 
29 Enc. Logic, § 124, p. 193. 
30 Enc. Logic, § 125, p. 194. 
31 Enc. Logic, § 129, p. 198. 
32 Enc. Logic, § 130, p. 198. 
33 See Sec. 1(b)(iii) above. 
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any propositional form, which is the explication of the logical, does necessarily include 
within itself contradiction. One of the main points of contradiction is that it withdraws 
to the ground; in other words, the concept of contradiction cannot be separated from 
that of sublation. But it is to be noticed that sublation had clearly appeared earlier in the 
sphere of being while contradiction was only implicitly or in-itself expressed as infinity 
in the realm of being. 34 
(b) Contradiction for Kant and Hegel 
Here the issue of contradiction has to be referred back to the relation between Kant's 
view and Hegel's. For Kant the law or principle of (non-)contradiction means that any 
predicate which is contradictory of a thing cannot belong to it; 35 i. e. this is the 
contradiction between the statement (predication) and the fact (determinateness) of an 
object. For Hegel, however, having admitted the above grasp of contradiction by Kant, 
what is more important is that everything is in itself contradictory, 36 and that the 
validity of the law of (non-) contradiction consists not in that to attribute to things 
contradictory determinations and determinateness is false (as stated just above as 
Hegel's description of contradiction), but in that objective contradiction is only as self- 
disclosing. 37 
For Kant contradiction is mainly as antinomies or opposition. Kant's opposition 
consists of (1) analytic opposition, (2) dialectical opposition (this is a predecessor to 
Hegel's doctrine of contradiction), and (3) real opposition (this presages the concept of 
negativity which is basic to contradiction for Hegel). Hegel does not deny the 
differences between these three types of opposition set forth by Kant. It is only that 
Hegel critically assesses the above difference while Kant emphasises the term 
`contradiction' to analytic opposition. Therefore although for Kant the negativity 
results in a determinate sublation, yet what is sublated is not considered by analytical 
judgement (including Kant's) to be the determinations which genuinely belong to a 
thing. Hence although it was supposed to be `sublated', yet the thing as a subject of 
predication is also not sublated. For this analytical judgement the consequences of 
34 See Preliminaries (b) above. 
i` Critique of Pure Reason. A 151=B 190. 
36 Sci. Logic, p. 439. 
37 Wolff, `On Hegel's Doctrine of Contradiction'. p. 2. 
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opposed determinations mutually sublate themselves; i. e. consequences merely equal 
zero. 38 That is, the gist of the sublation as development is not grasped by this sort of 
judgement. This is what Hegel criticises in Kant. 
For Hegel two determinations that differ in content are to be related to the 
substrate of logical reflection and thus to become opposed determinations. This point 
clarifies the meaning of negativity. Negativity is what is needed for the opposition to be 
opposition. Without negativity there would be no opposition. For Hegel opposition is a 
relation between the positive and the negative. 39 
What is contradiction for Hegel, then? (1) For Hegel contradiction consists in a 
relation between (a) one of two opposed determinations (Bestiminungen) and (b) the 
substrate of logical reflection on the mutually opposed determinations, i. e. the substrate 
of the reflection of the determinateness (Bestimmtheit) of the objects. The reflection of 
the former (a) is the negative reflection (for opposition presupposes the negative), and 
the reflection of the latter (b) is the positive reflection. Therefore the gist of 
contradiction consists in that the self-sufficient determinations of reflection are related, 
in one and the same regard, as both negative and not-negative. For Hegel contradictory 
opposites are real predicates, i. e. they are the positive determinations whose opposition 
or negativity depends on their relation to the substrate of logical reflection. (2) 
Therefore contradiction is an objectively logical relation - in contrast to Kant and 
analytical thinkers who treat the logical as only subjective. More precisely, 
contradiction is a relation of objective logical reflection. Hegel transforms the 
traditional logic of reflection into an `objective logic' in two ways: (a) From relations 
among logical predicates to relations among determinations (that are already 
presupposed by the relations among logical predicates); i. e. by identifying, 
distinguishing and opposing the logical predicates, we already presuppose the identity, 
difference or opposition of determinations. For Hegel the concepts such as identity, 
difference and opposition, become meaningful only as the determinations of reflection 
(i. e. determinations of relations among determinations), not as the concepts of 
subjective reflection. (b) Logical relation cannot be deduced from logical reflection 
alone, but only when it is related to the substrate of logical reflection. That is, 
determinations of reflection (such as diversity and opposition), which correspond to the 
logical relations of contrariety and contradictoriness, cannot obtain by themselves, but 
38 Wolff, pp. 8-9,13. 
39 Wolff, pp. 14-15, cf. Sci. Logic, pp. 424-31. 
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depend on, the internal determinations to specifically determined objects. In other 
words, the external relations (as opposition) of the determinations of reflection are 
mirrored in the internal contradiction of individual things. (3) Genuine judgement. 
which explicates the objective contradiction, consists in that it sees the fundamental 
reason for the objective contradiction in objects themselves. 40 
(c) The Feature of Contradiction in Essence 
Contradiction in the realm of essence is the more developed form of infinit-N, which was 
only implicitly explicated in the realm of being. 41 Infinity was the unity of unities, i. e. 
the unity as a singular double-movement consisting of infinity and finitude, having 
double-sided circulation between them (each of them is the unity of itself and its 
opposite). In this sense the relation between contradiction and ground has a parallel 
position to that between infinity and finitude. Contradiction withdraws to the ground. 
Ground is the sublated result of contradiction. Contradiction and ground are in the unity 
like that of infinity and finitude. However, in the realm of essence there is no longer 
passing-over or transition (Übergehen) between opposites. The singular double- 
movement of infinity as the unity of unities which was clearly explicated in the realm 
of being, is now significantly transformed or developed to the sublation of 
contradiction into the ground. As just before mentioned, contradiction does not pass 
over into the ground, but withdraws into the ground. This is the expression of how 
sublation occurs and is carried on. The sublated result of contradiction has the more 
determinate, developed form of categories, here in the realm of reflection, as the 
ground. 
More broadly speaking, in the realm of essence, the double-movement of 
categories which was there in the realm of being, now has to be grasped rather in a 
more organic form, the interpenetration, than be called circulation which may retain 
somewhat mechanical connotation. This interpenetration is, of course, a form of the 
unity of unities, as infinity is. But it is still better described by this organic term to 
express the organic feature of categories in the realm of essence, in which categories do 
40 Wolff, pp. 18-19. 
41 See Preliminaries (b) above. 
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no longer pass over into others. Instead they grow like living creatures: they develop to 
the more mature categories. 42 
Section 3 
Appearance 
Essence must shine forth or appear (erscheinen). The inward shining of essence is the 
sublating of itself into immediacy. Shining (Schein) is the determination in virtue of 
which essence is not being but essence; and the developed shining is shining forth or 
appearance (Erscheinung). Therefore essence is not behind nor beyond appearance. 
Existence is in this sense appearance since the essence is what exists. 43 Appearance 
should not be confused with semblance (Schein) which remains the truth in the sphere 
of being or immediacy. 44 
What-appears (das Erscheinende) does exist in that its subsistence (Bestehen) is 
immediately sublated. Therefore what-appears has its ground in the form (Form) as its 
essence or as its inward reflection vis-a-vis its immediacy. 45 As regards the relation 
between content and form, content (Inhalt) has the form within itself just as much as the 
form is something external to it. In other words, form is firstly the content as inwardly 
reflected and secondly the external existence as not reflected inwardly. Content and 
form can reciprocally overturn into each other. Or rather, content is the overturning of 
form into it, and form is the overturning of content into it. But this relationship between 
content and form is not what is posited until we reach the absolute relationship. 46 
Appearance is relationship since immediate existence is the determinacy of subsistence 
itself and of the form, and content has the externality through the moment of its 
subsistence. 47 The difference between relation (Beziehung) and relationship 
42 1 will continue this issue of the more organic form of categories in Sec. 6 below. 
43 Enc. Logic, § 131, p. 199. 
'4 Enc. Logic, § 131 Addition, p. 199. 
45 Enc. Logic. § 132, p. 201. 
46 Enc. Logic, § 133 Remark, p. 202. 






(Verhältnis) should be noticed. Relationship is the unity of relation to itself and relation 
to another. 48 
The immediate relationship is that between the whole and the parts. In it the 
parts are parts only in their identical relation to each other, or insofar as they constitute 
the whole. 49 They are inseparable. 50 
Other examples of relationship are that between force and its utterance (i. e. the 
utterance of force is the mediation), 51 and that between what-is-inner and what-is-outer. 
What-is-inner (das Innere) is not separate from what-is-outer (das Äußere), but they are 
also opposed to each other as determinations of the form. 52 However, it should be 
emphasised that what-is-inner and what-is-outer (or external) are essentially identical 
as moments of the one form, and thus what is first posited only in one abstraction (as 
what-is-inner or what-is-outer) is also immediately only in the other one. 53 Such empty 




(a) Actuality as such 
Actuality (Wirklichkeit) is the unity of essence and existence, or of what-is-inner and 
what-is-outer. In other words, actuality is the positedness of this unity. This unity is the 
relationship which has become identical with itself, and is thus exempted from passing- 
over (Übergehen) whereas being was unreflected immediacy, and passing-over was an 
48 Enc. Logic, § 135 Addition, p. 204. 
49 Enc. Logic, § 135, p. 204. 
so Enc. Logic, § 136 Remark, p. 205. 
Cf. Enc. Logic, §§ 136-37. 
Eric. Logic, §§ 138-39, p. 209. 
5; Eric. Logic, § 140, p. 209. 
54 Cf. Enc. Logic, § 138. 
55 Enc. Logic, § 141. p. -113. 
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important category in the realm of being. The being-there (Dasein) of actuality is only 
the manifestation of itself. 56 
(i) Possibility 
Actuality, as such identity or unity, is at first possibility (Möglichkeit). Possibility is the 
inward reflection which is posited as the abstract and unessential essentiality, in 
contrast to the concrete unity of the actual. Possibility is what-is-essential (das 
Wesentliche) to reality (Wirklichkeit) in such a way that it is also only possibility. 57 In 
other words, as being the concrete thought, actuality contains within itself the 
possibility as an abstract moment. 58 
(ii) Contingency 
As mere possibility the actual (actuality) is to be considered as something-contingent 
(ein Zufälliges), as mere chance (Zufall). 59 As such, possibility and contingency 
(Zufälligkeit) are the moments of actuality. 60 In other words, possibility is merely the 
external actuality, and contingency is the actuality considered as what is merely 
possible. 6' The externality (Äußerlichkeit) of actuality implies the contingency (as 
immediate actuality) as what is identical with itself only as positedness (Gesetztsein). 
But this positedness is sublated as an externality that is there (eine daseiende 
Äußerlichkeit). That is, it is to be sublated to be the possibility of an other, i. e. condition 
62 (Bedingung). 
(iii) Necessity 
The above stated externality is a circle (Kreis) of the determinations of possibility and 
immediate actuality. The reciprocal mediation of these determinations is real possibility 
56 Enc. Logic, § 142 and Remark, pp. 213-14. 
57 Enc. Logic, § 143, p. 215. 
58 Enc. Logic, § 143 Addition, p. 216. 
59 Enc. Logic, § 144, p. 217. 
60 Enc. Logic, § 145, p. 217. 
61 Enc. Logic, § 145 Addition, p. 218. 
62 Enc. Logic, § 146, p. 219. 
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in general. The externality of actuality, as this circle, is the totality (Totalität), i. e. the 
content (Inhalt), the matter (Sache); and it is the concrete totality of the form for itself 
which is the self-translation of the inner into the outer, and vice versa. This self- 
movement of the form is activity (Tätigkeit), i. e. the activation of the matter (Sache), as 
the real ground, which sublates itself into actuality; and it is the activation of the 
conditions of contingent actuality. The developed actuality as the coincident alternation 
(Wechsel) of what-is-inner and what-is-outer, or the alternation of their opposed 
movements that are united into one movement, is necessity. 63 
The three moments of necessity (Notwendigkeit) are condition (Bedingung), 
matter (Sache) and activity (Tätigkeit). But insofar as these moments remain 
independent of one another, the necessity is merely the external or restricted 
necessity. 64 The relationship among the three moments is that what is necessary (was 
notwendig ist) falls apart into the mediating ground (matter and activity) and into an 
immediate actuality as something-contingent (condition). 65 
(b) Substantiality 
The necessary (das Notwendige) is in itself the absolute relationship which sublates 
itself into absolute identity. It is the relationship of substantiality (Substantialität) and 
accidentality (Akzidentalität). Substance (Substanz) as such is the absolute identity of 
this relationship with itself. 66 Substance is the totality of accidents; substance reveals 
itself in accidents as their absolute negativity, i. e. as the absolute might and also as the 
richness of all content. `Substantiality is the absolute activity-of-form (Formtätigkeit) 
and the might (Macht) of necessity, and every content is just a moment that belongs to 
this process alone - the absolute overturning of form and content into one another'. 
67 
Substance is at first simply substance. Substance, then, as absolute might, relates itself 
to itself as a merely inner possibility (innere Möglichkeit) and is thus accidentality. 68 
That is, Schein or accidentality is in itself substance through might, but substance is not 
posited as this self-identical Schein. Therefore, here substance has only accidentality 
63 Enc. Logic, § 147, pp. 220-21. 
64 Enc. Logic, § 148, p. 224. 
65 Enc. Logic, § 149, p. 225. 
66 Enc. Logic, § 150, p. 225. 
67 Enc. Logic, § 151, pp. 225-26. 
68 Enc. Logic, § 152, p. 227. 
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for its positedness: it is not yet substance as substance. Therefore the relation of 
substantiality here is that substance manifests itself as formal might; this relation is in 
truth the inner of the accidents which are, however, only in the substance. In other 
words, the relation of substantiality is only the totality in the form of Schein as a 
becoming, but this relation is equally reflection; here the accidentality which is in itself 
substance, is also posited as such because of this same reason. Hence the relation of 
substantiality is determined as self-relating negativity toward itself, i. e. determined as 
self-relating simple self-identity. Substance therefore exists for itself and has might. 
Hence the relation of substantiality passes over into the relation of causality 
(Kausalität). For substance is the might which posits determinations and distinguishes 
them from itself; therefore substance, as self-relating in its determining, posits itself as 
a negative, or makes itself into a positedness; hence this is already the sublated 
substantiality, i. e. the merely posited, i. e. effect; however, substance is for itself cause. 69 
(c) Causality 
Substance is cause (Ursache) because firstly it is inwardly reflected - here it is the 
originating thing (die ursprüngliche Sache) - and because secondly it equally sublates 
this inward reflection (or its mere possibility); i. e. because it posits itself as the negative 
of itself, and here it produces an effect (Wirkung). Effect is an actuality (Wirklichkeit) 
which is thus only a posited one, but it is also a necessary one in this causality. 70 (It is 
to be reminded of the etymological viewpoint that in German the terms Wirkung 
(effect) and Wirklichkeit (actuality or reality) stem from the verb wirken (to have an 
effect), and therefore the category `effect' cannot be separate from actuality or reality. ) 
The cause is sublated in effect as positedness; i. e. the cause is actual only in the effect. 
In this sense the cause is in-and-for-itself causa sui which is the same as effectus sui. 71 
The distinction between cause and effect is that between positing and being posited, and 
they are one and the same content. This distinction of form sublates itself again `since 
the cause is not only the cause of an other, but is also the cause of itself, and the effect 
69 Sci. Logic, pp. 557-58, trans. emended. 
70 Enc. Logic, § 153, pp. 227-28. 
" Enc. Logic, § 153 Remark, p. 228. 
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is not only the effect of an other, but also the effect of itself". Causality (Kausalität) is 
this infinite progression. 72 
The effect is positedness, but as inward reflection and immediacy. Although 
effect is diverse from cause, the effective action of the cause, i. e. its positing, is also a 
presupposing. At this stage there is consequently an other substance on which the cause 
acts. This second, other substance, as immediate, is not active but passive - in that it is 
not negatively relating itself to itself. However, this other substance, as substance, is 
also active: it sublates the presupposed immediacy and the posited effect. That is, this 
other substance reacts: it sublates the activity of the first substance (mentioned above). 
However, the first substance is likewise this sublation of its immediacy or of the effect 
posited in it. Therefore the first substance sublates the activity of the second, another 
substance, and reacts. Consequently causality has now passed over into the relationship 
of reciprocal action. 73 
(d) Reciprocal Action, and Transition to the Concept 
The determinations which in reciprocal action (Wechselwirkung) are considered to be 
firmly distinct from each other, are in themselves the same. There is thus only one 
cause which sublates itself as substance in its effect and gives itself only in this effective 
action (in diesem Wirken). Or rather, reciprocal action itself is the sublating-again of 
each of the posited determinations and its conversion into the opposite one. 74 
Reciprocal action stands on the threshold of the concept (Begriff). But reciprocal action 
still has to be comprehended in the way the cause and effect are considered to be the 
lower moments of the third, a higher whole, i. e. the concept. 75 The truth of substance is 
the concept. 76 The concept is the truth of being and essence, in such a way that being 
and essence return to the concept as their ground; and conversely the concept develops 
itself out of being as out of its ground. The concept is determined in relation to being 
and essence as essence that has returned to being as simple immediacy. Through this 
return the shining of essence has actuality which is a free shining within itself. '? Why, 
72 Enc. Logic, § 153 Addition, p. 229. 
73 Enc. Logic, § 154, pp. 229-30. 
74 Enc. Logic. §§ 155-56, pp. 230-31. 
7s Enc. Logic, § 156 Addition, p. 231. 
76 Enc. Logic, § 158, p. 232. 
77 Eric. Logic, § 159 and Remark. pp. 233-34. 
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then, do we not start from the concept, the truth of being and essence? Because only 
when we start from the poorest, being, going through essence, and reach the richest. the 
concept, do we recognise and consider that this is the dialectical development and how 
being and essence sublate themselves into the unity of the concept. 78 
Section 5 
The Absolute in Actuality 
Here we move back to the absolute. In the Larger Logic the absolute is described 
before actuality (i. e. `Section 3: Actuality, Chapter 1: The Absolute, Chapter 2: 
Actuality'). But since I would like to discuss in detail the absolute in the whole range of 
essence consecutively, I discuss the absolute after the descriptions of actuality here in 
this section and the next. 79 
(a) The Exposition of the Absolute 
The exposition of the absolute (die Auslegung des Absoluten) at the stage of actuality is 
as follows. (1) The absolute is not merely being nor even essence. Both being and 
essence are totalities within themselves, determinate totalities. (2) In the realm of 
essence, being emerges as existence, and the connection between being and essence 
progresses to the relation between the inner and the outer. The inner is essence as 
totality only in connection with being. The outer is being, but with the determination of 
being connected with reflection, and with a relationless identity with essence. (3) In this 
sense the absolute is itself the absolute unity of being and essence, and of the outer and 
the inner. (4) Hence the determination of the absolute is to be the absolute form as the 
identity and is the complete whole. But conversely the absolute is the absolute content 
in such a way that the content has the negative form relation by which the manifoldness 
of the content is only one substantial identity. (5) Therefore the identity of the absolute 
is the absolute identity since each of its parts is itself the whole, or each 
determinateness is the totality. The absolute as against the reflected determinations is 
78 Enc. Logic, § 159 Addition, pp. 234-35. 
79 See also the next Sec. 6 below. 
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the ground in which they have been engulfed (untergegangen). The absolute does not 
determine itself since the form, in the absolute, is only simple self-identity. The 
absolute itself is absolute identity; this is the determination of the absolute since all 
manifoldness of the world-in-itself and the world of appearance, or the manifoldness of 
inner and outer totality, is sublated. (6) There is no becoming in the absolute itself since 
the absolute is no longer mere being. The absolute is the absolute identity of the inner 
and the outer, as stated above. But the movement of reflection stands over against 
(gegenüber) this absolute identity of the absolute. In this identity the movement is 
sublated and is thus only the inner of the identity, but as the inner this movement is 
external to the identity. (7) Therefore the movement of reflection consists only in 
sublating its act in the absolute. It is the beyond (Jenseits) of the manifold differences 
and determinations and their movement, i. e. a beyond which lies at the back of the 
absolute. Hence although this movement accepts the differences and determinations, it 
also destroys them. This movement of reflection is thus the negative exposition of the 
absolute previously mentioned. This negative exposition of the absolute is now known 
to be the preceding whole of the logical movement of the spheres of being and essence. 
The content of being and essence has internally determined itself, through its inner 
necessity, as being's own becoming and as the reflection of essence, and has withdrawn 
into the absolute as into its ground. (8) But this exposition of the absolute also has a 
positive side - in that, insofar as the finite falls to the ground, the nature of the ground 
is to be connected with the absolute, or is to contain the absolute within itself. But this 
positive exposition is shining (Scheinen). The absolute is reflected in the shining in that 
the shining is a relation to the absolute. What is truly positive in the exposition is the 
absolute itself. (9) But the exposition of the absolute is in truth the absolute's own act 
which begins from itself and arrives at itself. The absolute only as the absolute identity 
is still determinate or imperfect since the absolute is here posited by external reflection 
merely as against opposition and manifoldness; it merely remains the negative of 
reflection. This is not yet the absolute absolute, but only the absolute in a 
determinateness, or it is attribute. (10) In other words, the absolute is the absolute only 
because it is not abstract identity but the identity of being and essence or of the inner 
and the outer. Therefore the absolute as this identity is the absolute form which makes 
80 it reflect itself into itself and determines it into attribute. 
80 Sci. Logic, pp. 530-33. 
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(b) The Absolute Attribute 
The above expression `the absolute absolute' denotes the absolute which in its form has 
returned into itself or whose form is identical with its content. By contrast, the absolute 
attribute (das absolute Attribut) is merely the relative absolute, a connection which 
signifies simply the absolute in a form determination. But since form is also the form of 
the absolute, the attribute is the whole content of the absolute. That is, the attribute is 
`the totality which previously appeared as a world, or as one of the sides of the 
essential relation, each of which is itself the whole'. 8' 
(c) The Mode of the Absolute 
The absolute is truly the absolute identity only as the act (Tun) of the reflective 
movement itself. The absolute is absolute being in that the exposition is the self- 
dissolving reflection which is the return-into-itself because the exposition is the shining 
(Schein) as shining. The expounding reflection seems (scheint) to begin from 
something external, but it in fact has, in the absolute itself, the determinateness from 
which it begins. This determinateness belongs to the reflective movement; through this 
alone it is determined and has absolute form, and is what posits itself as equal to 
itself. 82 
Therefore `the mode of the absolute' (der Modus des Absoluten) truly means the 
absolute's own reflective movement as a determining (Bestimmen). It is the 
manifestation (Zeigen) of itself as what it already is. It is the movement out of (heraus) 
itself. But this being-outwards (Sein-nach-Außen) is also inwardness (Innerlichkeit) 
and is thus also a positing (Setzen) which is not merely positedness but absolute being. 
The absolute manifests that the distinction between form and content is dissolved in the 
absolute. Or rather, to manifest itself (sich zu manifestieren) is the content of the 
absolute. The absolute is the absolute form which is identical with itself. The content is 
the exposition of the absolute form. The absolute is the absolute manifestation of itself 
for itself, as the absolute identity-with-itself. As such the absolute is actuality. 83 
81 Sci. Logic, p. 533. 
82 Sci. Logic, pp. 534-35. 
83 Sci. Logic, pp. 535-36. 
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Section 6 
The Absolute Further Described 
As stated up to this point, in the realm of essence the absolute has developed from 
reflection, through appearance, to actuality. The absolute now shows its more mature 
form. 84 Here the absolute is already the absolute unity of being and essence, and the 
unity of the inner and the outer; the absolute is now not only the absolute form but also 
the absolute content whose manifoldness is the only identity, in which each of the parts 
is itself the whole. The absolute is the ground into which the reflected determinations 
(such as appearance, the inner and outer totality, form and content) are engulfed 
(untergegangen). This shows the more developed feature of the absolute than in the 
previous realm of being. Categories, the expressions of the absolute, do no longer pass 
over into other categories. They are engulfed into the ground. 
The absolute is the identity, as stated before. 85 But it is the absolute identity in 
which the moment of reflection is sublated. In this sublated movement of reflection, the 
differences set forth by the absolute itself are also destroyed; or rather, they are 
engulfed into the ground (an expression of the absolute). This movement is therefore 
the negative movement, as a retreat to the ground, towards the truth of the absolute. 
This negative movement which is also positive as shining, is now clearly shown in the 
realm of essence, here at actuality. The absolute now seems to be fully exposed. But 
this exposition is itself the absolute's own act which makes the absolute be the absolute 
itself. However, here at the stage of actuality, the emphasis is still on the identity, which 
still remains to be the work of negative reflection. Therefore the absolute is not yet 
fully exposed. That is, the absolute is not yet the absolute absolute but the absolute 
attribute although the absolute has grown up, through several stages within the realm of 
essence, to the stage of actuality, as absolute attribute. The more developed or grown- 
up feature of the absolute will be shown only in the next, the highest stage of the 
absolute, the concept. 
Here an important aspect of the development of categories (the expression of 
the absolute) is seen. Each category, in the realms of being and essence, has developed 
84 I discussed this point of more mature, organic form explicated in the category of contradiction in Sec. 
2(c) above. This section is its continuation. 
$5 See Sec. 5(a) above. 
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from the preliminary forms to the more mature forms of categories. But even the most 
mature form of categories in the lower stage is to be considered as still immature or 
undeveloped, from the viewpoint of the higher stage. That is, the meaning of the 
development of many categories in Logic can be correctly grasped only when it is 
viewed from the perspective of the organic growth of categories - from the lower, 
immature to the higher, more developed and mature. (Here I use the term `organic' in 
contrast to mechanical or abstract. The organic is in this sense concrete. ) However, 
this organic feature of the development of categories, i. e. the development of the 
absolute itself, is not complete in essence. The full maturity will be attained only in the 
realm of the concept, which includes the category of life. 
A general aspect of the absolute in Logic can be stated here. The absolute, in a 
certain phase of its own non-temporal self-movement (as self-development and thus 
also as self-explication, through self-mediation), finds itself in contradiction. Thus the 
absolute has necessarily to sublate itself, i. e. it raises itself up to a higher category by 
its own freedom as self-movement. Through all the phases of logic the absolute 
restlessly (but atemporally) develops itself until it finally (but atemporally) reaches the 
absolute idea as its own ultimate truth. This whole process as self-development is 
dialectic, the truth. In other words, dialectic is this self-development, and thus also the 
self-disclosure, of the absolute. This self-movement of the absolute, i. e. dialectic, has 
within itself contradictions and their sublation, as its own necessary moments. This 
self-movement is the free, and thus necessary, act of the absolute. For Hegel the 
absolute is in the ultimate sense God, which is the thought which thinks of itself. 86 The 
so-called identity of thought and being, when grasped in thought, is nothing but an 
expression of the thought's self-identity to itself, i. e. the absolute's self-identity to 
itself. For thought, when described in general terminology, being or reality is the 
realised thought, and thought is the idealised or sublated being. The identity of thought 
and being is the above whole process of the absolute's own self-development as self- 
explication to itself. This whole process is dialectic, as stated above. This process is 
organic since the development of categories is organic, as mentioned before. 
87 As has 
been shown through my clarification of infinitv$8 and contradiction, 
$9 a category or 
Ra See Chap. 4 Sec. 3(b). 
87 See Chap. 5 Sections 2(f) and 6. 
88 Loc. cit. 
89 See Sec. 2(c) in this chapter. 
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moment is a unity of unities, each of which is itself the unity of itself and its opposite, 
as the self-movement (self-development and self-explication) of the absolute. 
Moreover, it is to be remembered that here in the realm of essence the development of 
categories (expressions and moments of the absolute) has become more organic than in 
the realm of being9° - for example, sublation has become more organic in that the 
determinations of reflection (identity, distinction and contradiction) do no longer pass 
over into others, but are to be engulfed into the ground. (The organic is to be also 
grasped as the unity of the organic and its opposite, the inorganic. Each of them is the 
unity of itself and its own opposite. As a whole unity of these unities, this unity is 
organic, embracing within itself the inorganic. ) This whole process of the development 
of categories is the identity of thought and being. Hence this identity is organic - not 
the amalgamation of different moments but the interpenetration between 
distinguishable but inseparable moments of the absolute. Thought and being stem from, 
and withdraw into, their one and the same origin, the absolute, which is the thought 
which thinks of itself, and the act of which is dialectic, i. e. the self-development of 
categories through the whole process of logic. 
The above stated is a general aspect of the absolute, the self-movement (as such 
a whole process) of which is dialectic, when referred to the identity of thought and 
being. However, this feature of the absolute is still immature in the realm of essence. 
This feature will be more clearly explicated by the absolute's own development to the 
higher realm, the concept. 
90 Loc. cit. 
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Chapter 7 
Dialectic in the Doctrine of the Concept 
Preliminaries 
To designate Begriff I will always employ the term 'concept'. ' In this chapter I will 
follow the descriptions of the concept which is the ultimate phase of Logic, and which 
therefore shapes the dialectic in its richest form. The main issues on dialectic through 
my interpretation will be discussed not in this chapter but in the next chapter. For the 
discussion of dialectic in the concept has to be itself the total discussion of dialectic as 
such which embraces within itself all the previous expositions of dialectic sublated to 
its richest form, and which therefore needs another, independent chapter. This chapter 
therefore focuses on how Hegel describes the feature of dialectic in the realm of the 
concept. 
(a) The Concept 
The absolute has now reached the stage of the concept (Begriff). The concept is free 
and is totality since each of its moments is a whole. The concept is in philosophy (in the 
proper sense) the principle of all life and is thus the utterly concrete whereas in the 
understanding the concept is taken merely as dead, empty and abstract form of 
thinking. In the realm of the concept the antithesis between form and content is 
overcome dialectically through themselves. That is, the concept contains all the earlier 
determinations of thinking sublated within itself. The concept is not abstract but 
concrete (not in the meaning of `sensibly concrete') since the concept contains being 
11 follow the usage in Geraets et al. 's Shorter Logic. 
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and essence and thus contains within itself their richness in ideal unity. ̀
 In the realm of 
the concept there is no longer passing-over (Übergehen) into another (like in being) nor 
shining (Scheinen) into another (like in essence). Instead, in the concept there is the 
movement of development (Entwicklung) since its distinguished moments are 
immediately posited as identical with one another and also with the whole. Through the 
development what is already implicitly present, is posited. The stage of the concept in 
logic is parallel to organic life in nature. 3 
The above stated is also described as follows. Being and essence are now 
known to be the moments of the becoming of the concept. Or rather, the concept is the 
foundation (Grundlage) and truth (Wahrheit) of both being and essence as the identity 
in which they are submerged and contained. In other words, the concept is the result 
(Resultat) of being and essence. The concept is the truth of substance - in that necessity 
is the substance's specific mode of relationship, and freedom is therefore known to be 
the truth of necessity and the mode of relationship proper to the concept. 4 Life, or 
organic nature, is a stage within nature at which the concept emerges, but as 
unconscious of itself and unthinking. In contrast, the concept, as self-conscious and 
thinking, pertains solely to spirit. 5 
(b) Logic as the Science of the Absolute Form Expressed as the Concept 
Logic is the science of the absolute form which is a totality and thus contains the pure 
idea of truth itself. This absolute form has within itself its content or reality. The 
concept is not an empty identity, and thus possesses the differentiated determinations in 
its moment of negativity or of absolute determining. Content (Inhalt) is solely these 
determinations of the absolute form which posits the content itself. 6 In order for logic 
(as the science of absolute form) to be true, it must possess within itself a content 
which is adequate to its form. Moreover, the formal element of logic is the pure form, 
and the truth of logic must be the pure truth itself. Therefore logic, i. e. the formal 
2 Enc. Logic, § 160 and Addition, pp. 236-37. 
3 Enc. Logic, § 161 and Addition, p. 237. 
° Sci. Logic, pp. 577-78. 
5 Sci. Logic, p. 586. 
6 Sci. Logic, p. 592. 
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science in this sense, must be regarded as possessing richer determinations and content 
? and as more closely related to the concrete than is usually considered. 
(c) The Division of the Concept 
The concept is the unity of being and essence in that essence is the first negation of 
being, and the concept is the second negation as the negation of the first negation of 
being. Therefore the concept is being-once-more (das wiederhergestelte Sein) as the 
being which has been restored as the infinite mediation and negativity of being within 
itself. 8 That is, the concept is the absolute self-identity as the negation of negation or as 
the infinite unity of the negativity with itself. 9 
Therefore the doctrine (Lehre) of the concept subdivides into (1) subjective (or 
formal) concept, (2) objectivity or the concept as determined to immediacy, and (3) the 
idea or the subject-object as the unity of the concept and objectivity, i. e. the absolute 
truth. 10 
Section 1 
Subjectivity (or Subjective Concept) 
(a) The Concept as such 
The concept as such contains the moments of universality, particularity and singularity. 
Universality (Allgemeinheit) is the free equality with itself in its determinacy. 
Particularity (Besonderheit) is the determinacy in which the universal is serenely 
(ungetrübt) equal to itself. Singularity (Einzelheit) is the inward reflection of the 
determinacies of universality and particularity; it is the singular negative unity with 
itself, i. e. what is in-and-for-itself determined as what is identical with itself or 
7 Sci. Logic, p. 594. 
8 Sci. Logic, p. 598. 
9 Sci. Logic, p. 601. 
10 Enc. Logic, § 162, p. 238. 
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universal. " What is to be pointed out here is that each moment of the concept is itself 
the whole concept. 12 Singularity, i. e. subject, is nevertheless the concept which is 
posited as totality. 13 
When taken abstractly, universality, particularity and singularity are identical 
with identity, distinction and ground, respectively. Universality is the same as identity 
in the sense that universality contains within itself the particular and the singular. 
Particularity is the immediate or what is distinct - but only in the sense that the 
particular is inwardly universal and is actual as something-singular. Singularity is 
ground in the sense that the singular is subject. What is described here is the posited 
unseparatedness of the moments in their distinction14 - this is the clarity (Klarheit) of 
the concept, i. e. the unseparatedness in distinction. 15 It should be remembered again 
that universality, particularity and singularity (or individuality) should not be 
considered to be apart (isolated) from one another; only mere representational (or 
pictorial) thinking (Vorstellung) supposes such false abstraction . 
16 
Singularity posits the moments of the concept as distinctions inasmuch as 
singularity is the negative inward reflection of the concept. Singularity is thus initially 
the concept's free distinguishing, as its first negation. Therefore the determinacy of the 
concept is posited as particularity, firstly as the distinct moments over and against each 
other, secondly as their identity. This posited particularity of the concept, in this 
double-sided sense (i. e. with both distinction and identity), is judgement. '? 
(b) Judgement 
Judgement (Urteil) is the concept as the distinguishing relation (Beziehung) of the 
moments (i. e. universality, particularity and singularity) which are posited as being-for- 
themselves (fürsichseiende), i. e. as identical with themselves. '8 Yet it should be noticed 
Enc. Logic, § 163, p. 239. 
12 Cf. Enc. Logic, § 160. 
13 Enc. Logic, § 163 Remark, p. 240. 
14 Cf. Enc. Logic, § 160. 
15 Enc. Logic, § 164 Remark, p. 242. 
16 Sci. Logic, p. 620. 
17 Enc. Logic, § 165, pp. 242-43. 
18 Enc. Logic. § 166, p. 243. 
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that the concept is essentially one (wesentlich einer); the moments of the concept 
should not be considered to be diverse sorts of the concepts-19 
Judgement should not be considered as subjective. Judgement is to be at first 
entirely universal. That is, every thing is a singular which is in its inner nature a 
universality, i. e. a universal that is made singular. In this sense every thing is a 
judgement. Universality and singularity distinguish themselves from each other, but are 
also identical. 20 
The standpoint of judgement is finitude (Endlichkeit). The finitude of things 
consists in their being a judgement - in that their thereness (Dasein) and their nature 
are united; otherwise the things would be nothing. 21 
In the abstract judgement the singular is the universal, the subject (the singular) 
is concrete, and the predicate (the universal) is abstract and undetermined. However, 
since in this judgement the singular and the universal are connected by the copula `is', 
the predicate must contain within its universality the determinacy, the subject, i. e. 
particularity. This particularity is the posited identity of subject and predicate. 22 
(i) Qualitative Judgement 
Qualitative judgement is the immediate judgement which is the judgement of thereness 
(Dasein). Here the subject is posited in the universality (as its predicate) which is an 
immediate (and hence sensible) quality. Qualitative judgement initially falls into (1) the 
positive judgement (i. e. the singular is something-particular) and (2) the negative 
judgement (i. e. the singular is not something-particular). Then the judgement falls into 
itself as (3)(a) the judgement of identity (the empty identity-relation) and as (3)(b) the 
infinite judgement (the total incommensurability of subject and predicate). 23 
Hegel points out that correctness is not truth. Correctness (Richtigkeit) is 
merely the formal agreement of our representation with its content whereas truth 
(Wahrheit) is the agreement of the object with itself, i. e. with its concept. 24 
19 Enc. Logic, § 166 Addition, p. 245. 
20 Enc. Logic, § 167, pp. 245-46. 
21 Enc. Logic, § 168, p. 246. 
22 Eric. Logic, § 169, pp. 246-47. 
23 Enc. Logic, §§ 172-73, pp. 249-50. 
24 Enc. Logic, § 172 Addition, pp. 249-50. 
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(ii) Judgement of Reflection 
For the singular as the inwardly reflected singular, the subject is, as relating itself to 
itself, an other to the predicate. Unlike in qualitative, immediate judgement, the subject 
is in relationship (connectedness) with an other. In this sense the subject (the singular) 
is therefore something-universal; i. e. the subject is already above the mere singularity. 
This results in particularity - in that this judgement pertains to both the singular itself 
and something else. Hence the particular is extended to universality. The universality in 
the context of the singularity of subject is allness (Allheit), i. e. communality 
(Gemeinschaftlichkeit) or the ordinary universality of reflection (die gewöhnliche 
Reflexions-Allgemeinheit). Since the subject (as the singular) is also something- 
universal, as stated above, the universality which is identical with the negative inward 
reflection of subject, entails the necessity of judgemental relation . ̀'S 
(iii) Judgement of Necessity 
Judgement of necessity, i. e. the identity of content in its distinction, falls into (1) 
categorical judgement (e. g. `Gold is a metal'), i. e. the immediate judgement, (2) 
hypothetical judgement ('If A is, then B is'), i. e. the identity in which the actuality of 
the one is also not its own but is the uttering of the other, and (3) disjunctive judgement 
('A is either B or C or D'), i. e. the circle of its self-including particularisation, of which 
the either-or as well as both-and is the genus, and in which the genus is the totality of 
its species, and conversely the totality of the species is the genus. This unity of the 
universal and the particular is the concept which forms the content of the judgement. 26 
(iv) Judgement of the Concept 
Judgement of the concept is that which has the concept (the totality in simple form) as 
its content, i. e. the universal with its complete determinacy. Judgement of the concept 
falls into (1) assertoric judgement, i. e. the agreement or disagreement of two 
determinations about what is good, true, correct, etc., (2) problematic judgement, and 
(3) apodeictic judgement, which expresses what constitutes the content of predicate 
2' Eric. Logic, §§ 174-76, pp. 251-53. 
26 Enc. Logic, § 177 and Addition, pp. 253-55. 
119 
(e. g. `This (immediate singularity) house (genus) being constituted thus and so 
(particularity) is good or bad'). In apodeictic judgement all things are a genus - this 
means that if the objective particularisation is posited in the subject, then the subject 
2' expresses its relation of how it is constituted to its determination, i. e. to its genus. 
What has been posited in judgements, stated up to this point, is the unit, of 
subject and predicate as the concept itself. That is, the concept is the fulfilment of the 
empty `is' of the copula. In this unity, as long as it is the unity, the moments (subject 
and predicate) are distinct. Therefore the concept is posited as the unity of these 
moments; it is the relation mediating between them. The unity as this relation is 
syllogism. 28 
(c) Syllogism 
Syllogism (Schluß) is the unity of the concept and judgement. It is (a) the concept; it is 
the simple identity into which the form-distinctions of judgement return. It is also (b) 
judgement insofar as it is posited also in reality, i. e. in the distinction of 
determinateness. Syllogism is the essential ground of everything. The absolute is now 
syllogism. In this context everything is syllogism since everything is a concept in that 
the universal nature of the concept realises external reality through particularity, and in 
that as the negative inward reflection the concept makes itself into the singular. In other 
words, the actual (das Wirkliche) is a singular which rises to universality by means of 
particularity, and which hence becomes identical with itself. In this sense the actual is 
one (Eines), but it is also the stepping asunder of the moments of the concept. 
Syllogism is the cycle of this mediation of the moments of the concept. Only through 
this cycle is the concept one. 29 
(i) Qualitative Syllogism 
The forms of qualitative syllogism falls into (1) S-P-U (singular-particular-universal: S- 
M, M-P . -. S-P), (2) U-S-P 
(universal-singular-particular: M-S, M-P . -. S-P), and (3) P- 
27 Enc. Logic, §§ 178-79, pp. 255-56. 
28 Eric. Logic, § 180, p. 256. 
29 Enc. Logic, § 181 and Remark, pp. 256-57. 
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U-S (particular-universal-singular: S-M, P-M . ". S-P). 
3° Hegel highly praises Aristotle 
for his contribution to the formulation of syllogistic forms. Hegel rejects the fourth 
form (P-M, M-S . ". S-P) as `superfluous and even absurd addition made 
by Moderns'. 31 
Aristotle himself did not set this fourth form. 32 
Syllogism is truth only insofar as it is used in the process of reason or 
speculation. What Aristotle achieved is exactly this. 33 It can be even said that if 
syllogism is used for the understanding alone, it is meaningless. 
The objective meaning of the forms of syllogism is that everything rational is a 
threefold syllogism - in the sense that each of the three terms holds the position both of 
an extreme and of a mediating middle. In this context the logical idea, nature and spirit 
are the three terms of absolute syllogism. Here each of them can be a middle-term to 
the other two of philosophical sciences. 34 
The significance of the difference among the three forms of syllogism is as 
follows. In the first form (S-P-U), S-P and P-U are still unmediated. But S-P is to be 
mediated in the third form (P-U-S), and P-U is to be mediated in the second form (U-S- 
P). Therefore the mediating unity of the concept has to be posited as the developed 
unity of singularity and universality. This is the reflected unity as the singularity which 
is also determined as universality. 35 
(ii) Syllogism of Reflection 
Syllogism of reflection is first of all (1) the syllogism of allness (Allheit), in which the 
middle term is not only the abstract particular determinacy of subject but also all 
singular concrete subjects. This syllogism of allness, however, entails a problematic 
point - that the major premise, which holds the middle term as the particular 
determinacy as stated above, inevitably already presupposes the conclusion itself which 
it itself has to prove. Therefore the syllogism of allness leads to (2) the induction, in 
which there is endless enumeration of singular instances as the middle term. Induction 
is therefore necessarily incomplete since it is based on (3) analogs'. Although the 
30 Enc. Logic, §§ 183-87, pp. 259-62. 
;1 Enc. Logic, § 187 Remark, p. 262. 
32 Geraets et al., Note 19 to Enc. Logic, § 187 Remark. p. 332. 
33 Enc. Logic, § 187 Remark. p. 263. 
34 Enc. Logic. § 187 Addition, p. 263. 
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induction based on analogy is actually important in empirical sciences, and Hegel does 
not deny the importance of induction, yet it is to be recognised that any induction is 
imperfect since whether it reaches the truth or not is arbitrary as long as it is based on 
analogy. 36 
(iii) Syllogism of Necessity 
Syllogism of necessity has the universal as its middle term whereas the syllogism of 
reflection had singularity as its middle term. Syllogism of necessity falls into (1) 
categorical syllogism, in which the particular is the mediating determination, (2) 
hypothetical syllogism, in which the singular in the sense of immediate being is its 
mediating determination, and (3) disjunctive syllogism, in which the universal is the 
mediating determination as the totality of its particularisations and as a singular 
particular or as excluding singularity. In all these determinations there is one and the 
same universal in the forms of distinction. 37 
(iv) The Fundamental Point of Syllogism 
The universal result of the process of syllogism is the self-sublation of these 
distinctions and of the self-externality of the concept. To elaborate: (1) Each of the 
moments which are in-themselves identical, is the totality of moments, i. e. the whole 
syllogism. (2) The negation of their distinctions (and the mediation of them) constitutes 
the being-for-itself (Fürsichsein) of the concept. Here one and the same universal is 
posited also as their identity. In the ideality of the moments in this context, syllogistic 
reasoning attains a determination as the negation of the determinacies through which 
the syllogistic reasoning itself proceeds, and it also attains a determination as a 
mediation through the sublation of mediation, and attains a concluding of subject - not 
with an other but with a sublated other, i. e. with itself . 
38 
The concept is subjective. But this point is to be grasped in the context that the 
subjectivity of the concept itself breaks through its own barrier and opens itself up into 
is Enc. Logic, § 189 and Remark, p. 264. 
36 Enc. Logic, § 190 and Addition, pp. 264-66. 
37 Enc. Logic. § 191, pp. 266-67- 
38 Enc. Logic, § 192, p. 267. 
122 
objectivity by means of syllogism. In this sense the subjectivity of the concept is 
dialectical. 39 
This realisation of the concept, in which the universal is this one totality 
returned into itself, and which, through the sublation of the mediation, has determined 
itself as immediate unity, is the object. This realisation of the concept as the object was 
the passage from subject (i. e. from the concept in general and from the syllogism) to the 
object. The object is the one whole which is inwardly still undetermined, i. e. the 
objective world in general, God, the absolute object. But the object equally has 
distinction within it - in that each of isolated bits is also an object (objective world) or 
something-there (Dasein) which is inwardly concrete, complete and independent. The 
ground from which existence emerges, i. e. the relationship of reflection that sublates 
itself into actuality, was the still imperfectly posited concept; it was merely the unity of 
the concept at the level of essence. Contrary to this, the concept contains real 
distinctions as totalities within itself. It cannot be emphasised enough that the concept 
and objectivity are in-themselves identical . 
40 
An important point of syllogism is as follows. Syllogism is the restoration of the 
concept in judgement; therefore it is the unity and truth of both the concept and 
judgement. The essential feature of syllogism consists in the unity of the extremes, and 
the middle term which unites them, and also the ground which supports them. 
However, if syllogism is considered as merely positing the unity of extremes, and if this 
unity is considered merely as a particular on its own and also as an external relation, 
and also if non-unity is considered as the essential relationship of syllogism, then 
reason (Vernunft) which constitutes the syllogism, contributes nothing to rationality 
(Vernünftigkeit) . 
41 Only when considered as the necessary path from subjectivity to 
objectivity - i. e. as the path to reach the objectivity of the concept in the 
aforementioned context - is the syllogism meaningful. 
39 Enc. Logic, § 192 Addition, p. 268. 
40 Enc. Logic, § 193 and Remark, pp. 268-70. 




(a) Objectivity as such, Mechanism and Chemism 
The object (Objekt) is the immediate being as the sublated distinction and is the totality 
in itself. The object is also the same as its own unity since the identity as totality is the 
identity of its moments; it is the falling asunder into distinct moments, each of which is 
itself a totality. Therefore the object is the absolute contradiction between the complete 
independence of distinct moments and their equally complete dependency. 42 
Objectivity at first takes the forms of mechanism (Mechanismus) and cheini sm 
(Chemismus). They are equally the still imperfect concepts - i. e. both of them are the 
concepts existent only in itself - whereas purpose is the concept as existent for itself. 
But mechanism and chemism are also very different from each other - in mechanism 
the object is only the indifferent relation to itself (i. e. the object is not considered as 
related to the other) whereas in chemism the object at least presupposes its relation to 
the other. 43 The two forms in chemical process sublate each other reciprocally, and this 
shows the path from chemism to teleological relationship. Consequently the concept, 
which was still merely present in itself in mechanism and chemism, now becomes free, 
and this concept that is now for itself is purpose. 44 
(b) Teleology, and Transition to the Idea 
Purpose (Zweck) is the concept which is now free and is-for-itself (für-sich-seiende) by 
means of the negation of immediate objectivity. The purpose itself is the sublation of 
the contradiction between the self-identity and the negation posited in the antithesis. In 
this sense purpose is the activity (Tätigkeit) which negates the antithesis; i. e. the 
purpose posits its self-identity. This is the realising of the purpose (das Realisieren des 
Zwecks). Here purpose sublates the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity 
since the purpose makes itself into the other of its subjectivity and objectifies itself. 
"`' Enc. Logic, § 194, p. 272. 
4' Enc. Logic, § 200 Addition, pp. 277-78. 
44 Enc. Logic, § 203 Addition, p. 279. 
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Therefore purpose has concluded itself alone and has preserved itself. That is, purpose 
does not pass over (nicht übergeht) but preserves itself (sic/i erhält). Purpose is at the 
end what it was in the beginning; what is truly original is only through this self- 
preservation (Selbsterhaltung). 45 
Teleological relation is initially external purposiveness. Here the purpose is 
finite, and its self-determination is merely formal. Teleological relation is, then, 
syllogism. 46 Then teleological relation leads to the point at which the one-sided 
subjectivity is sublated in the realising of the purpose. The concept posits itself as the 
essence of the object, in taking hold of means. But the object is already posited as null 
and merely ideal since the accomplished purpose is determined only as means and 
material. Here the opposition between content and form has also vanished. The reason 
for this is as follows: Purpose concludes itself with itself by sublating the form- 
determinations, therefore form is posited as identical with itself, i. e. as content; and 
hence the concept, as the activity of form, has only itself for content. The concept of 
purpose is thus posited through such whole process. The unity in-itself of the subjective 
and the objective is now posited as being for-itself (als für sich seiend). This is the 
idea. 47 
In other words, `Since the purpose (Zweck) is the concept that is posited as ... 
relating itself to objectivity and as sublating ... its defect of being subjective, the 
purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit) which is initially external becomes internal and the 




The idea (Idee) is what is true in-and-for-itself, and is the absolute unity of the concept 
and objectivity. In other words, the ideal content (ideeller Inhalt) of the idea is the 
concept in its determination whereas the real content (reeller Inhalt) of the idea is only 
45 Enc. Logic, § 204 and Remark, pp. 279-80. 
46 Enc. Logic, §§ 205-06, pp. 281-82. 
47 Enc. Logic, § 212, pp. 285-86. 
48 Sci. Logic, p. 710, trans. emended. 
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the presentation (Darstellung) that the concept gives itself in the form of external 
thereness (äußerlichen Dasein), i. e. in its objectivity. Therefore since this figure 
(Gestalt) is included in the ideality of the concept or in its might (Macht), the concept 
preserves itself (sich erhält) within its ideality. 49 
The idea is the truly genuine concept, i. e. the true as such or the objectively 
true. Anything possesses truth only insofar as it is through the idea. The idea is the 
unity of the concept and objectivity, but it should not be grasped as a goal, a beyond. 
That is, it must be recognised that everything actual is only insofar as it possesses the 
idea and expresses it. 50 At the stage of the concept, `being has attained the significance 
of truth in which the idea is the unity of the concept and reality; thus being is now only 
what the idea is'. 51 
The definition of the absolute has now reached the ultimate, absolute stage - as 
the idea, as stated above. All the previously given definitions return into this definition 
which is itself absolute. The idea is the truth since the term `truth' means the 
correspondence between objectivity and the concept. The absolute is the universal and 
one idea, the particularisation of which is the judging into the system of determinate 
ideas. But these determinations return into this one idea, their truth. Because of this 
judging into determinate ideas, the idea is initially just the one and universal substance. 
But the more developed, authentic actuality (Wirklichkeit) of the idea is subject and 
thus spirit (Geist). However, it is to be remembered that the idea is essentially concrete 
since the free concept determines itself and thereby makes itself real. 52 
The idea can be grasped as (1) reason, (2) subject-object, (3) the unity of the 
ideal and the real, of finitude and infinity, (4) the possibility which has its actuality in 
itself, and (5) that whose nature can be comprehended only as existing, and so forth. 
The idea can be grasped in all these ways since the idea contains within itself all the 
relationships of the understanding in their infinite self-return and self-identity. 53 
The idea is not merely the unity of the concept and reality, but, more precisely, 
it is the unity of subjective concept and objectivity. That is, the concept as such is the 
identity of the concept itself and the reality since the term `reality' means in general the 
49 Enc. Logic, § 213, p. 286. 
50 Sci. Logic, pp. 755-56. 
51 Sci. Logic, p. 757, trans. emended. 
52 Enc. Logic, § 213 Remark, pp. 286-87. 
53 Enc. Logic, § 214, p. 288. 
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being-there (Dasein), and the concept possesses this being-there in its own particularity 
and singularity. Similarly, objectivity is the total concept that has withdrawn into the 
identity with itself. 54 
The idea itself is the dialectic which eternally distinguishes the self-identical 
from the differentiated, the subjective from the objective, the finite from the infinite. 
The idea is eternal creation, vitality and spirit in this sense. The above distinction or 
diversity is the one side of the idea, i. e. the abstract understanding. The other side of 
the idea is reason - in that through dialectic this diversity (the product of the 
understanding) is known to be finite, and the independence (also as the product of the 
understanding) is known to be a mere semblance, and its truth is known to be the unity 
of the moments differentiated by the understanding. There is a double movement 
between the understanding and reason, between distinction (or diversity) and unity. 
This double movement is not temporal; and in this movement the distinction (as 
independence, separation) as the feature of the understanding and the units' as the 
feature of reason, are not separate. In this way this double movement is the eternal 
intuiting of itself into the other. Through this intuiting (as double movement), the 
concept is the objectivity and subjectivity, i. e. as the object which is the inner 
purposiveness as essential subjectivity. 55 
In the negative unity of the idea, i. e. in this double movement, the infinite 
overgrasps (greift hinüber) the finite, thinking overgrasps being, and subjectivity 
overgrasps objectivity. Therefore the unity of the idea (as subjectivity or thinking or 
infinity) has to be essentially distinguished from the idea as substance. 56 
It is to be noticed that the idea is process57 - in that it is within the process as 
the self-movement (self-development and self-explication) of the absolute. 
The stages of the idea in its development in the process are (a) life (i. e. in the 
form of immediacy) and (b) cognition (as mediation or difference). The result of the 
process of cognition (i. e. the re-establishing of unity enriched by distinction) leads, 
through (c) willing, to (d) the absolute idea. This last stage of the logical process (i. e. 
sa Sci. Logic, p. 758. 
SS Enc. Logic, § 214 Remark. p. 289. 
56 Enc. Logic, § 215 Remark, p. 290. 
`7 Enc. Logic, § 215. p. 290. 
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the absolute idea) proves also to be what is genuinely first and what is only through 
itself. 58 
(a) Life 
Life (Leben) is the immediate idea. Life is its own result as the negative unity that is 
for-itself. Life concludes itself only with itself in the dialectic of corporeity. Hence life 
is essentially the singular living being (Lebendiges) in its immediacy. 59 However, the 
significance of life as the process consists in the overcoming of the above immediacy. 
This process, a threefold one, results in the idea in the form of judgement, i. e. the idea 
as cognition. 60 Living beings are active syllogisms or process. In this sense it is to be 
noticed that within the subjective unity of living being, the three processes are only the 
aspects of one process (ein Prozef3). 61 
The details of the above `three processes' of living being are as follows. (1) The 
first process is that of the living being inside itself. It sunders itself and makes its 
corporeity into its object, or into its inorganic nature. Here the emphasis is on the self- 
reproduction, and the living individual behaves itself inwardly as subject and the 
concept. (2) In the second process the judgement of the concept in its freedom goes on 
to release the above objectivity out of itself as an independent totality. The dialectic, 
through which the object sublates itself, is the activity of the living being that is certain 
of itself. Living being thereby maintains, develops and objectifies itself. Here the living 
individual assimilates its external objectivity to itself. (3) In this way the living 
individual posits the real determinacy within itself as the substantial universality. 62 
(b) Cognition 
The idea is freely for-itself inasmuch as the idea has itself as its object. The subjectivity 
of the idea is the pure distinguishing inside itself. 63 The idea is the certainty of the 
implicit (an sich seiende) identity of the objective world with it. Reason is that which 
58 Enc. Logic, § 215 Addition, p. 291. 
59 Enc. Logic, § 216, p. 291. 
60 Enc. Logic, § 216 Addition, p. 292. 
61 Enc. Logic, § 217, p. 292. 
6` Enc. Logic, §§ 218-20, pp. 292-93. 
63 Enc. Logic. § 223. p. 294. 
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posits this identity. TM The reason acting as the understanding consists in that the truth 
reached by the understanding is only the finite truth - in that the understanding 
considers the infinite truth of the concept as fixed as a goal that is only in-itself, or as a 
beyond (cf. Kant's noumenon) since the understanding considers the conceptual 
determinations as merely diverse or different from one another. Yet, in truth, the 
understanding stands under the guidance of the concept, but the understanding does not 
know this. 65 
Cognition (Erkennen) can be grasped as the moments of both analytical method 
and synthetic method. The analytical method consists in making a concrete universal 
(e. g. the genus, or force and law) stand out through the abstraction from the seemingly 
inessential particularisation. The analytical method has formal identity or the 
abstraction of universality. 66 
The synthetic method is the taking up of the object into the form of the 
determinate concept of the understanding. 67 The difference between analytic method 
and synthetic method is as follows: The analytic method starts from the singular and 
advances to the universal. In contrast to this, the synthetic method starts with the 
universal (as a definition), and through the particularisation (in division) it advances to 
the singular (in the theorem). Therefore the synthetic method is known to be the 
development of the moments of the concept in the object. 68 
The details of synthetic method are as follows. (a) Definition is the object which 
is brought first into the form of determinate concept by cognition. The material and 
justification of definition are provided by the analytical method. 69 Three moments of 
the concept which definition contains are (1) the universal as the proximate genus, (2) 
the particular as the determinacy of species, and (3) the singular as the defined object 
itself. 70 (b) Division is the determinacy of the universal as particularisation; this is the 
specification of the second moment of the concept, as stated above. " Theorem is, as its 
64 Enc. Logic, § 224, p. 295. 
65 Enc. Logic, § 226, p. 296. 
66 Enc. Logic, § 227 and Addition, p. 296-97. 
67 Enc. Logic, § 228, p. 297. 
68 Enc. Logic, § 228 Addition, p. 297. 
69 Enc. Logic, § 229, p. 297. 
70 Enc. Logic, § 229 Addition, pp. 297-98. 
71 Enc. Logic, § 230. p. 298. 
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object, a synthetic relation of distinct determinations when taken in its concrete 
singularity. 72 
Necessity as such, in itself, is now known to be the concept that relates itself to 
itself. In this way the subjective idea reaches what is in-and-for-itself determinate, and 
is thus immanent in the subject. The subjective idea as cognition is now to pass over 
into the idea of willing. 73 
(c) Willing 
The drive (Trieb) of the subjective idea as the good (das Gute) to realise itself has, as 
its converse, the drive of the idea of the true; and it aims to determine, by its own 
purpose, the world which it finds already there. The willing (Wollen), then, ascertains 
itself that the presupposed object must be null and void (Nichtigkeit); the drive, 
however, as being finite, considers the purpose of the good as merely subjective idea, 
and this drive presupposes the independence (Selbständigkeit) of the object. 74 
Therefore the finitude of this activity of the drive is the contradiction - in that 
the purpose of the good is both achieved and not achieved in the self-contradictory 
determinations of the objective world. In other words, the purpose of the good is 
posited as both essential and inessential purpose, and as both actual and merely possible 
purpose. This contradiction is the infinite progress in the actualisation of the good, as 
fixed in this progress as a mere ought (Sollen). How can this contradiction be resolved? 
The above activity of the drive formally sublates the subjectivity of the purpose and 
hence also sublates the objectivity which is the subjectivity's antithesis that makes both 
(subjectivity and objectivity) finite. That is, the activity of the drive sublates the 
subjectivity in general, not the finitude of this or that subjectivity. Moreover, in this 
infinite progress of willing, the subjectivity, as the re-production of its antithesis 
(objectivity), cannot be distinguished from the previous subjectivity. This is the return 
or recollection (Erinnerung) of the content (which is both the good and the identity in- 
itself) into itself. Or rather, it is the recollection of the theoretical activity, cognition. 75 
72 Enc. Logic, § 231, p. 299. 
73 Eric. Logic, § 232, p. 301. 
74 Enc. Logic, § 233, p. 301. 
71 Enc. Logic. § 234, pp. 301-02. 
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In other words, in the above infinite progress, the finitude of willing (which has 
been considered as only practical, not theoretical), through this process of the willing 
itself, is sublated as the will's returning to the presupposition of cognition. Therefore 
such sublation or recollection is the unity of the theoretical and practical idea. 76 
That is, the truth of the good is posited as the unity of the theoretical and the 
practical idea. This is the truth that the good has been reached in-and-for-itself, i. e. that 
the objective world is in-and-for-itself the idea, positing itself as purpose, and also 
bringing forth its actuality through its activity. This life (Leben) is the speculative or 
absolute idea - in that life has returned to itself from the difference and finitude of 
cognition, and in that life has become identical with the concept through the activity of 
the concept. 77 
(d) The Absolute Idea 
The idea is the concept of the idea, as the unity of subjective and objective idea. For the 
concept of the idea, the idea as such is the object, i. e. the object is itself. Therefore the 
unity of subjective and objective idea is the absolute truth and all truth. This unity is the 
idea that thinks itself (die sich selbst denkende Idee). 78 It should be pointed out that in 
the realm of logic the idea is presented as thinking, i. e. as logical idea, of course. 79 
The absolute idea is the unity of the practical and theoretical idea. It is thus the 
unity of the idea of life and the idea of cognition. Here the idea of life is only the idea 
in-itself, and the idea of cognition is only the idea for-itself. Therefore the unity and 
truth of these two ideas is the idea in-and-for- itself, hence it is absolute. 80 
The above stated can be explained thus as follows. The absolute idea is the 
identity of the theoretical and practical idea, as stated above. The rational concept, by 
virtue of its immediacy of objective identity, is the return to life, and is also the sublated 
form of its immediacy as life, and contains within itself the highest degree of 
opposition. The absolute idea alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and 
76 Enc. Logic, § 234 Addition, p. 302. 
n Enc. Logic, § 235, p. 303. 
78 1 discussed this point. i. e. the influence from Aristotle, in Chap. 4 Sec. 3(b). 
79 Enc. Logic. § 236, p. 303. 
80 Enc. Logic, § 236 Addition, p. 303. 
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is all truth. The absolute idea is the sole subject-matter (Gegenstand) and content of 
philosophy. 8' 
In the absolute idea there is no longer passing-over nor presupposing. Therefore 
the absolute idea is for itself the pure form of the concept which intuits its content as 
itself. The absolute idea is its own content; and this content is the system of the logical. 
All that remains as the form for the idea is the method of this content. The true content 
of the absolute idea is the entire system; it is the absolute form. All determinations as 
the whole of the content return into this absolute form. 82 
The moments of the speculative method are (1) the beginning. (2) the 
progression and (3) the end. They are explicated as follows. 
(1) The beginning (Anfang) is being or the immediate. But it is the self- 
determining which judges and posits itself as the negative of itself. Hence being is 
negation, positedness (Gesetztsein), mediatedness (Vennitteltsein) and presupposition 
(Vorausgesetztsein). But being is the concept that is not yet posited as the concept. It is 
merely the concept in-itself (der Begriff an sich) which is still indeterminate. This being 
is just as much the universal. The beginning, in the sense of immediate being in the 
finite cognition, is taken from sense-intuition: this is the beginning of the analytical 
method of finite cognition. Here the logical is something that simply is, and is the 
concept itself in its immediacy. On the other hand, the beginning, in the sense of 
universality, is the beginning of the synthetic method of finite cognition. Here the 
logical is something-universal; i. e. it is something that the concept presupposes to 
itself. 83 Hegel points out an important issue. That is, the philosophical method is both 
analytic and synthetic - in that the philosophical method contains the analytic and 
synthetic methods sublated within itself, and the philosophical method thus behaves 
both analytically and synthetically in every one of its movements. 84 
(2) The progression (Fortgang) is the posited judgement of the idea. 
Progression is the immediate universal as the concept in-itself; it is the dialectic of 
spontaneously (an ihm selbst) reducing its own immediacy and universality to a 
moment. Therefore what-was-first (das Erste), i. e. the negative of the beginning, is now 
posited in its deternainaey, compared to the indeterminacy of the beginning. This 
81 Sci. Logic. p. 824- 
82 Enc. Logic, §237 and Addition, p. 304. 
83 Enc. Logic, § 238 and Remark, pp. 304-05. 
84 Enc. Logic, § 238 Addition, p. 305. 
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progression is both analytical and synthetic. It is analytical because, through the 
immanent dialectic, only what is contained in the immediate concept is posited. It is 
also synthetic because this distinction had not yet been posited in the immediate 
concept85 - since philosophical method is both analytic and synthetic, as stated above. 
Progression has taken its various shapes in the system of logic. In the realm of being 
the abstract form of progression was an other (ein Anderes) and passing-over 
(Übergehen) into an other. In essence the progression was shining within what-is- 
opposed (Scheinen in dem Entgegengesetzten). In the concept the progression is at first 
the distinctness of singularity from universality, and this distinctness reaches the point 
at which this distinctness is also as identity. 86 The development of essence (the second 
sphere of logic) becomes a return into the first sphere of logic, being - in that the 
concept, which was in-itself in being, has come to shine in essence. That is, the concept 
was already in-itself the idea. Each of these two spheres (being and essence) 
consummates itself into the totality, and works out its unity with the other. Only 
through this double movement (gedoppelte Bewegung) does the distinction between the 
two spheres (being and essence) get its due. That is, the self-sublating of the one- 
sidedness of these spheres prevents the unity from becoming one-sided. 87 
(3) The end (Ende): The above second sphere of essence develops the relation 
of the distinct terms into what it is initially; i. e. into the contradiction in these terms 
themselves - in the infinite progress. This contradiction resolves itself into the end 
where what is different is posited as what it is in the concept. This end is a unity in the 
sense that it is the negative of the first and the negativity of its own self. Here both of 
these first terms (as ideal and as moments) are there as sublated and thus also as 
preserved. The concept as the end is the realised concept. Here the concept is the idea 
for which the end is also only the vanishing of the semblance that the beginning may be 
something-immediate. In this sense the idea is a result. This is the cognition that the 
idea is the one totality. 88 
What is the method is to be stated here. Method (Methode) is in truth the self- 
knowing concept - as the absolute, as the subjective-objective 
for its subject-matter 
(Gegenstand), and therefore as the pure correspondence between the concept and its 
85 Enc. Logic, § 239 and Remark, pp. 305-06. 
86 Enc. Logic, § 240, p. 306. 
87 Enc. Logic, § 241, p. 306. 
88 Enc. Logic, § 242, pp. 306-07. 
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reality, i. e. as the concrete which is the concept itself. That is, the method is, as Hegel 
grasps, the movement of the concept itself. And what is explicated here is that the 
concept is everything (alle), and its movement is the universal absolute activity, i. e. the 
self-determining and self-realising movement. 89 
The method is not a mere form, but the soul and concept of the content. Method 
is distinct from the concept only inasmuch as the moments of the concept do reach the 
point where they appear as the totality of the concept. Here the idea presents itself as a 
systematic totality, i. e. as only one idea - in that the content as determinacy leads itself 
back to the idea. The particular moments of this one idea are in-themselves (an sich) 
this same idea. This leads to that, through the dialectic of the concept, these moments 
produce the simple being-for-itself of the idea. Therefore the science of logic concludes 
itself at the point where it grasps the concept of itself as the concept of the pure idea for 
which the idea is. 90 
According to the above unity, the idea that is for itself is intuiting and this 
intuiting idea is nature. The absolute freedom of the idea is that it does not merely pass 
over into life, nor that it lets life shine within itself as finite cognition, but that the 
absolute freedom of the idea resolves to release the moment of its own particularity or 
of the initial determining and otherness, i. e. the immediate idea, as its reflexion 
(Widerschein) or itself as nature. 91 
Section 4 
Dialectic in Kantian and Pre-Kantian Philosophy 
In the historical development of dialectic, the dialectic which old Eleatics and Plato 
emphasised, had a feature that two different items can be asserted: e. g. finitude versus 
infinity in space and time; presence versus non-presence in this place, etc. Here the 
emphasis is on the contradiction and nullity of the assertions. But this shows two 
meanings: (1) In the objective sense (as by Eleatics), the subject-matter (Gegenstand) 
contradicts itself and cancels (sublates) itself out and is null and void. Here truth is 
89 Sci. Logic, p. 826. 
9° Enc. Logic, § 243, p. 307. 
91 Enc. Logic, § 244, p. 307. 
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denied to world, motion, point, etc. (2) In the subjective sense, cognition is defective. 
This view would lead to a rather Kantian stance, according to which the dialectic 
imposes on us the trick of illusion; and this view is considered as the so-called `sound 
commonsense' (my wording). This is the prejudice by which dialectic is considered to 
lead only to the negative result. 92 
In form the above commonsensical view (i. e. that subject-matter or subjective 
cognition is null and void) has not had an insight on determinations (Bestimmnungen). It 
is Kant's contribution that he showed a critical view of the above uncritical view for the 
first time in modern history of philosophy. His contribution is, briefly, `the restoration 
of logic and dialectic in the sense of the examination of the determinations of thought 
in and for themselves'. 93 
Kant showed the dialectic as necessary to reason although he himself regarded 
the dialectic as defective and deceptive. 94 
Section 5 
Hegel's Dialectic in the Concept 
Some points of dialectic described by Hegel himself are to be shown here. 
One of the important concepts for the dialectic is contradiction. The thinking of 
contradiction is the essential moment of the concept. Formal thinking, i. e. the 
understanding, does not know this; it considers the contradiction to be unthinkable; i. e. 
although it views contradiction, it passes over to abstract negation. 95 
Dialectic is to be considered as the truth, which can be grasped through the 
threefold negation. The negative, initially the first negative, is the turning point of the 
movement of the concept. The negativity is the source of all activity and spiritual 
movement; this negativity is the dialectical soul which everything true possesses and 
through which alone the true is true. Hence the second negative (the negative of the 
negative), then, is the sublating of the contradiction, the sublating of the opposition 
92 Sci. Logic, pp. 831-32. 
93 Sci. Logic, pp. 832-33, my italics. 
94 Sci. Logic, p. 831.1 discussed this problem of Kant in Chap. 1 Sections 4 and 5. 
95 Sci. Logic. p. 835. 
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between the concept and reality. The second negative is thus the objective moment of 
life and spirit. (This would suggest the development from the realm of logic to those of 
nature and spirit. ) Then, the third comes. The third is the positive which results from 
the sublation of the negative; it is the concept which has realised itself by means of its 
otherness and which, by the sublation of its reality, has become united with itself and 
has restored its absolute reality, i. e. its simple relation to itself. Therefore the third, the 
result, is truth; it is equally immediacy and mediation. This third is the self-mediating 
movement and activity as this unity of immediacy and mediation. In other words, the 
third is the result, conclusion - at which the concept, by its own negativity, mediates 
itself with itself and hence posits itself as the universal and the identity of its 
moments. 96 
Then, the main feature of Hegel's dialectic expressed in the realm of concept is 
to be discussed. 
The concept, as has been described, is the ultimate phase of logic. The concept 
is the being-once-more - in that the being which was negated in essence is restored as 
the second negation of the first negation (i. e. essence). The concept is therefore the 
absolute self-identity as the negation of negation, i. e. the infinite unity of the negativity 
with itself. 97 
The concept contains within itself the moments of universality, particularity and 
singularity. But the main point is that those moments are in a unity, i. e. in the unity as 
the unseparatedness in distinction expressed by Hegel as ̀ the clarity of the concept'. 98 
However, having said this, the feature of distinction among those moments 
plays an important role in judgement - in that the judgement is the concept as the 
distinguishing relation of those moments. Yet the concept is essentially one; those 
moments are not separate. Only the representational thinking would hold such 
miscomprehension, i. e. the isolation of those moments. 99 Judgement is the concept in 
its particularity, or rather, the posited particularity of the concept is judgement - in that 
the determinacy of the concept (the subject) is particularity, initially as the distinction 
of moments, then as the identity of moments. Through this, the subject is predicate - in 
that the subject as the singular develops to the point at which the subject acquires the 
9' Sci. Logic, pp. 835-38. 
97 See Preliminaries (d) in this chapter. 
98 See Sec. 1(a) above. 
99 See Sec. 1(a) and (b). 
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particularity and the singularity; and the predicate as the universal develops to the point 
at which the predicate acquires the particularity and the singularity. The three moments 
are thus united, retaining the distinction among themselves. In other words. the 
judgement is the unity of subject and predicate as the concept itself. 100 
Syllogism is the restoration of the concept in judgement. Syllogism is therefore 
the unity and truth of both the concept and judgement. The subjectivity of the concept 
reaches the objectivity through syllogism. Syllogism is the necessary path to proceed 
from the subject to the object in this sense. To elaborate: The result of syllogism is the 
self-sublation of the distinction of the moments (singularity, particularity and 
universality) and also the self-sublation of the self-externality of the concept. 
Syllogistic reasoning entails that the subject concludes itself with itself, i. e. the sublated 
other (the object). The concept realises itself as the passage from the subject to the 
object; i. e. the object is the realisation of the concept. In this context the syllogism is 
the process which embodies within itself the unity (or identity), i. e. the infinite self- 
sublation of the above moments expressed as the totality, the whole process. This 
process of syllogism is truly dialectical although this point is not known by the abstract 
understanding. Syllogism is useful only when it is used as the process of reason. 1°' 
The object is the immediate being as the sublated distinction and is the totality 
in itself. In other words, the object is its own unity itself - in that the identity of its 
moments is the identity as totality. Objectivity has the forms of mechanism and 
chemism. The main difference between them is that chemism is at the threshold to 
teleology since chemism at least presupposes the presence of its other, and the forms in 
chemism sublate each other. '02 
Purpose is the concept which is free and is for itself. The main feature of 
purpose is self-preservation. Teleological relation develops - from the stage of external 
purposiveness, through the stage of syllogism, to the stage of the realising of the 
purpose. At the stage of purpose the opposition between content and form vanishes - in 
that the purpose concludes itself with itself by sublating the form-determinations and 
thereby positing the form as identical with itself, i. e. as content; here the concept, the 
activity of form, is content. In the process of purpose, the concept is known to be the 
10° See Sec. 1(b), esp. (iv). 
101 See Sec. 1(c), esp. (iv). 
102 See Sec. 2(a). 
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unity in-itself of subjectivity and objectivity, and is therefore the being-for-itself, which 
is the idea. ' 03 
The idea, the highest phase of the concept, is what is true in-and-for-itself; it is 
the absolute unity of the concept and objectivity. The idea is thus the truly genuine 
concept. That is, the idea is the true as such, the objectively true. More precisely, the 
idea is the unity of subjective concept and objectivity. Or rather, the idea is the concept 
as such. It is the identity of the concept itself and reality. The idea shows the ultimate 
exposition of dialectic. Dialectic is initially shown in the abstract understanding - in 
that here dialectic distinguishes. Dialectic is then shown in reason - in that the 
distinction or diversity set forth by the understanding is known to be merely the finite, 
and the truth consists in the identity of the moments which were separated by the 
understanding. The idea is this dialectic, which is the unity of the understanding and 
reason. Or rather, the non-temporal double-movement between them is the dialectic, 
which has now arrived at the highest stage of the concept, the idea, i. e. the ultimate 
stage of the absolute, the explication of which is the whole of logic. ' 04 
Dialectic, in my view, is the movement as the unity of unities - in that the 
dialectic is the double-movement between the understanding and reason (as stated 
above), and this unity is the unity of the infinite and the finite, each of which is itself 
the unity of itself and its own other. The infinite is thought, and the finite is reality. 
That is, the infinite, as the unity of such unities, is the speculative, the unity of the 
infinite (as dialectical thought) and the finite (as the understanding); each of the 
dialectic (in the narrow sense) and the understanding presupposes its other. 
Life, an aspect of the process of the idea, is the dialectic, through which the 
object sublates itself; it is the activity of the living being which is certain of itself, i. e. 
which knows its own purpose. Dialectic at the highest stage, is thus inseparable from 
teleology. '05 
The absolute idea, i. e. the concept of the idea, is not only the unity of subjective 
idea and objective idea, but also the unity of practical idea and theoretical idea. In the 
latter sense, the absolute idea is the unity of the idea of life (which is in-itself) and the 
idea of cognition (which is for-itself). In this sense the idea is now the idea in-and-for- 
itself, hence it is absolute. At the stage of the absolute idea the difference between form 
103 See Sec. 2(b). 
104 See Sec. 3. 
105 Loc. cit. 
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and content had already vanished (as aforementioned in the purpose). The absolute idea 
is the form of the concept which intuits content as itself; the content of the absolute idea 
is the absolute form. The science of logic concludes itself at the point where it grasps 
the concept of itself as the concept of the pure idea for which the idea is. 106 
All the above descriptions are the summary of the dialectical movement of the 
concept, which is the highest expression of the absolute. That is, the absolute has found 
itself as the idea as such, the absolute idea, and it is therefore the turning point into 
nature. 
What is to be described, then, is: (1) dialectic as the self-movement of the 
absolute, (2) dialectic as the ultimate expression of the infinity (which was at first 
expressed in the realm of being, then as contradiction in the realm of essence), (3) 
dialectic as the truth (which contains within itself both reason and the understanding), 
(4) dialectic as the unity of unities (as the infinite double-movement), and so forth. All 
these points are the various aspects of one and the same truth, dialectic. They will be 
explicated in the next chapter, focusing on the three key-concepts expressed as (1) the 
absolute, (2) contradiction and sublation, and (3) the identity of thought and being. 




The Fundamental Feature of Hegel's Dialectic 
Section 1 
Logic as the System of the Truth 
Before discussing Hegel's dialectic in general, what logic is for him has to he 
examined. Logic is for Hegel the exposition of God in his eternal essence before the 
creation of nature and spirit. ' Here `God' means the thought which thinks itself. 2 That 
is, at the final phase of the concept, i. e. the absolute idea, the absolute has found itself 
as iiocsis noeseos (the self-thinking thought above mentioned). 3 
For Hegel the `logic' designates a system, a circle which concludes itself as the 
thought that thinks itself. That is, for him logic is a full circle in which the result as the 
('d is the accomplished, fulfilled being (from the stage of pure being as the beg n,, i,, 0. 
i. e. the concept which conceives itself, i. e. the being that has become the c ocrele and 
is now the thorough totality. 4 The end of logic is the concept, the ultimate exposition of 
which is the iclca. Hence the dialectical system of logic is a circle of circles, a ýý hole of 
\\, holes, each one of which is a self-manifestation of the idea. the ultimate phase of the 
cýýncc'pt. 
1 (. I. Logic, p. 4.4. 
2 Sc< ( hap. 4 tics. ? (bl. 
l -cft-arin. Hegel and lrivtot . p. 
1 ''. 
4 Burbidge. On Hegel'. Logic. p. -19, ct. Sci. Loýic-, p. S-i_. 
5l. L. I11iFiS, 
. 
1ºý liýtc rýýrctation of the Logic of /Ic'tel. p. 1-4: ct. Enc. Logic. 1- 
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This `idea' is the ultimate self-explication of the absolute as it is expressed as 
thought (thinking). The `absolute' means that it is unbounded and unconditioned by 
anything other than itself. The absolute idea as thought is therefore the thought which 
has become unbounded by anything else; it has come to make itself the object of its 
own thinking. That is, at the stage of the idea, the absolute has found itself as nothing 
but the thought which thinks of itself, the self-thinking thought. All the previously 
described categories in logic are the moments or phases of the self-movement of 
thought, the absolute. The absolute as thought (which self-develops and self-explicates) 
knows itself also as the being which is in the mode of knowing itself - since knowing is 
the movement of being. The whole process of the development of the absolute in the 
system of logic, shows this absolute identity of thought and being, the truth. 6 
In the context of the self-thinking thought, mediation plays an important role. 
One of the main points of Hegel's dialectic is self-mediation - in that `thinking' means 
that one meets with oneself in the other. The whole of Hegel's system of logic is the 
absolute self-mediating totality. In this system the end is the expressed self-mediation 
of the beginning that is the whole in itself, the articulation of which is dialectic. The 
double or two of the `dia' of dialectic implies the sublation of double into one absolute, 
self-mediating whole. Or, in other words, the two or double means the two sides of the 
one encompassing process of absolute self-mediation. For Hegel the `dia' of dialectic is 
the prelude to the return of thought to itself, i. e. to the thought which thinks itself in the 
other. Here the other is not real other - in that this other finally returns to the thought 
itself in its otherness. 7 
Thus stated, the absolute has finally (but atemporally) found itself as the 
absolute idea, as absolute thinking, the object of which is itself. In the system of logic, 
the absolute starts its progression from the stage of being, which shows itself initially as 
simple being, and then nothing, and their truth, becoming. Then it turns into its higher 
truth, being-there. The realm of being-there shows the importance of infinity, which is 
the double-movement of the infinite and the finite. Then, by showing the reality as the 
second negation of the first, abstract negation (the ideal), this being-there turns into 
being-for- itself which includes the one. At the stage of the one, being as quality turns 
into quantity. Quantity, through the stages of pure quantity and quantum, then turns into 
measure. Measure, through the unity with the measureless, shows that the being as 
6I will elaborate this issue in Sec. 2 below. 
7 Desmond, `Thinking on the Double'. pp. 224.230,232. 
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immediate explicates itself as mediation. Here being is no longer being, but essence, the 
sublated, negated being. Essence, the timelessly past being, initially shows itself as 
reflection which embraces Schein. Reflection has its determinations as identity. 
distinction and contradiction (in which the opposition is reflected into itself and 
withdraws into its ground). But essence does not stop to stay as mere reflection as 
shining and mediation with itself. Essence has to show the self-sublation of distinction 
and mediation. Essence restores itself as the immediacy or being again, as existence. 
Existence shows itself as thing, which has contradiction of form and matter. Hence 
thing is, then, appearance or shining-forth. Essence is not behind nor beyond 
appearance. Appearance embraces within itself the distinction between the inner and 
the outer, between content and form. But soon afterwards it is known that they are 
essentially identical. This identity is actuality. Actuality as such shows itself as 
possibility, contingency and necessity. Then actuality shows itself as substantiality, 
causality (cause and effect) and reciprocal action. In reciprocal action the seemingly 
distinct determinations are known to be identical. But the absolute, at the stage of 
actuality, cannot fully explicate itself - in that cause and effect are still the lower 
moments of a higher whole. The absolute as essence, then, has to explicate itself as the 
concept. The concept, the highest phase of the absolute, the system of development and 
explication of which is logic, has to show itself initially as subjective concept. The 
concept, still as subjectivity, shows itself as judgement, and then as syllogism (the unity 
of the concept and judgement). But syllogism (and judgement as well) is not merely 
subjective; it shows the path from subjectivity to objectivity. Objectivity shows itself 
initially as mechanism and chemism as the concepts existent in itself. The higher stage 
of the concept for itself is purpose. Teleology clearly shows the unity in-itself of the 
subjective and the objective as the being-for- itself which is the idea. The idea, the 
ultimate phase of the concept, is the truth - in the sense of the unity of objectivity and 
the concept. The idea, as life, cognition and willing, finally (but atemporally) and 
ultimately explicates itself as the absolute idea, the truth as such, which is logic's 
whole process itself, totality. The driving force of the development throughout the 
whole system of logic, is contradiction and its sublation. Each category in logic has 
within itself its contradiction, and it has to be sublated by being developed to higher (in 
being) or more mature (in essence) or more absolute (in the concept) category. 
The truth is to be disclosed only as this whole process of logic, which is the 
self-development and self-explication of the absolute as the self-thinking thought. In no 
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other way can this ultimate, absolute truth be known. If the truth is that which can be 
proved (in ordinary sense) in other ways or by something other than itself, then the 
`ultimate' or `absolute' truth is in fact not ultimate nor absolute. (This means that the 
absolute truth cannot be grounded nor conditioned by anything other than itself, hence 
it can be duly called `absolute'. ) This unconditioned truth, the absolute truth, is the self- 
thinking thought. Being unbounded by anything other than itself, this absolute truth, as 
the self-thinking thought which is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity as the idea 
in-and-for- itself, is freedom as such. Truth shows itself as the cognition of this truth of 
thought - as the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, or, in other words, as the identity 
of thought and being. 
Section 2 
The Identity of Thought and Being 
In the sphere of the concept, as stated above, the thought recognises its categories as the 
determinations both of being and of thought. 8 In other words, the system of Hegel's 
logic determines the structure of being as well as of thought. Therefore his system of 
logic explicates not simply validity, but truth. 9 This shows the identity of thought and 
being. 
The above can be also stated as follows. The thought characterises its entire 
range of the objects. Hence there are no remainder, i. e. no things-in-themselves left 
outside the structure of thought. That is, the structure which is manifested by the self- 
comprehension of thought, also embraces within itself the structure of all objects of 
thought. An object which is not an object of thought, is not an object in truth. 10 
When described in general terminology, being can be also called reality (not in 
Hegel's strict sense as the negation of the ideal), or the objective world, or objectivity. 
Thought (or thinking), by the same token, can be also called cognition or the subjective 
(also not in Hegel's strict sense). The so-called identity of thought and being can be 
thus called the identity of reality and thought, or the unity of objective reality and 
8 Houlgate, Freedom, Truth and History, p. 57. 
9 Houlgate, p. 70. 
'° de Vries, 'Hegel's Logic and Philosophy of Mind', p. 230. 
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subjective thinking. However, as Hegel explicates throughout the whole development 
of the spheres of the concept, this identity is not a fixed identity - such as the abstract 
understanding supposes - but the identity as the progression from the subjective 
concept to the truly objective concept, the idea, which is the ultimate expression of the 
absolute. This progression is, in other words, the self-movement of the absolute froin 
subjectivity to objectivity. Thought is not merely subjective, but truly objective. Only 
by seeing this whole development of the concept can the identity of thought and being 
be properly grasped. This progression from subjectivity to objectivity is clearly shown 
in the syllogism. " And also at the stage of purpose, the concept is known to be the 
unity in-itself of subjectivity and objectivity. 12 
The idea is not only the unity of subjective concept and objectivity, but also the 
unity of the understanding and reason; the latter consists of the negatively rational (as 
dialectical reason - in the narrow sense) and the positively rational (as speculative 
reason). The understanding supposes the clear-cut distinction between subjectivity and 
objectivity. But the thought at the level of reason knows that this clear-cut distinction is 
not the ultimate truth. It knows that the truth consists in the unity of the seemingly 
separate opposites, i. e. the unseparatedness in distinction. This unity is not static but in 
movement; or rather, the unity is the self-movement of the absolute itself - in that it 
departs from itself and returns to itself. In this sense the movement of the absolute is 
infinite, or rather, infinity as such. 
The absolute, to know itself, has to explicate itself for itself initially as being, 
then as essence, and finally (but atemporally) as the being-once-more, the concept. This 
non-temporal self-movement (as self-departing and self-returning) is the whole system 
of the self-development, and thus the self-explication, of the absolute. (Only after the 
transition into nature does the temporality emerge, hence in logic every movement is 
non-temporal. ) However, this whole movement was implicit or in itself in the realms of 
being and essence. This movement is shown explicitly or for itself only in the realm of 
the concept, as the idea, which is the ultimate expression the absolute gives to itself. 
The thought, as the absolute idea, has come to explicate itself only through this 
systematic, self-upgrading exposition of itself, by proceeding from being and its 
negation, essence, and reaching the concept, as the truth of itself. 
11 See Chap. 7 Sec. 1(c)(iv). 
12 See Chap. 7 Sec. 2(b). 
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`Truth' can have various meanings - such as (1) the unity (or agreement) of 
reality (or being) and thought (or thinking, knowing), (2) the unity of subject and 
object, (3) the unity of subject and predicate (this truth is clearly shown in judgement, 
as the fulfilment of the copula `is'), 13 (4) the unity of reason and the understanding, (5) 
the unity of quest and answer (the resolution of the quest), and so forth. Here the 
meaning of the `truth' as the unity (agreement) of reality and thought has to be 
emphasised. For Hegel, God alone is the genuine agreement between the concept and 
reality. 14 God is for him the thought which thinks of itself, as aforementioned. The 
object of this self-thinking is the thought itself. It may appear that Hegel has dropped 
`being' from his view. But it is not so - since thought is also the self-movement of 
being itself. Knowing or knowledge is that which aims at the true, i. e. what being is in- 
and-for-itself. ¢5 Without being (or reality - in general terminology) there would be no 
knowing or thought. It is to be remembered that at the stage of the concept, being 
acquires the significance of truth - in that the idea is the unity of the concept and 
reality. 16 This agreement between the concept and reality, i. e. the idea, is the truth, as 
stated above. It is now known that this truth, the identity of thought and being, has been 
already presupposed in the concept of God, the self-thinking thought, which is the sole 
absolute truth. 
Truth in any sense (as stated above variously) is the double-movement of the 
absolute - in that it embraces within itself the two moments which are contradictory 
and are thus to be sublated into a unity. Truth is in this sense not what is static but the 
movement of the absolute - for Hegel as the self-thinking thought which embraces 
within itself being. 
However, the next question arises here. That is, how and why does this 
movement of the absolute emerge? To answer this, the concept of energeia is 
important. 
13 See Chap. 6 Sec. 1(b); cf. Enc. Logic, § 169. 
14 See Chap. 4 Sec. 2; cf. Enc. Logic, § 24 Addition 2. 
15 See Chap. 6 Preliminaries (a); cf. Sci. Logic. pp. 389-90. 
16 See Chap. 7 Sec. 3; cf. Sci. Logic. p. 757. 
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Section 3 
Dialectic as the Truth 
Aristotle's energeia is variously rendered by Hegel as actuality (Wirklichkeit) or 
activity (Tätigkeit) or development (Entwicklung). Hegel interprets energeia as the self- 
referential activity, as the actualisation of the potency which is immanent in the subject 
of the movement as the developing process. This is variously expressed as the 
processes, from the self-grounding of essence to the concept, or from teleology to life, 
or from the finite thinking of man to the absolutely free thinking which has itself as its 
object. For Hegel this last expression is Aristotle's noesis noeseos (the thought thinking 
itself, i. e. the self-thinking thought), which is the prefiguration of absolute spirit. " 
(However, it is to be remembered that it is Hegel himself who combined the unmoved 
mover, God, with the above self-thinking thought. )'8 For Hegel and Aristotle (as 
rendered by Hegel) energeia is the self-determining concept, the universal in its 
concretisation. For them the end is the true, the concrete. For Hegel, in this sense, 
Aristotle expresses the speculative idea, i. e. the absolute as the thought. ' Pure energeia 
is the thought which thinks itself since the thought is the essence of the first substance 
and is the thinking in actuality. For Hegel, Aristotle expresses the true as the becoming 
identity of subject and object in the above expression (the self-thinking thought) which 
is nothing but pure energeia. Here the identity is activity and movement, and so is 
energeia. 20 
Thus stated, energeia is the truth as such - as the activity and movement as 
such, which is rendered by Hegel variously, but ultimately as the concept. Truth is the 
unity or identity of subject and object, of reality and thought, of the understanding and 
reason, and so forth. 21 But the main emphasis by Hegel consists in that the truth is the 
activity and movement of thought. For him this thought is the thought which thinks 
itself, the concept as such, i. e. God. 
17 Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, pp. 7-8; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics. 1074b. 
18 See Chap. 4 Sec. 3(b). 
19 Ferrarin, p. 108; cf. Hegel, His. Phil, II, p. 134. 
''° Ferrarin, p. 124. 
21 See Sec. 2 in this chapter. 
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However, Hegel does not deny the importance of reality (in ordinary sense) or 
the real. But his main point is that the reality can be grasped properly only in thought. 
To elaborate: Truth is the movement of the thought as such. This movement is, as has 
been clarified, the double-movement which embraces within itself the unities of 
opposites, i. e. the unities of the infinite and the finite, of subject and object, etc. As a 
whole of these unities, truth is itself the unity of unities, as the infinite as such, i. e. as 
the affirmative, true infinite. This affirmative infinite alone is the truly real, as the 
negation of the first, abstract negation (the ideal). 22 In this context the thought as the 
infinite is the solely real, the true. For Hegel the unity of reality and thought is grasped 
as the infinite self-movement of the thought, as the self-identification of thought with 
itself. 
Logic is for Hegel the system of the description of the determinations of thought 
which, being in their finitude, exposes the infinite. 23 In this context the truth of logic is 
the thought's returning unto itself. Through the whole process of logic, thought 
becomes truly itself; the thought comes to think itself; the thought becomes infinite. 
Thus stated, logic is a full circle of the descriptions of thought, which 
culminates in the idea. Logic is the whole process through which alone the absolute (as 
the self-thinking thought) knows itself - until it finally (but atemporally) comes to 
know itself as the concept as such, the idea. In this sense the whole content of logic is 
the self-exposition of God which is the self-thinking thought. Dialectic is the activity of 
thought which immanently dwells in thought-determinations. 24 In this sense, dialectic is 
that which penetrates, or runs through, the whole process of logic. Since logic is the 
infinite self-development, and thus the self-explication, of the self-thinking thought, the 
dialectic is the infinite movement of the thought as such, of this self-thinking thought. 
As long as the `truth' means the absolute unity of reality and thought, as the thought's 
self-identification to itself, the truth consists in its being the self-explication of the 
thought. Dialectic is in this sense the self-explication, self-activity, of the thought as 
this truth, as the movement of the absolute, the knowing of God. 
Unlike the understanding which has the feature of restrictedness or one- 
sidedness, reason is the faculty of the unconditioned, i. e. the faculty to know the 
22 See Chap. 5 Sec. 2(e); cf. Sci. Logic, p. 149. 
23 See Chap. 4 Sec. 1(c); cf. Enc. Logic, § 82 Remark. 
24 See Chap. 4 Sec. 3; cf. Enc. Logic, § 41 Addition 1. 
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absolute. 25 As long as the `dialectic' means the explication of the truth, dialectic is also 
the self-movement of the thought itself to attain the absolute truth, as the thought's self- 
knowing. Dialectic is therefore the faculty of reason to know what the absolute is - in 
both senses of the negatively rational (dialectical reason - in narrow sense) and the 
positively rational (speculative reason). In this context, dialectic is infinite, i. e. the 
immanent transcending, sublation, which penetrates the whole range of the thought's 
self-development, logic. Dialectic is in this sense the moving soul of scientific 
progression. 26 
However, this thought, the truth as such, does not dwell solely within itself, i. e. 
in the system of logic. If logic is the science of determinations grasped in thought, and 
if its ultimate truth is expressed as the concept, then how energeia is at work in nature 
and in spirit, has to be shown. 27 That is, the idea must fall into nature. The concept, as 
the absolute idea, as the spirit conscious of itself, as complete in itself, must go out of 
itself to capture itself through nature and spirit. That is, spirit must realise the dialectic 
of the idea and explicate itself by going through the process - from the absolute idea, 
then the particularisation in nature, to the individuality in spirit. Or rather, nature and 
spirit are the moments of the self-actualisation of the idea as self-determining spirit. 
Hence, with the culmination as the idea, logic must conclude itself when spirit grasps 
itself as the totality of its moments. The release of the idea into nature expresses its 
freedom by which the idea (as the infinite) assumes a finite form, nature. This release is 
in truth the work of the self-knowing activity of the idea itself. 28 
Thus stated, the absolute as the idea as such finally knows itself as nature. As 
side by side with the idea's self-release into nature, dialectic has to be released into its 
freedom. That is, dialectic is to be grasped not only with the emphasis on the self- 
movement of thought, but with the emphasis on the self-development of reality. This 
will be explicated in the following chapters. 
25 See Chap. 4 Sec. 2; cf. Enc. Logic, § 45. 
26 See Chap. 4 Sec. 1(b); cf. Enc. Logic, § 81 Remark. 
27 Ferrarin, p. 140. 
28 Ferrarin, pp. 196-97. 
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Part III 
Dialectic as the Truth of Reality and Thought 
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Chapter 9 
Transition to the Materialist Dialectic 
Section 1 
Who Thinks? 
I have now clarified that for Hegel the absolute is the thought which thinks of itself. 
The thought, the expression of spirit in the realm of logic, has within itself the 
development of the categories which contain contradiction and its sublation. At the end 
of the whole process of logic, the thought as the absolute idea comes to know itself as 
being - not as the abstract being which was described as the first sphere of logic, but as 
nature. Thought has turned into nature. From Hegel's point of view this shows the 
identity, of thought and being as the thought's self-identification, self-returning to itself. 
Being is not simply self-sufficient being. but the explication of thought - for Hegel. 
The truth as the absolute, i. e. the identity of thought and being, is for him the self- 
circulation of thought or spirit. 
However, the next serious question or doubt arises: what thinks') or who thinks? 
or, in other words, what is" or who is" From Hegel's viewpoint the thought would be 
defined as the self-thinking thought (noesis noc'sc'os), i. e. God, the ahsolutc itself. I[oor- 
Heocl, therefore, that which thinks is the self-thinking thought. The activit\ and result 
of thi, ikinh (thought) is described as nature, but it is another expression of thought. 
Therefore this e\pression (self-thinking thought) cannot but be an empty tautolo \. 
ho\v ever richly he has clarified the concreteness of thoýu,, ht vv ith the detailed 
descriptions of categories in 1. oß ic. If thoýuc1it. the absolute. xe/f thinks, then nature and 
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finite spirit (i. e. man and his society) are merely the empty replica, abstract skeletons of 
rich, concrete thought. Something must be odd or wrong with his descriptions. 
The answer is clear: it is man, as thinking body, that actually thinks. But 
thinking man does not think in an empty, abstract realm. He exists in nature and in 
society which he created and developed through the interaction with nature over a long 
period. Thinking is the conscious activity of this actually living human being. Man 
thinks as this living-thinking body within nature and human society. 
To elaborate: Man is a part of nature. As Ilyenkov argues, in man, nature acts as 
thinking. In other words, nature itself thinks, in this sense. Thought (thinking) is the 
activity of this one and the same nature. Therefore, if thought thinks of itself in Hegel's 
terminology, then this expression can be transformed to another one that nature, in the 
shape of man, thinks of itself in this rather Spinozistic sense. Thinking is the 
performance, action of the materially existing body. (Thinking is therefore materially 
existing action in this sense. ) Hence there is no cause-and-effect relation between 
thinking (mind) and body which Cartesian dualism has been seeking in vain. Thinking 
and body are not two different things, but are the two aspects of the activity of one and 
the same thinking body, i. e. man who is living within nature. Thought is the being of 
this living body as thinking. Thought is not the product of an action, but the action itself 
of thinking body, man. ' 
Section 2 
The Identity of Thought and Being - from the Materialist Viewpoint 
Although Hegel himself clearly states that thoughts are not merely subjective but 
`objective thoughts', and that therefore logic, the science of the objective thoughts, 
coincides with the science of things grasped in thoughts, i. e. metaphysics (in his 
sense), 2 yet it cannot be denied that he in fact does not succeed in clarifying how and 
why thought is objective. This is simply because he thinks that thought itself is the 
1 Ilyenkov, Dialectical Logic (hereafter abbreviated as Dia. Logic), pp. 34-35. Hereafter I will often refer 
to this work of Ilyenkov. However, my arguments in this chapter (and in the next) are not the mere 
paraphrasing of his theory. They are rethought and presented through my interpretation of dialectic. 
2 Hegel, Enc. Logic § 24, p. 56; cf. Ilyenkov, Dia. Logic, p. 195. 
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generator of all things, beings, reality, the world, etc., - not vice versa. The question 
where and how thought originates must be answered. 
To reply to the above question, how Hegel endeavours to clarify the objectivity 
of thought (although he is not successful), has to be explained at first. He intends to 
make logic coincide with its real subject-matter, i. e. with real thought, the universal 
forms of reality. That is, he tries to make the subjective consciousness of the thought 
about itself be identical with its object, i. e. identical with the universal and objective 
forms of universal (not individual) thought. For him the principle or concept of the 
identity of subject and object, of thought and being, is the most crucial principle of 
philosophy. But this means that for him this principle requires the self-identification of 
thought: one and the same thought is both subject and object. When he refers to the 
term `thought', this identity, coincidence, is always presupposed; and this thought is the 
primary and ultimate, all the truth, as this self-identity. 3 He is clear and right about the 
importance of this identity of subject and object, of thought and being. His error, 
however, consists in his misconception of the origin of the thought expressed as 
categories. 
For Hegel categories, the forms of thought, are eternal, stemming from 
themselves, as the expressions of the self-activity of thought itself (the expression of 
spirit in the realm of logic). On the contrary, as Ilyenkov argues, the truth is that these 
categories of thought stem only from the historical process of the interaction, co- 
operation of the enormous sum of individuals who really lived and acted through 
labour (the core factor of human society), creating, using and developing language 
(also the core factor for man to be man), i. e. the instrument of thinking and 
communication. 4 Through the historical process of the development of human society, 
mankind has realised and developed both sides of thought, as its subjective and 
objective sides, and accordingly deepened the distinction between thought as such and 
the thought about being. But they are to be, and actually had been, intermingled. In 
ancient Greece, before Socrates and Plato, thought about itself (philosophy) and 
thought about being (science) were not separate. But in the modern era, especially since 
Descartes, the distinction between thought and being had been taken for granted, except 
for Spinoza. Philosophers had endeavoured to connect thought and being, subject and 
object - they intended the conquest of dualism; 
but their conclusions were not 
3 Dia. Logic, pp. 198-99. 
4 Dia. Logic, p. 206. 
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satisfactory as Hegel clearly demonstrated. 5 However, his own solution of the problem 
of the relationship between thought and being was to expound the thought's self- 
identity, self-returning to itself. 6 He did not succeed in explicating the relationship of 
thought and being. 
The truth is that categories are the universal forms of all the objects grasped in 
thought; categories were formed by mankind through his historical and conscious 
endeavours. In other words, categories are the universal determinations of objects in the 
eyes of human cognition (science, in a broad sense), in the eyes of universal thought. 
Hegel regards these categories (of thought) as the self-sufficient units, not as the forms 
of objectively existing materials, reality grasped in human cognition. He falsely 
considers these forms (categories) as stemming from themselves in thought. Although 
he correctly recognises categories as universal, yet his recognition is based on the 
presupposition of the neglect of the origin of the very categories, which are in truth the 
expressed forms of objective beings. Categories are the universal forms of the 
reconstruction, reflection of those objects in the consciousness of all the individuals of 
mankind in all the history of human society, which means all the collective efforts of 
the past generations of living-thinking human beings with their power of their 
collective, impersonal thought. This is the true meaning of universal and objective 
thought. Categories have been developed as the universal schemas of scientific 
cognition - at first as a particular individual's cognition, and then as incorporated into 
collective cognition of mankind as a whole; and in later generations an individual 
receives and utilises this scientific cognition as given, as granted, and further develops 
this cognition. Thought, as the collective mass of categories, in this sense, presupposes 
this historical process which is usually hidden behind its seemingly non-historical 
universality. However acutely and correctly Hegel apprehends the historicity of thought 
(as the history of philosophy), he is not free from the false presupposition, i. e. eternal, 
non-historical apprehension of the universality of thought. (However, it is also to be 
reminded that it is his very conception of historicity (another important aspect of 
dialectical thinking) that gave to later generations, Marx and Engels, a key to the 
solution of this problem of the historicity of thought. ) Categories function as the active 
forms of thought-activity, i. e. as the forms of processing the materials of sense 
impression into the forms of concepts. Thought, in the forms of categories, thought- 
5 See Chapters 1-3 on Hegel's critique of Kant. Fichte and Schelling. 
6 See Chap. 8. 
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forms, thus stems from the objective materials grasped in man's thought-activity. 
Thought-forms, categories, are not external, existing outside man, but are the realised 
forms of man's own activity which is both the living and the thinking. Thought is this 
form of the activity of living-thinking man. Thought can never be separated from 
materials although they are not the same. 7 This unseparatedness in distinction, as in 
Hegel's terminology, is the `clarity of the concept'. 8 
However, Hegel's contribution, i. e. the clarification of the concreteness of 
thought, is to be remembered. That is, for him thought embraces the objectification (or 
externalisation) of thought as the practical realisation of thought in the material world 
through man's action, practice. The human action, practice, transforms materials 
according to man's subjective concepts (forms of thought). Language is a good 
example. The recognition of the role of practice is Hegel's great contribution to 
philosophy. Thought is thus outwardly expressed in the forms of human language (or 
speech) and action (or practice). Thought is the realisation of living-thinking man's 
being, in this sense. 9 
Having said this, though, Hegel falsely tries to solve the contradiction between 
thought and being by the abolition of this very contradiction: being comes to be 
embraced within thought, as Feuerbach criticises. 10 For Hegel the identity of thought 
and being is the thought's self-identification with itself, as aforementioned. " That is, 
the being expressed in the forms of thought (categories), is posited everywhere in the 
place of real being. Hegel's conception of the identity of thought and being is therefore 
a tautology: man thinks the world as and how he thinks it. That is, for Hegel the 
principle of the identity of thought and being is not truly established: being as such, i. e. 
the free, independent, self-sufficient being existing outside and independently of 
thought, is not taken into account. (We have only to remember a simple fact: when 
mankind emerged, the world had already gone through its history for billions of years. ) 
For Hegel being comes to be immaterial and undetermined; this being is in fact the 
noumenon which Kant envisaged as outside of man's cognition. Kantian dualism is still 
hidden and retained in Hegel's philosophy. For Hegel (and for other philosophers as 
Cf. Dia. Logic, pp. 206-08. 
8 Enc. Logic, § 164 Remark, p. 242: see Chap. 7 Sec. 1(a). 
9 Cf. Dia. Logic, pp. 209-10. 
10 Ludwig Feuerbach, `Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie', in Kleinere Schriften II [ 1839- 
46] (Berlin, 1970), p. 257; cf. Dia. Logic, pp. 212-13. 
See Chap. 8. 
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well) thinking mind, as something immaterial, is opposed to everything material. For 
him the thinking mind is an immaterial being which is organised self-sufficiently by its 
own logical forms. Thus his Logic cannot but be the representation of thought as the 
activity of such supernatural, immaterial subject, which inevitably forces itself to have 
the relation of mediation, from outside, with nature and finite spirit (man) in order to 
shape them according to its own image. 12 This is a hidden revival of Fichte's Anstoß. 
For Hegel thought constitutes being, in fact. 
Section 3 
Feuerbach's Contribution to Materialism 
However, as Feuerbach rightly suggests, the thought as such which Hegel describes as 
the self-sufficient, self-thinking thought is in fact human thought, abstracted and 
alienated from man and counterposed to man as the activity of a special being existing 
beyond man. The question how thought as such is related to being as such, is in truth 
impossible - since this question is based on the presupposition that thought, as the 
alienated form of man's thinking, is taken as something independent in contrast to 
being. This being, taken properly, is not being in thought, but is the real, sensuous, 
objective world of nature and man, including thought. That is, being includes not only 
nature but also the thinking body of man. When being is considered merely as the 
ordinary being in nature (such as stones, trees, stars, etc. ), this view of being is narrow. 
This means that considering being, excluding man (as living-thinking body) from view, 
is insufficient, misleading. This insightful, correct suggestion by Feuerbach is the 
revival of Spinoza's view in a more advanced, refined manner. 13 
When described in a materialist way, thought is the real activity of the living 
brain of man. That is, it is not necessary to ask how thought is connected with brain 
since there is only one and the same thing: a brain whose activity is thinking. Or, more 
philosophically put, the real being of living brain is thought, and real thought is the 
being of the living brain which is an indispensable part of the living-thinking body of 
man. In other words, this is the immediate unity of soul and body, the separation of 
12 Dia. Logic, pp. 212-13. 
13 Dia. Logic. pp. 214-15. 
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which Cartesian dualism had falsely presupposed. There is no distinction between 
material and immaterial being. With this unity `matter thinks and the body is mind, and 
conversely the mind is body and thought is matter'. '4 
The identity of thought and being, grasped in such a materialist way, is the 
expression of true philosophy. This does not need a scholastic proof or mediation. 
Without this identity there is no truth; or rather, truth is this identity which requires no 
presupposition. This seems to be what Feuerbach suggests. That of which he accuses 
Hegel is not the latter's recognition of this identity of thought and being in the thinking 
man, but his false attempts to comprehend this unity of opposites (thought and being) 
from the unsatisfactory view of the division between thinking spirit and unthinking 
flesh, resulting in the product of joining them together. Dualism is not yet overcome by 
Hegel, who tries to comprehend the real fact from two equally false abstractions: 
proceeding from illusion to fact and from abstraction to reality. Materialism, as 
Feuerbach rightly suggests, starts from an opposite point: it starts from the directly 
given facts in order to clarify the origin of those false abstractions which idealism 
uncritically accepts as given. To say it again, Hegel starts from the viewpoint of the 
opposition of incorporeal thought and flesh without thought in order to reach the unity 
of opposites. Materialism, on the contrary, starts from the factual, direct, indivisible 
unity of the human individual, and thus can comprehend how and why the illusion held 
by idealism (i. e. the imaginary opposition of thought and corporeal being) emerges in 
the mind of this human individual, this living-thinking body of man. 15 
In other words, Kantian dualism, or even Cartesian dualism, is still hidden in 
Hegel's philosophy. To prevent this implicitly remaining dualism from appearing, 
Hegel has to retreat to the last resort of the concept of the self-thinking thought, a 
monistic and also tautological expression in which dualism remains hidden, untouched 
- although he is not a mere monist nor a dualist. This is the limit of Hegel's dialectic. 
The living, thinking brain, as Feuerbach also correctly suggests, is an object in 
which there is an identical opposition expressed as that between thought and sensuously 
objective being, between thinking and what is thought, between the ideal and the real, 
between the spiritual (or ideal) and the material, between the subjective and the 
objective. That is, this living-thinking brain (the essential part of the living-thinking 
14 Feuerbach, 'Über Spiritualismus und Materialismus', in Kleinere Schriften IV (Berlin, 1972), pp. 152- 
53; cf. Dia. Logic, p. 216. 
15 Dia. Logic, pp. 216-17. 
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body of man) is a very special, particular object which can be comprehended only in 
such a way that mutually exclusive determinations are mutually determined as 
embracing or entailing the direct unity, identity of such mutually opposing categories 
mentioned above. '6 
As explained above, thinking is a material process, in the sense of the material 
activity of a material organ (brain of living-thinking man) whose product is correlated 
with things-in-themselves (when expressed in Kantian terminology), i. e. with the things 
outside of thought. Thinking does not need any merciful aid of God or the power of the 
absolute spirit or whatever. Concepts - philosophical, religious, scientific, social or 
whatever - do exist in one and the same space-time as real things. One and the same 
subject, this living-thinking man, perceives and thinks of this world, of which he 
himself is a part, within which he finds himself surrounded, with these concepts. This 
living-thinking man exists only as this sensuously objective creature. Therefore logic, 
the system of the logical determinations of the world comprehended in thought (i. e. 
concepts or categories), is nothing but the system of the descriptions of this one and the 
same material world. What differentiates logic from sensuous cognition is that there is 
the contemplation of this world through logical thought-determinations in the former. 
Therefore it is clear that there is no distinction between logic (the system of the 
universal determinateness of this material world comprehended in logical thought- 
determinations, categories) and metaphysics (the expression of the abstract, universal 
determinateness of the things given in intuition) since logic (related to thought) and 
metaphysics (related to intuition) deal with one and the same real material world which 
man (living-thinking being) lives. Logic, properly grasped, is thus the science of the 
laws of the development of real thinking (thinking of this material world), the science 
which expresses itself as the system of the universal forms of the real content of 
thought, i. e. this real material world sensuously given to man. '7 
Hegel's Logic is the description of this real world in this sense, as Feuerbach 
rightly points out. The logical forms of judgement presupposes the metaphysical 
concepts such as - universality, singularity and particularity - the whole and the parts - 
necessity, ground and concepts, etc. Logical forms are possible only through these 
16 Feuerbach, `Wider den Dualismus von Leib und Seele, Fleisch und Geist', in Kleinere Schriften III 
(Berlin, 1971), p. 125: cf. Dia. Logic, p. 219. 
17 Cf. Dia. Logic, pp. 220-21. 
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metaphysical concepts. Without metaphysics there is no logic: `only metaphysics as the 
science of categories is the true esoteric logic - that was Hegel's profound thought'. 
18 
That is, logical forms are nothing but the realised universal forms of being, of 
the real material world sensuously given to man. This is the core of materialism, and is 
the core of the meaning of the identity of thought and being in the materialist sense. 
The comprehension of the truth as the identity of thought and being, in this materialist 
view of Feuerbach, is absolutely indispensable to any materialist view if one intends to 
be a consistent materialist - even though his view had some logical weak points as 
Marx acutely criticised later. 19 
The weak points of Feuerbach's view are (1) the lack of the concept of the 
practice of man, and (2) the lack of dialectic. As for the former, Marx points out: `The 
chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that the 
thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of 
contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in 
contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism - 
which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. 20 Feuerbach's lack of 
the grasp of practice is shown when he fails to see that the actually existing nature 
given to us is itself in fact the product of human labour. Nature is not simply nature; it 
is given to us as the realised labour of man. 21 
On the other hand, the latter weak point held by Feuerbach, i. e. the lack of 
dialectic, is, too, not only his weak point, but also that of `all hitherto existing 
materialism'. The above quotation in fact indirectly indicates also the lack of dialectic 
in all the previously existed systems of materialism (i. e. before that of Marx). That is, 
the sensuous human activity, as practice, is nothing but the activity of the living- 
thinking man who acts in this real material world. Feuerbach cannot apprehend this real 
world as self-developing according to the laws inherent within itself; i. e. he fails to see 
the self-movement of this real world. He cannot see the dialectical moments inherent 
within nature and human society. This dialectical point of view was, in fact, developed 
and made mature only by so-called idealists, namely Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. That 
is, dialectic, in the modern history of European philosophy, could not but be developed 
18 Feuerbach, Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie (Berlin, 1955), p. 35; cf. Dia. Logic, pp. 221-22. 
19 Dia. Logic. pp. 222-23. 
20 Marx, Theses on Feuerbach I. p. 171. my italics. 
21 Cf. Dia. Logic, pp. 224-25. 
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in the idealist manners and systems which culminated in Hegel's philosophical system, 
the core exposition of which is his Logic. His Logic is therefore the culmination of the 
exposition of dialectic in all the hitherto existing philosophical systems of any kind - 
although in a one-sided manner in which the identity of thought and being is 
comprehended as the thought's self-identity to itself -a tautology. Our task to develop 
the theory of dialectic should be based on the sure grasp of Hegel's dialectic with 
critical eyes. Hegel, even at the beginning of the twenty-first century, is never a `dead 
dog', as Marx says: `The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no 
means prevents him from being the first to present its [the dialectic's] general form of 
working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it [dialectic] is standing 
on its head. 22 It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational 
kernel within the mystical shell. ' 23 Our task, and also my task in which I have been 
engaged through all the previous chapters, is to find this `rational kernel' within 
Hegel's gigantic system of Logic, as the system of the truth comprehended in his one- 
sided but great manner. This is the only possible method for the further development of 
the theory of dialectic. 
So much for Feuerbach. We shall turn to the core of materialist dialectic, i. e. the 
dialectic initiated by Marx. Truly comprehensible materialism starts from the critique 
of objective idealism. 
22 Interestingly a similar expression had already been used by Hegel himself when he criticised 
Empiricists on their misconception between the concrete universal and abstraction, saying that 'this 
stands things on their heads' (Enc. Logic, § 227 Addition, p. 297). Marx obviously knew the details of 
Hegel's Logic, including Zusätze. It is therefore thinkable that Marx made an allusion to Hegel, 
employing the latter's critical comment, to criticise Hegel himself. Engels later used similar critical 
expressions on Hegel, saying that `the Hegelian dialectic was placed upon its head', or '[the] head, on 
which it was standing' (Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. P. 
383). Engels, of course, knew both Hegel's and Marx's above expressions. 
23 Marx, `Afterword to the Second German Edition', in Capital I. p. 19. 
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Section 4 
Critique of Objective Idealism 
Hegel's philosophy as a whole can be described as objective idealism of such kind as 
which does not neglect the existence of real being, the real world, and nevertheless 
finds the origin of thought in thought itself. Or rather, it does not even allow such a 
question of where thought originates to arise. 
To elaborate: Hegel considers all the forms of human culture (including all the 
theoretical human activities, namely philosophy) as the manifestation of the faculty of 
thinking. He does not feel the need of an inquiry into the origin of thinking, i. e. where 
and how thought (or thinking) emerges in man. Thought, thinking, is considered by him 
as a kind of divine power which does not need any presupposition - since the thought 
which thinks of itself, noesis noeseos, is the meaning of God, for him. Hegel does not 
need a view of the real human being - in the sense that he consequently does not see 
the sensuously objective activity of all the human beings who, by their own labour, 
create human culture (including political institutions, legal systems, ideology). The 
external objective world exists for him only as a manifold of materials to realise and 
concretise thought itself. Therefore for him thought is the only active and creative 
force, and consequently the external objective world is merely the application of this 
divine power, thinking, thought. That is, the sensuously objective practice of the 
actually existing living-thinking man is considered by him as the consequence, external 
objectification, of the thought-determinations (such as ideas, concepts, categories). For 
him thought is the creator of material world, being. He does not need to ask where and 
how thought originates. Thought comes from itself; or more simply, thought is. 
Thought comes to know itself, as expressed in the details of his Logic. 24 To know itself, 
thought (the explication and expression of the absolute as the absolute idea) turns into 
nature, the real being. Thought is the actor, creator of the real world. 
25 This Hegelian 
expression is absolutely upside down. This is the most crucial feature of Hegel's 
version of objective idealism. 
However, despite the weakness explained above, Hegel's objective idealism has 
a decisive merit. That is, what he describes as the forms of the manifestation and 
24 See esp. Chap. 8. 
25Dia. Logic, pp. 236-37. 
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realisation of thought, i. e. logical categories and their expressions in Logic, are in fact 
the real forms of really existing material world - since he acquires such conception of 
categories through the study of the really existing material world which he himself sees 
as the mere manifestation of thought. His upside-down thinking does not prevent him 
from reaching the appropriate, real conception of the real world. 26 Hence the following 
words of Lenin: `The sum-total, the last word and essence of Hegel's logic is the 
dialectical method - this is extremely noteworthy. And one thing more: in this most 
idealistic of Hegel's works [Logic] there is the least idealism and the most materialism. 
"Contradictory", but a fact! '27 Hegel's version of objective idealism can be even 
considered as idealistically described materialism, i. e. materialism which is upside- 
down. This is the merit of Hegel's philosophy. 
Having said this, however, the weak point of Hegel's view cannot be denied. 
That is, he idolises the categories (i. e. the logical forms of human thought about the real 
world), and considers them as absolute, excluding the need of any explanation of their 
real origin. 28 Therefore his objective idealism results in the tautology of his logic, as the 
system of the development of the thought which thinks of itself. 
Then, the quest of the possibility of the further development of the theory of 
dialectic in the materialist manner has to be asked. 
26 Dia. Logic, p. 237. 
27 Lenin, `Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic' (1914), in Philosophical Notebooks 
(hereafter abbreviated as Phil. Note. ), p. 234. 
28 Dia. Logic, p. 238. 
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Chapter 10 
Towards the Materialist Reconceptualisation of Dialectic 
Section 1 
The Real and the Ideal in Materialism and Idealism 
From what has been explicated, it can be clearly said that Hegel's catclýorics, the 
description of which is genuinely dialectical, are in truth the ir, ui 'ersal . 
for, r1. v o1' the 
objective world reflected in the collective consciousness of ,n an; the development of 
the external real world existing independently of thought (thinking) is reflected into our 
consciousness. ' 
However, the crucial point is that the reflection of objective reality into 
collective human consciousness is not imninediate, i. e. not the immediate reflection of 
nature. This is what Marx points out. Man thinks only when he is in unity with human 
society, i. e. with the collective socio-historical materials, which produce his mental or 
spiritual life. That is, man does not directly reflect nature into his consciousness, but 
through `the ideal'. 2 The ideal is the subjective reflection or image of obieeti vc reality. 
The ideal is the reflection of the external world in the forms of man's acti\ itv, in the 
forms of his consciousness and will. The ideal is not individual but socio-historical: the 
ideal is the product and form of man's mental production. 
' 
r Ilyenkov. Dia. Logic, p. 25l. As described in the previous chapter. my references to Ilkenkov". %%(, r k do 
not mean the mere paraphrasing. but are the reworked presentation of my interpretation of dialectic. 
1 use the term 'the ideal' in contradistinction to 'the real' and 'the material'. A' the later irr _uments will 
show, although the ideal does not e\i,, t in a physical "en, e, ii, e\itence 
is not illusoir but actual in 
human thought and activ itie'. 
3 Dia. Logic. p. 25- 
162 
Therefore, as Marx says, `the ideal' is nothing but `the material world reflected 
by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought'. Furthermore, as Marx also 
describes, if the inquiry into the subject-matter of the object which man is investigating, 
is correctly and accurately done on the basis of the above recognition of reflection, i. e. 
`if the life of the subject-matter [of inquiry] is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it 
may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction'. ` This seems to show 
how and why Hegel's vivid descriptions of the categories in Logic are the accurate, but 
distorted or upside-down, descriptions of the objective world. Or, in other words, the 
material world is correctly translated into Hegel's system of philosophy, but correctly 
in a reverse way: he considers the ideal as the real, and the real as the ideal - not vice 
versa. This divides Hegel's objective idealism from materialism. 
However, as Ilyenkov argues, various forms of materialism which existed 
before Marx, including that of Feuerbach, had a serious weak point in common: they 
directly identified the ideal with the neuro-physiological structure of man's brain and 
its functions. Although they were certainly right in pointing out the fact that man is a 
part of nature, yet they were insufficient in failing to recognise man as a socio- 
historical being. They could not understand the crucial factor of man's society - labour, 
i. e. the sensuously objective activity of social man, this living-thinking man in real 
society. Thus they could not properly understand the real society which is being formed 
by human labour. The truth of the matter is that the ideal is this result and active 
function of human labour in nature and society. The true meaning of the ideal was 
correctly grasped by, at first, idealists, namely Fichte and Hegel - in that the active 
aspect of the relation between thinking man and nature was seriously thought about by 
them. The appropriate materialism had to start from the debt to the great achievements 
of those idealists even though their descriptions of the ideal were in a distorted, 
abstract, one-sided or upside-down way. 
5 
Categories in man's thought arise and function only as the forms of the 
determination of the purposive will of individuals in the course of the practical, 
objective transformation of nature by man in his society. Categories never arise in an 
empty space by the work of thought or contemplation. The ideal exists immediately 
only as the form of the activity of social man, i. e. man's being in the true sense, which 
is directed to the external world, the real. The material system of society, i. e. the whole 
° Marx, `Afterword to the Second German Edition', in Capital I. p. 19. 
5 Dia. Logic, pp. 253-54. 
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mass of social institutions, is in truth nothing but the social man who is in unity with 
real, objective world through which he acts as human life activity. The ideal therefore 
cannot be reduced to the brain. The ideal is the special function of this living-thinking 
man as the subject of social labour activity. Man inherits the forms of this activity from 
all the previous generations and develops them. Practice, or labour, or production. is 
the crucial link between man's thinking and nature. Through production, labour, man 
transforms the object of nature into the object of thought. Feuerbach did not understand 
this important link, i. e. labour, practice: he stopped only to think of nature directly 
counterposed to thought; he did not understand that the object of his contemplation or 
thinking is in fact the product of collective human labour. 6 
Contemplation is concerned not directly with the object, but with man's 
objective transforming activity on objects, and with the results of this practical, 
subjective activity. To elaborate: The so-called contemplation or intuition of nature as 
such is in fact concerned with the forms which had already been decisively stamped on 
the very contemplation by man's transforming activity of the object. Even the 
genuinely objective features of nature (as natural material) are given to man's 
contemplation only in the forms which man has given to natural materials through the 
process of the subjective activity on the materials. Therefore the so-called purely 
objective picture of nature is given to man not in pure contemplation but only as the 
result of social man's activity. Man produces his own life. Appropriate materialism is 
that which takes all the above points into account. 7 Therefore the following words of 
Marx: `The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not 
a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i. e. the 
reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the 
reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic 
question. '8 
In the form of an active, real faculty of man as the agent of social production 
(the core factor for man's society to be society), the objects exist ideally as the result of 
this production as reflected into man's consciousness which is directed toward the aim 
of his own activity. Therefore the ideal is the form of things, which, however, exists 
outside of the very things, in the form of man's active practice. The ideal is the socially 
6 Dia. Logic, pp. 256-58. 
7 Dia. Logic, pp. 258-59. 
8 Marx, Theses on Feuerbach 11. p. 171, my italics. 
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determined form of human being's activity. Of course, the ideal does not exist in nature 
itself which includes man as a biological being. The ideal, i. e. the active form of social 
man's activity, is embodied in the form of the structure of human brain. But the 
material being of the ideal, in this sense, is merely the form of its expression in the 
organic body of individual man. Appropriate materialism does not identify the ideal 
with the material process which occurs in the human brain. It considers the ideal (i. e. 
the socially determined form of man's creating activity on objects) as not existing in 
man's biological head (brain), but as existing, through the work of the brain, in man's 
real objective activity on objects, i. e. in the social production (in the broadest sense). 9 
All forms of the ideal are the products, forms of man's historically developed 
society. The most appropriate example is language, which has vocabulary, syntax and 
its culmination in logical categories. Man, by the work of language, converts his words 
to actual deeds, and, through this, acts on things. The objective, the real, is thus 
properly transformed into the ideal only in the forms of the properties of social man, in 
this sense. '0 
The ideal is therefore that which does not exist in the form of sensuously 
perceivable things, but exists in the form of active faculty of man, the faculty of 
production as the realisation of his will on things. The ideal being of things has to be 
differentiated from the real being of things. That is, the ideal is the subjective being of 
the object, or the otherness of the object, i. e. the being of an object in-and-through 
another. 11 
Human labour - which is the real transformation of the world and of man 
himself, being performed in social forms - is the process within which the ideal is 
realised as the transformation of the reality, nature, human social relations. Language is 
the externality (objectification, realisation) of the ideality of the objective world. The 
ideal is thus realised through and by labour and language. 12 
Without an ideal image man cannot commit to nature; i. e. man cannot directly 
act on things in the process of social production. The ideal image, for its realisation, 
requires real materials, including language. That is, human labour needs language. 
13 
9 Dia. Logic, pp. 260-61. 
10 Dia. Logic, p. 262. 
11 Dia. Logic, pp. 264-65. 
12 Dia. Logic, pp. 266-67. 
13 Dia. Logic, p. 274. 
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However, there is a problem of language. Language needs, as its constituents, 
linguistic symbols, i. e. vocabulary (words), some of which are of abstract concepts. 
When engaged in linguistic activity, man operates not on the ideal ground On the 
aforementioned sense) but on the verbal ground. That is, it is not rare that a man comes 
to see the real things only through the already historically conceptualised terms: he 
comes to see only the terms themselves in a traditional context, not seeing the real 
things by means of those terms, yet believing that he is seeing the things. In such a way 
a linguistic symbol becomes a tool of fetishisation of the verbal existence of the ideal 
of objectively existing things; the symbol ceases to be a tool for the real activity (seeing 
the things themselves). '4 
In spite of such a risk, however, without the ideal images and symbols of 
language, man cannot act in the real world. Man needs the ideal images of real things to 
operate his mental life, an aspect of his living-thinking life. Only by transforming the 
real objects of human life activity into the ideal images can man be the active subject of 
social production (in the broadest sense aforementioned). 15 
The ideal is the form of man's activity. All forms of his activity - e. g. skills, 
technology, institutions, language - are passed on from the previous generations to later 
generations only in the forms created by man for man. They are not innate in man in a 
biological sense. An individual's form of activity, i. e. the ideal image of the object and 
product of his activity, does not coincide with the objective structure of nature as his 
object. But the ideal is possible only there: the form itself of his object, which 
corresponds to the form of the external real object, is transformed into a special object 
with which he operates without touching and changing the real object - to some extent. 
There man ceases to be merged with the form of his life activity: he separates the form 
from himself, and transforms it into an idea. This is inevitable and even necessary. For, 
since man grasps the external real objects only insofar as he is engaged in his activity of 
social production through the ideas, the ideal image of the objective real thing has 
inevitably to be merged with the image of his activity in which the thing operates by his 
hands. This is the epistemological root of idealism - through the identification of the 
thing with the idea, of the real with the ideal. But this is only a root of idealism: the 
objectification of the form, as taking the form of man's subjective activity as the real 
14 Cf. Dia. Logic, pp. 274-75. 
15 Dia. Logic, p. 276. 
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object, is not itself idealism, but is even necessary for man to act. 16 Such objectification 
or identification of the ideal with the real -- this necessary process - becomes idealism 
only under certain historically constituted social conditions, by the division of labour 
into mental one and physical one in history, i. e. in the class-divided society - in that 
those who only do the mental labour have a risk of thinking of the ideal as the real. 
Idealism is not a person's personal tendency. A man who is engaged only in 
mental labour, often - not always, though - falls in the fetishisation of his activity 
itself. Religious fetishisation by priests of what is in fact man's faculty and activity 
(love, mercy, benevolence, contemplation, etc. ) as God's faculty and activity, is a good 
example. 
The ideal exists as the form of man's activity, as aforementioned. Its good 
example is the technique or skills of a craftsman. A man can observe the activity of the 
craftsman who is engaged in the material productive labour. But the observer cannot 
pass on the craftsman's technique directly into his physical body; the technique which 
is the ideal image, the active faculty possessed by the craftsman, can never be copied. 
One can acquire the equivalent technique only by being engaged in the equivalent 
active operation with the object and product of his labour. Only in such a way can the 
ideal be transformed from a man to another. This shows that the ideal exists only as the 
form of man's activity (namely, labour), related to the form of his object of such 
activity. The ideal is not what exists as a material thing although its root is material. '? 
The confusion of the ideal with the real is a main symptom of idealism. The 
ideal can be also described as the succession of the general forms of human activity 
realised by individuals with their wills, aims. The realisation of the ideal image is done 
under certain specific socio-historical conditions with certain needs and certain 
materials given to individuals under those conditions. In such general cases, the ideal 
functions normally as an object on which he can act; i. e. with the ideal image man can 
alter the object purposively according to the needs of his activity. However, when, and 
only when, man comes to be in terms with the ideal image formally, i. e. only as a 
pattern, sequence of such operative actions, and therefore does not understand its origin 
and nevertheless operates with the real actuality of the object and its product by man's 
action (labour), then he begins to be confused about the relationship between the real 
and the ideal; he is entrapped in the mud of ideal images. In this case, it is not the man 
16 Dia. Logic, pp. 277-79. 
17 Cf. Dia. Logic, p. 281. 
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that acts with the ideal image, but it is the dogmatised image that acts in-and-through 
the man. Now he has become the function of that distorted ideal image. he is no longer 
the master of the ideal image. What he has now is a manifold of estranged, fetishised 
falsely ideal images; he himself cannot understand from whence they come. Idealism 
has, as its symptom, such distorted picture of real objects . 
18 
However, the root of idealism is not in an empty space or ground. Idealism has, 
as aforementioned, material roots. What differentiates idealism from materialism is that 
the former finds the roots of the ideal images (of language, religion, social institutions, 
ideology, social morality, etc. ) in the ideal images themselves; they do not and cannot 
see that those ideal images come from the material objects with which men operate 
under historically given conditions. However, although idealism is a distorted image of 
the objectively real, as Hegel has been criticised, yet if one carefully sees its roots and 
contents without labelling idealism as simply false, then he can acquire a rich content 
which he can utilise and transform into the certain materials to constitute the 
appropriate, not dogmatic, materialism which becomes necessarily dialectical. This is 
what Marx has done; its best example is his Capital. Therefore the following words of 
Lenin: `philosophical idealism ... has epistemological roots, it is not groundless; it is a 
sterile flower undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on the living tree of living, 
fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolute human knowledge [i. e. the 
materialism that is genuinely dialectical]', 19 and: `If Marx did not leave behind him a 
`Logic' (with a capital letter), he did leave the logic of Capital, and this ought to be 
utilised to the full in this question [i. e. inquiry into the construction of the materialist 
dialectic through the anatomy of the capitalist society]. In Capital, Marx applied to a 
single science [1] logic, [2] dialectics and [3] the theory of knowledge of materialism 
(three words are not needed: it is one and the same thing) which has taken everything 
valuable in Hegel and developed it further. ' 
20 
Materialism which is dialectical, considers the forms of thought, i. e. categories, 
not as simple abstractions from unhistorically understood sensuousness (as by 
Feuerbach), but as universal, ideal forms of social man's sensuously objective activity 
reflected into his consciousness. That is, categories, the logical forms, are the ones 
18 Dia. Logic, pp. 281-82. 
19 Lenin, Phil. Note., p. 363. 
20 Phil. Note., p. 319. Lenin's identification of logic, dialectic and epistemology, will be discussed in the 
next section. 
168 
which have to be grasped as the ideal forms of man's real activity (labour) transforming 
nature according to his aims. It is human labour as the alternation of nature by man 
himself that is the basis of human thought . 
21 Through this human activity as labour, 
man becomes man: a simple, natural man, through such labour (alternation of nature), 
comes to constitute human culture, society, and thus himself; he becomes a social man. 
All the above points (in this section) are the descriptions of the relationship 
between the ideal and the real, and between idealism and materialism. Materialism 
which is dialectical, does not deny the being of the ideal; rather, it seeks the real roots 
of the ideal. Materialism is that which truly grasps that logical forms, categories, are 
`the reflections of the objective [i. e. the real] in the subjective consciousness of man'. 22 
Hegel's Logic consists of the most accurate descriptions of the real world transformed 
into the ideal within Hegel's head (not in the physical sense but in the ideal sense 
mentioned everywhere in this section): he only misunderstood the ideal (the thought, 
and man's consciousness in society, etc. ) as the real. If one succeeds in overturning his 
distorted, reverse description of logical categories on the genuine, material base, then 
his system will surely be the rich resource of the materialist dialectic which is to be 
further developed. 
Section 2 
The Identity of Logic, Dialectic and the Theory of Knowledge 
For the development of the theory of dialectic, then, the position of dialectic, in its 
relation to logic and the theory of knowledge, has to be examined first. 
The subject-matter of logic is the objective forms and laws of subjective 
activities on both the material and the mental, both of which are objective. On the other 
hand, when a theoretician of any kind (natural scientist, or social scientist, or whoever) 
is successful in solving the pending theoretical problems, he has been surely forced to 
think dialectically even if he had been unaware of it, or been an opponent to dialectic. 
Dialectic, and only dialectic, is the real logic, and they are (or rather, it is) one and the 
21 Cf. Engels, Dialectics of Nature. pp. 456-59; cf. Dia. Logic. pp. 283-84. 
22 Phil. Note., p. 183. 
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same as the theory of knowledge. This is what Lenin indicates. 2' But what does this 
mean - the identity or coincidence of logic, dialectic and the theory of knowledge (of 
materialism)? 
As Ilyenkov says, when Lenin wrote on this identity in 1915, the term 
`epistemology' had already been established, by the neo-Kantians since the late 
nineteenth century, as a special `science' which investigates the form of knowledge 
about the subject of knowledge, counterposed to `ontology' (or metaphysics) which was 
supposed to investigate the form of knowledge about the object of knowledge, i. e. about 
the real external world. According to the views of these neo-Kantians, the so-called 
`scientific world-view', represented by both natural and social sciences, which intends 
to know the truth or structure of the real world, is nonsense - since, for them, man's 
knowledge about the external world, expressed as `ontology' (or metaphysics in the 
above sense), is only through his subjective comprehension. According to them, we 
cannot have the knowledge of the objective world; we can only have the knowledge 
about man's thinking, i. e. knowledge about the knowledge itself alone. Kant's original 
theme that things-in-themselves (noumena) are unknowable and beyond our cognition, 
remained strongly in their view. 24 
Logic as such - for them, as the science of man's knowledge in the form of 
logical concepts and formulas - was therefore supposed to be a part of epistemology 
(theory of knowledge) which was supposed to cover all the knowledge (in the above 
mentioned sense). For them the main task of epistemology is to establish the limits of 
knowledge and clarify the inner limitedness of the possibilities of thought in the course 
of constructing a world-view (the task of ontology). On the other hand, logic, as only a 
part of epistemology, has nothing to do with the attempts to know the real world, 
things-in-themselves. The task of logic is therefore, for them, to analyse the already 
given images or concepts ('transcendental objects' in their terminology) and synthesise 
or organise them into a rigidly constructed order by the work of rigorous forms 
(accordingly, syllogism is an important area of logic) in order to construct a total 
science of epistemology. Logic, as a part of epistemology, was therefore supposed to 
help to show the impossibility of objective knowledge - in the sense that our knowledge 
2s 
cannot cross the boundaries between phenomena and nournena. 
21 Phil. Note., p. 319; cf. Dia. Logic, pp. 289-91. 
24 Dia. Logic, pp. 295-97. 
°` Dia. Logic, pp. 299-301. 
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Hegel's conception of logic and theory of knowledge was, of course, completely 
different from the above neo-Kantian contention, as Lenin points out. For Hegel (and 
Lenin, too) there is nothing beyond the possibility of our knowledge. The subject- 
matter of logic is the whole of knowledge, which is in truth the knowledge of the whole 
world. This knowledge not only includes our subjective knowledge but also, or more, 
the objective knowledge of real objective world. Although in Hegel's sense logic is the 
system of the self-development and self-explication of thought itself, yet in truth it is 
the system of the descriptions of the real objective world. 26 Logic therefore includes the 
external objective materials which are, for Hegel, the externalised, realised thought and 
the real force or origin of thought. Logic is for him merged with the theory of 
knowledge - in the sense that for him the true knowledge (as absolute knowing) is that 
expressed as logic; other modes of knowledge (including epistemology) are subordinate 
to it. This can be verified in that the thought - as the self-thinking thought, the system 
of which is nothing but logic - at the end of the process of logic, comes to know itself 
as nature, the real material world (the thought as the absolute idea turns into nature, in 
Hegel's terminology). 27 Although Lenin, as a materialist, is completely different from 
Hegel in the comprehension of the relation between thought and being (as the real 
world) in that he does not agree with Hegel's conception of the whole real world 
(being) as the estranged thought, yet he completely sides with Hegel in that `logic 
coincides with the theory of knowledge'. 28 
Why and how can Lenin side with Hegel on this point? Hegel thinks that logic 
embraces not only man's thought but also the real world outside man's consciousness. 
This is linked with his panlogicism in which the form of the real world is the alienated 
form of thought. At this point Lenin's view is the opposite to Hegel's. But the crucial 
factor why Lenin sides with Hegel is on another point: it is the decisive fact that Hegel 
introduced the concept of practice (or activity of social man) into the realm of logic. 
Practice, and only practice, is the criterion both of truth and of the correctness of man's 
operation in his mental activities (including language activity). For Hegel logic is 
identified with the theory of knowledge precisely because man's practice (the 
realisation of man's aims in the real material world) is directly and necessarily 
associated with man's logical reasoning (although for Hegel it is the faculty of the 
26 See Chap. 9 Sec. 4. 
27 Cf. Dia. Logic. p. 302. 
28 Phil. Note., p. 175. 
171 
thought itself; he himself does not say that thought is the power, faculty of man) - in 
that man's practice is for Hegel the thought in its external revelation, with which logic 
deals. Therefore Lenin notes: `... undoubtedly, in Hegel practice serves as a link in the 
analysis of the process of cognition, and indeed as the transition to objective 
("absolute", according to Hegel) truth. Marx, consequently, clearly sides with Hegel in 
introducing the criterion of practice into the theory of knowledge: see the Theses on 
Feuerbach. '29 
For Hegel, thought, as a practical act, includes things outside consciousness 
(things-in-themselves, in Kantian terminology), which are subordinated to man's 
thinking (or thought) expressed as logical forms. This means for Hegel that logical 
forms dictate the movement not only of spirit but also of the external material world. 
Consequently logic becomes not only a theory of self-knowledge of spirit but also a 
theory of knowledge of things. Lenin therefore also notes: `Logic is the science not of 
external forms of thought, but of the laws of development "of all material, natural and 
spiritual things", 30 i. e. of the development of the entire concrete content of the world 
and of its cognition, i. e. the sum-total, the conclusion of the history of knowledge of the 
world. '31 However, as Ilyenkov says, there is no such formulation or conception of the 
subject-matter of logic in Hegel's Logic. 32 The fact is that Lenin does not simply 
paraphrase Hegel's conception into his own terminology, but reworks what he believes 
is the `rational kernel' of Hegel's Logic, materialistically. The above conception is 
Lenin's own. 33 
However, Lenin's suggestion is acute. It is true that Hegel's logic is also his 
theory of knowledge since Hegel constructs his system of logic according to his 
investigation into the history of the spirit's self-knowledge, and therefore also into the 
history of the world of natural things, which are for him the moments of logical process 
29 Phil. Note., p. 212, my italics; cf. Dia. Logic, pp. 307-08. In this passage Lenin designates Marx's 
Theses on Feuerbach II which I quoted in Sec. 1 above. 
30 This inverted quotation by Lenin can be found in Larger Logic I (trans. Johnston and Struthers) p. 45. 
In this passage, Hegel describes only that the concept itself is the core of objects. 
31 Phil. Note., pp. 92-93; cf. Dia. Logic, pp. 225: cf. Bakhurst, Consciousness and Reº'olutionn in Soviet 
Philosophy, p. 171. 
32 See Footnote 30 above. 
33 Dia. Logic, pp. 309-10. 
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or forms of thought, alienated in natural materials in the real, objective and material 
world. 34 
Logic is also the theory of knowledge for the materialist theory of dialectic, 
known as `Marxism', too. But its reason is just the opposite to Hegel's. The theory of 
materialist dialectic investigates the history of mankind's knowledge and practice, and 
accordingly constructs the categories and forms of logic (they are for Hegel the activity 
of spirit). That is, it conceptualises the system of logic according to the investigation 
into the historical process in which man grasps and transforms the material world. In 
this sense logic cannot but be a theory which explains the universal form of the 
development of knowledge and of the transformation of the material world by social 
man (man as social being). In this sense logic is also the theory of knowledge. 35 
Logic is not a part of the theory of knowledge; it is the whole of the latter. For 
logical determinations of thought include all universal categories and forms of the 
dialectical development of the objective material world which were found through the 
mankind's whole history of practice on both natural and social-historical matters. 
Those logical forms, being reflected in man's social consciousness (or in mankind's 
spiritual culture), function as active logical forms of thinking, which is nothing but the 
dialectical. Hence logic is the theoretical systematisation of the universal forms of the 
dialectical development of nature (material world), of man's society, and of thought as 
such. 36 
According to the above conception of logic as theory of knowledge (and vice 
versa), logic is fully merged with dialectic. Or rather, they are not merged, but logic is 
dialectic. Logic is the theory of knowledge only insofar as it is itself dialectic. 37 Now it 
is clear that Lenin's materialist conception of the identity of logic, dialectic and theory 
of knowledge, is based on the two distinguishable but inseparable investigations into 
Hegel's structure of the descriptions on this issue, as follows: (1) the inter-relation or 
identity between logic and epistemology (theory of knowledge), and (2) the conception 
of dialectic as the science which embraces all the scientific, theoretical solution of the 
;' Dia. Logic, pp. 310-11. 
35 Dia. Logic, p. 311. 
36 Dia. Logic, pp. 311-12. 
37 Dia. Logic. p. 312. 
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problems that have been traditionally treated in logic and epistemology, not in 
dialectic. 38 
Thus stated, it is obvious that for Lenin logic, theory of knowledge and dialectic, 
are completely identical, one and the same; dialectic has no subject-matter apart from 
that of theory of knowledge (as logic) inasmuch as logic (as theory of knowledge) has 
no object of its inquiry apart from that of dialectic. They are, or more correctly, it is, 
the science of universal forms of development as such reflected in consciousness in the 
shape of logical forms of thought (i. e. reflected in the shape of the determination of 
categories). Furthermore, categories, as the forms of the synthesis of experimental data 
in concepts, have the objective significance attached to the scientific picture of the real 
material world in which man lives. This is how scientific world-view is attained. 39 
The above genuinely dialectical conception of dialectic = logic = epistemology 
(theory of knowledge), however, had never been considered by Marxists before Lenin, 
who writes: `Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism. This is the 
"aspect" of the matter (it is not "an aspect" but the essence of the matter) to which 
Plekhanov, not to speak of other Marxists, paid no attention. '40 
However, in the Marxist theory of dialectic, the above brilliant insight by Lenin 
has been seriously misunderstood. The most of Marxists treated dialectic as a special 
science which treats pure (or general) forms of being whereas they treated logic and 
theory of knowledge as also special sciences which treat exclusively the specific forms 
of the reflection of this ontology (dialectic ! ). 41 (But logic does not deal with specific 
features of thinking. It deals with the universality (or universal forms) of thought 
(man's thinking) and also the universality of the dialectical development of the 
objective material world. If logic is that which deals with specific features or modes of 
thinking, then there would be no difference between logic and psychology. Even from 
this one aspect alone, those Marxists' contentions are proved to be misleading. )42 The 
three sciences were at least considered by them as necessarily connected with one 
another; but those Marxists never took Lenin's words seriously or literally. It is 
therefore not surprising at all that the theory of dialectic which is to be genuinely 
38 Dia. Logic, p. 291. 
39 Dia. Logic, pp. 312-13. 
40 Lenin, On the Question of Dialectics'. in Phil. Note.. p. 362. 
41 Dia. Logic, p. 313. 
42 Dia. Logic, p. 314. 
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materialistic, was, regrettably, not fully developed at all by the hands of Marxists even 
after Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks (which contains all the above insights on 
dialectic) was published posthumously (in the years from the late 1920s to the late 
1940s), except for a few philosophers: e. g. Ilyenkov, Huh. 43 Our task is to develop the 
theory of dialectic, with the help of the insightful suggestions by Marx and Lenin (i. e. 
not obediently, but discussing with them), in a non-dogmatic way. This is the only 
possible way to fulfil the task of the inquiry into the truth of dialectic. 
Section 3 
The Problem of the `Three Principles', 
and Lenin's Attempt to Formulate the Dialectic 
For the further explication and development of the theory of dialectic, then, the 
problem of the dogmatic understanding of dialectic as the three principles, has to be 
examined. 
The so-called `three principles' of dialectic - which has been described in the 
text-books of Marxist philosophy, and have been officially asserted by many Marxists 
or materialists - are (1) transition from quantity to quality, and vice versa, (2) negation 
of the negation, and (3) interpenetration of opposites, or unity of opposites. They have 
their origin in Engels' formulation in Anti-Dühring, 4 and were developed or 
formulated by the next generation, Kautsky and Plekhanov. Another major work of 
45 Engels, Dialectics of Nature, was taken as supplementary to his above work. 46 
43 Huh Man-Won is a Korean philosopher who writes in Japanese. He holds a very similar view to 
Ilyenkov's; i. e. he asserts that we should take the `identity' of the three sciences literally. Cf. Huh, 
Dialectic as Epistemology (Theory of Dialectic II), pp. 54-62. 
44 Engels, Anti-Dühring (1878), pp. 110-32. 
45 Engels, Dialectics of Nature (manuscripts which were not completed; published posthumously in 
1925), pp. 492-521. 
46 In fact, as is well known, Engels had already been engaged in the latter work for several years when he 
was forced to embark on the critique of Dühring's 
boastful conceptions on all sciences, which had some 
significant influence on many members of 
Social Democratic Party of Germany. Engels and Marx 
considered his conceptions as false. and 
his influence as dangerous and harmful. 
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As has been clarified up to this point, dialectic is the total naming of the truth as 
the system and development of the objective material world and of man's thinking, 
thought, and is in truth completely identical with logic and theory of knowledge. 3' 
Therefore it is clear that the conception of dialectic can never be reduced to mere three 
`principles'. Or rather, ascribing the word `principles' (plural) to dialectic is, from the 
beginning, inappropriate. Dialectic, as the truth of reality and of thought, is that which 
should be considered as the self-movement (as self-development and self-explication) 
of reality (the real, objective material world) and thus of thought (the thinking by man 
who dwells within this real material world, and what is thought by man, including 
philosophy). Therefore if one tries to grasp the meaning of dialectic only from a limited 
viewpoint of each of the above `three principles', which has been, and even now is, 
done by many Marxists, 48 then he inevitably misses the crucial aspect (or rather, 
essence) of dialectic, totality. Dialectic is that which cannot but be total and thus has to 
be grasped totally. Dialectic is meaningful only when it is grasped as the whole of the 
descriptions of the self-movement of the material world and of man's thinking. 
Then, we have to ask a simple but serious question: is this the falsity of the 
conception by Engels? I myself judge that it is not the fault of Engels himself. We have 
to think of the situation in which he was forced to write up, rather hastily, Anti- 
Dühring. First of all, he had to criticise Dühring's conception of all sciences (indeed 
Dühring talked of so many subjects of human knowledge, very falsely, though), and 
therefore Engels' main aim was to clarify and emphasise the difference of the 
conceptions between him and Dühring. Secondly, therefore, Engels had to present his 
views rather axiomatically in order to be understood by general readers of Vorwärts. 49 
It was never intended to be an academic work; it was rather a polemical work, the 
theory itself expressed in which was, however, not arbitrary. It is to be clearly noticed 
that each explanation by Engels on the aspects of dialectic, as each of the `three 
principles''50 is not wrong - even appropriate - if one endeavours to grasp the total 
meaning of dialectic, using those examples of `principles' as the starting point and clue 
to the mature grasp of materialist dialectic. That is, if one totally grasps the structure of 
47 See Sec. 2 above. 
48 Gollobin, Dialectical Materialism, which is heavily dependent on the official conception of dialectic 
expressed in Soviet textbooks, is a typical example. 
"An organ of Social Democratic Party of Germany in Engels' time. 
-50 In Anti-Dühring Engels emphasises, and gives separate sections to, the 
former two 'principles', i. e. 
'transition of quantity into quality, and vice versa' and 'negation of the negation'. 
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Hegel's dialectic through the accurate and total reading of Hegel and then embarks on 
the reconceptualisation of dialectic from the materialist view, then Engels' `principles' 
are useful. This is also why Engels (and Marx, too) often persuaded younger 
generations to read Hegel's philosophical works, especially Logic. 
However, later generations did not follow their precious, crucial instructions. 
`Marxism' was thus formulated as the total science which includes the theory of 
dialectic. Therefore the falsity of axiomatising of dialectic lies in the later generations 
of Marxism although its root is in Engels' works. According to the official Marxism, 
dialectic was explained as the unity of those principles. However, this way of 
explanation of dialectic was, of course, inappropriate. Indeed most of the Marxists 
learned and memorised the theory of `dialectic' in the Soviet-style textbooks (named 
`dialectical materialism', `historical materialism', or even `dialectical-historical 
materialism', etc. ) in which `right' answers were kindly given to `students'. In that 
way, it is evident, a student could never reach the grasp of the unity of the above 
principles, which he had expected to be given in the very textbook. For students of the 
official theory of dialectic, this `dialectic' appeared as the mixture of axioms, such as 
`thesis-antithesis-synthesis'. Although this concept is useful and important to know an 
aspect of dialectic, yet axiomatic grasp of dialectic can never be its genuine conception. 
(It is also to be pointed out that the conception of dialectic as the axiom of `thesis- 
antithesis-synthesis' is not even Hegelian, bur rather Kantian or Fichtean. ) Dialectic 
was reduced and degraded to the amalgamation of axioms and principles. The theory of 
dialectic became a dogma, an authoritarian teaching. Marxist teachers taught dialectic, 
but not knowing the genuine meaning of dialectic; so were the students. Therefore it is 
not surprising, and even inevitable, that the anti-dialectical thinkers had serious 
contempt for the word `dialectic'. There is some truth in what they say, in this context. 
However, the theory of dialectic should be reborn, rejuvenated and upgraded, through 
the mature and critical digestion of Hegel's dialectic, to the appropriate, non-dogmatic, 
freely thought, dialectic. 
Interestingly there was already a Marxist thinker who really accepted the 
guidance of Marx and Engels (to study Hegel's Logic seriously) and tried to 
materialistically re-formulate the theory of dialectic. This thinker is the founder of the 
Soviet state himself, Lenin. 
When Lenin embarked on a serious and laborious study of Hegel's Logic in 
1914, the axiomatic and dogmatic grasp and teaching of Marxism, including the theory 
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of dialectic, had already been dominant. Such grasp and teaching of `Marxist' 
philosophy had the status of authority among the socialists and trade unionists 
throughout the world, including Russia. Lenin's major concern was, of course, with 
revolutionary activities. But his study of Hegel's Logic was not a hasty study to write 
up political pamphlets. Although Lenin's far-reaching concern was to criticise 
`revisionists' in the Russian Bolshevik movement, whom he believed had falsified the 
true grasp of dialectic (his study of all sciences, including philosophy, was closely and 
necessarily connected and merged with his political activities), yet his study of Logic 
was intense, scrupulous and total. (He not only studied Hegel's Logic, but also took 
many notes on other major philosophical works - from those of Kant and other modern 
philosophers, to those of Aristotle's Metaphysics and other ancient works. ) Lenin did 
not write up or publish a book of `dialectic', yet his notes and remarks on dialectic are 
worth attention. Let us have a glimpse into his words on this issue. 
Lenin's most significant attempt of the critique of Hegel's dialectic can be 
found in `Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic' (1914) 51 and `On the 
Question of Dialectics' (1915). 52 
In `Conspectus' Lenin expresses his way of reading Hegel's Logic as follows: `I 
am in general trying to read Hegel materialistically: Hegel is materialism which has 
been stood on its head (according to Engels)53 - that is to say, I cast aside for the most 
part God, the absolute, the pure idea, etc. '54 In contradistinction to his former major 
work, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1908) in which he militantly attacked 
idealist philosophers like Mach, Lenin here tries to grasp the core of Hegel's dialectic 
since he honestly admits that the culmination of the theory of dialectic, up to Lenin's 
days (in fact, even today), is Hegel's. He does not fall on the dogmatic rejection of 
`idealist Hegel'. Lenin truly apprehends that Hegel's Logic is nothing but the 
idealistically described materialism, the core and force of which is dialectic. 55 He also 
acknowledges that Marx's Capital is the greatest ever work which applies the positive 
51 Phil. Note., pp. 85-238. 
52 Phil. Note., pp. 355-63. Hereafter in this section, as for Lenin's works, I discuss the same issue as 
covered in my MA dissertation `Dialectical Thinking and the Understanding' (1997, unpublished). It is, 
however, rethought and presented in a hopefully more refined manner. 
53 Lenin refers to Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. I referred to 
this point (Hegelian dialectic's standing upside-down) in Chap. 9 Sec. 4. 
54 Phil. Note., p. 104. 
55 See Chap. 9 Sec. 4; cf. Phil. Note., p. 234. 
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aspect of Hegel's dialectic into practice. 56 Lenin is completely aware that, without the 
accurate and total grasp of Hegel's dialectic expressed in Logic, there would be no 
further development of the theory of dialectic. He reads Hegel's idealistically described 
dialectic `materialistically'. 
Lenin, then, describes that the identity (or unity) of opposites is crucial to 
understand the dialectic, and that appropriate human thinking should grapple with the 
movement of the opposites which transform into another, saying: `Dialectics is the 
teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they 
become) identical, - under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed 
into another, - why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but 
as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another. En lisant Hegel 
[in reading Hegel]. '57 
Lenin also stresses that man's practical activity (subjectively purposive activity) 
is based on the objectivity of nature. 58 For Lenin objectivity is prime and fundamental; 
subjectivity emerges as man's consciousness which acts (practices) with its own 
purpose in accordance with the law of nature (objectivity). 
Although Lenin criticises the idealistic limit of Hegel's thought, yet he properly 
evaluates Hegel's contribution to philosophy, i. e. the conception of the necessary 
relation between subject and object which are not mechanically opposed but 
dialectically united in human activity, practice. 
Man is free, but free in the sense that freedom, being expressed as man's 
purposive action, is based on the necessity (law) of nature (material world). This is the 
core or essence of the Marxist (materialistically dialectical) grasp of freedom. But 
Lenin never neglects the plausibility of Hegel's thought on this issue - in that Hegel, in 
describing idealistically (i. e. in an upside-down manner), yet correctly grasps the 
relation between freedom and necessity. This can be postulated by Lenin's quotation of 
Hegel: "... if freedom is regarded as the abstract opposite of necessity, this is merely 
the concept of understanding of freedom, whereas the true and rational concept of 
freedom contains necessity as transcended within it". 
59 
56 See Chap. 10 Sec. 1; cf. Phil. Note., p. 319. 
57 Phil. Note., p. 109. 
58 Phil. Note., pp. 187-88. 
59 Phil. Note., p. 181. This passage is quoted from Hegel, Larger Logic II. Werke VI (1840). pp. 347-48. 
trans. emended. 
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Lenin's most remarkable effort in formulating the dialectic in general is worth 
serious attention. 60 Although this is a preliminary formulation of dialectic as he himself 
admits ('a determination which is not a clear one!! '), he points out the fundamental 
`elements' of dialectic as follows: 
(1) The determination of the concept out of itself (the thing itself must be 
considered in its relations and in its development); 
(2) the contradictory nature of the thing itself (das Andere seiner [the other of 
itself]), the contradictory forces and tendencies in each phenomenon; 
(3) the union of analysis and synthesis. 61 
Lenin then describes the details of these elements of dialectic. He thinks, of course, that 
these details are not the final ones since he is aware that `one could perhaps present 
these elements in greater detail as follows'. 62 The `details' of the elements of dialectic 
are explained by him in sixteen items. 63 The first seven items are more general than the 
latter nine ones. Their order is not systematic, and one can never say that he has 
explicated the full details of dialectic. Saying this would be to over-value and thus 
misunderstand his efforts. It is important for us to see his seriousness in his attempt to 
clarify the internal relationships of elements or aspects of dialectic from within 
themselves. Or rather, he tries to apprehend the dialectic as the whole which has 
countless aspects integrated internally and necessarily (i. e. dialectically) into one 
dialectic, which is the truth of reality and thus the truth of thought. 
Lenin even tries to relate the so-called `three principles' within the internal, 
necessary unity. He describes items 15 and 16 as the examples of item 9; and this item 
9 is the detail of item 5. They are: 
(5) the thing (phenomenon, etc. ) as the sum and - unity of opposites; 
(9) not only the unity of opposites, but the transition of every determination, 
quality, feature, side, property into every other (into its opposite? ); 
(15) the struggle of content with form and conversely. The throwing off of the 
form, the transformation of the content; 
(16) the transition of quantity into quality and i'ice versa (15 and 16 are 
60 For the consideration of Lenin's formulation of dialectic, the work of Huh is quite suggestive. Cf. Huh, 
Dialectic as Epistemology (Theory of Dialectic II), pp. 130-43. 
61 Phil. Note., p. 221. 
62 Phil. Note.. p. 221, my italics. 
63 Phil. Note., pp. 221-22. 
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examples of 9). 64 
The `principle' of `negation of the negation' is expressed as follows: 
(14) the apparent return to the old (negation of the negation). 65 
For Lenin the `principles', i. e. `transition of quantity into quality, and vice versa', 
`negation of the negation', and `transition into the other (or interpenetration of 
opposites)', are to be considered as the aspects of one and the same dialectic, which 
can be expressed as the `unity of opposites', which can be best understood as the self- 
contradictory unity of opposites, having mutually conflicting opposites. The clue to 
grasp this point is his own words in item 2 of fundamental 'elements' ('the 
contradictory nature of the thing itself (the other of itself), the contradictory forces and 
tendencies in each phenomenon'), and its description in the `details' which appears as 
item 4: 
(4) the internally contradictory tendencies (and sides) in this thing. 66 
The concept of contradiction is important in Lenin's grasp of dialectic. He does not 
neglect that the above elements are dialectically (i. e. necessarily, intenially and 
contradictorily) united into one law, the truth. The dialectic, when grasped as the truth 
or law of thought, shows itself as the self-determination which is described in Lenin's 
own words, `the determination of the concept out of itself' (the fundamental `element' 
1); and then, when grasped as the truth or law of reality, dialectic is to be grasped as in 
the phase of the same item, `the thing itself must be considered in its relation and in its 
development'. Its detail is described in item 3: 
(3) the development of this thing (phenomenon, respectively), its own 
movement, its own life. 67 
Lenin does not grasp the law of reality and the law of thought separately; he treats them 
as the two aspects of one and the same dialectic. 
Lenin emphasises the essence or core of dialectic as the unity of opposites: `In 
brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies 
the essence of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development. ' 
68 
64 Phil. Note., pp. 221-22. 
65 Phil. Note., p. 22221- 
66 Phil. Note.. p. 221. 
67 Phil. Note., p. 221. 
68 Phil. Note.. p. 223, my italics. 
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As Lenin suggests, more detailed and systematic research on the nature and 
essence of dialectic should be done by contemporary philosophers, not from a dogmatic 
view. His insightful grasp of dialectic stems from his flexible (non-biased) and accurate 
view which is based on close, careful and critical reading of Hegel's Logic. As Lenin 
says, Marx `did leave the logic of Capital'. 69 Lenin himself, too, left a good example 
and guideline for the further research of dialectic; and it is we who should explain and 
develop the theory of dialectic. 
Lenin, then, tries to summarise his research on dialectic in `On the Question of 
Dialectics'. In it, he stresses the importance of the concept of `struggle' (conflict). The 
`unity' of opposites appears not only as the harmonious unity (which many 
philosophers tend to apprehend as rather static), but also as the struggle (or conflict) 
between opposites. The unity becomes struggle in the phase of development. Or rather, 
development is the struggle of opposites. He is aware of the importance of an aspect of 
the unity of opposites as the struggle of the mutually exclusive. 70 He does not stay at 
Hegel's grasp of dialectic which is after all speculative. For Hegel `speculation' (as the 
positively rational) is the synthesis of both the first moment of the understanding and 
the second, `dialectical' moment (as the negatively rational). Lenin proceeds to Marx's 
grasp of dialectic, which stresses the importance of the struggle of opposites. Marx, of 
course, did not neglect the `unity' in Hegel's sense: he was a great reader of Hegel. An 
aspect of the dialectical self-development of a thesis (in thinking) or a thing (in nature), 
which can be best described with the word `struggle', is more vividly grasped by Marx, 
Engels and Lenin than by Hegel. But they are not arrogant, nor rude to Hegel: they 
acknowledge that they are the `disciples' of Hegel. They were well aware of their debt 
to Hegel. 
We shall, then, probe into the possibility of the further development of the 
theory of dialectic. 
69 Phil. Note., p. 319- 
713 Phil. Note., p. 359-60. 
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Chapter 11 
For the Development of Materialist Dialectic: Conclusion 
The theory of dialectic, which was started by Kant in the modern history of philosophy, 
was developed, at first, by the hands of Fichte and Schelling, and finds its culmination 
in Hegel's Science of Logic. The fact that dialectic was most systematically described 
in his Logic, is not a coincidence. For, as Lenin pointed out later, logic is dialectic (and 
theory of knowledge, too). In Logic, which has three spheres of being (Sein), essence 
(Wesen) and the concept (Begriff), Hegel precisely describes the development of 
categories as the self-development and self-explication of the absolute. The absolute is 
for him, after all, the thought which thinks of itself, i. e. God. For him, only the self- 
movement of this self-thinking thought (noesis noeseos) is the truth, which is the 
identity of thought and being. The absolute, as this identity, can be known only by 
going through the whole process of the self-development of the self-thinking thought. 
For him logic is nothing but this system or process which explicates the development of 
the absolute. The absolute spirit, expressed as the absolute idea in the final sphere of 
the concept, has to know itself as, or turns into, nature, which is grasped by materialism 
as being, the real material world. However, although Hegel explicates, through the 
systematic exposition of the self-development of the absolute, that the identity of 
thought and being, and this alone, is the truth, yet this identity is not proved in fact: he 
concludes this identity by the abolition of the contradiction between thought and being, 
i. e. by introducing the concept of the self-thinking thought, the identification of thought 
with itself. `Being' is for him another term for `thought'. Therefore his logic is in fact a 
tautology of thought. For him it is the thought that constitutes being, as a result. This is 
a completely one-sided description of the truth in the idealist manner. Therefore the 
initial task of materialist dialectic was to make this upside-down system turned around 
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and set on the real, material ground. This major task was done by Marx, Engels and 
Lenin. 
However, as I said, the materialist theory of dialectic was not adequately 
developed by later generations. Although there have been significant efforts by some 
philosophers, it is not wrong to say that the theory of materialist dialectic is still in its 
adolescence - since many materialist thinkers have considered dialectic as the unity of 
`principles'. Although each `principle' is surely an aspect of dialectic, yet dialectic has 
to be grasped in its totality; it can never be reduced to `principles'. This axiomatic 
dogmatism, together with the authoritarianism under certain political situations, was the 
major factor that hindered the normal development of this theory. 
However, freedom of thought has to be initiated by the younger generations. 
This freedom means the purposive will to construct an appropriate theory of dialectic 
from a non-dogmatic view. This cannot be done by a single person: it needs collective 
endeavours by philosophers over generations. However, it has to be started by each 
individual to make collaborative work. 
We need to start from the accurate view - that the objective material world self- 
develops, and this movement can be correctly known by man, by reflecting the life of 
the subject-matter of this movement into his mind. This is the alpha and omega of 
materialism which has to be necessarily dialectical. But we also have to recognise the 
achievement by Hegel on the clarification of the truth of the movement of this real 
material world, which was by him, however, described upside-down as the movement 
of the self-thinking thought. That is, materialist dialectic has to be re-developed through 
the accurate but critical grasp of the essence (rational kernel) of Hegel's Logic (and 
other works, too), and through digesting the insightful suggestions by the original 
thinkers of materialism, Marx, Engels and Lenin. This was, of course, very often talked 
about. But talking of this did not mean that it had actually been done. 
Non-dogmatic view of dialectic would explicate that the `truth' expressed by 
Hegel as the movement of self-thinking thought (as the identity of thought and being) 
is, in truth, nothing but the life, activity, movement, of the objective material world 
(nature), and man grasps this movement as his own. The identity of thought and being 
as the truth can be known in this materialist sense. Hegel's Logic was the most 
accurate, but described upside-down, explication of this truth. Here we already have a 
good example, the most precious instrument for further development of the theory of 
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dialectic. As long as, or rather, only because, logic is dialectic (and theory of 
knowledge), the truth of reality and thought can be known by us, man. 
What, then, is the core or essence of dialectic in the materialist sense? It is the 
self-movement of the material world and thus that of man's thinking. Or, more 
precisely, the real material world self-develops and man grasps this movement. i. e. 
reflects this movement into his own consciousness which is being constructed restlessly 
in the interaction with this material world. If this material world is correctly reflected 
into man's thought, then the life of the reality becomes also that of thought. That is, the 
life-activity of materials can be correctly taken and digested into man's thinking. If this 
is done correctly, then man grasps his thought as nothing but the reflection of the life of 
the seemingly external world, i. e. material world, reality; he finds his own thought and 
himself dwelling within, and being a part of, the real, material world. Man therefore 
knows that the law of the self-development of material world is nothing but the law of 
the self-explication (self-knowing) of his own thought. Man grasps that the truth, life- 
activity, energeia, of the real, material world is also his own truth. Dialectic is this truth 
of the self-movement of both reality and thought. Dialectic is not only the truth of 
reality and of thought, but also the theoretical cognition, knowing of this truth, as has 
been explicated. That is, dialectic, as a science, is also both logic and theory of 
knowledge. ' In other words, ontology, metaphysics and epistemology are essentially 
united, or more correctly, necessarily integrated, into one and the same science, 
dialectic = logic = theory of knowledge. For logic is, in the materialist sense, the 
description of the self-development of the real, material world, which is explicated in 
man's thought in the forms of categories; and dialectic is not only this truth, self- 
development of reality, but also the cognition of this truth, as in logic; and theory of 
knowledge is the self-explication of both logic and dialectic. As Lenin correctly points 
out, `three words are not needed: it is one and the same thing'. `' 
The core of the meaning of materialist dialectic has thus been explicated. 
However, the relation between materialist dialectic and Hegel's Logic has to be 
clarified here: what kind of significance does Hegel's Logic hold for materialist 
dialectic? From the materialist point of view. logic. as a science, is the science of the 
law of the development of thinking (i. e. the real thinking of the living-thinking body of 
man) which is rooted in the really existing material world. Or, in other words, logic is 
See Chap. 10 Sec. 2. 
Loc. cit.; cf. Lenin, Phil. Note., p. 319. 
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the science which investigates the internal structure of the material world (or reality) 
which can be grasped in man's thinking, reflected in living-thinking man's 
consciousness. Hegel constructs his Logic through the scrupulous and accurate 
investigations into the internal structure of the material world. On this point. Hegel's 
position is truly realist, and has something in common with materialism. But what 
differentiates between Hegel's position and materialism is that for Hegel the self- 
movement of the material world is the self-development of the concept or the idea 
which explicates itself in this material world. On this point, materialism has a 
completely different view from his: materialism thinks that the material world self- 
develops by its own necessity (or law), and this movement can be grasped by man, i. e. 
can be reflected in man's consciousness. Although Hegel accurately grasps the 
movement of the material world in his own way, yet, as long as he thinks that the 
movement of the material world is the self-explication of the idea (or the concept, or 
spirit), his grasp of the relation between reality and thought cannot but be called 
upside-down. However, Hegel's great contribution which can be taken up by 
materialist dialectic, consists in that he found out and firmly established that the logical 
structure of thinking (thought) is identical with the real structure of the self-movement 
of the material world (reality). Materialism which is truly dialectical, understands that 
the critical digestion of Hegel's Logic is indispensable to materialist dialectic. To put 
the above points briefly: logic, as a science, has its real roots in the real, material world. 
Hegel constructed his Logic as the rigorous science of the categories of thinking. 
Although he grasped the relation between thought and reality in his upside-down or 
one-sided manner, his contribution to the theory of dialectic is undeniable. 
However, then, can Hegel's Logic be re-written from the materialist viewpoint? 
If one admits the indispensability of Hegel's contribution, as stated above, this may 
seem possible. But when one thinks of the meaning of his Logic in the following points, 
it will be clear enough that his Logic is self-coherent and unrevisable. First, historically 
speaking, Hegel's Logic was the culmination of all the sciences of Western society in 
his time: his philosophical system integrated the highest and the best results of the 
sciences in his days. His Logic therefore had, at the same time, the limit of his time: the 
categories he described in Logic were appropriate only in his system which was the 
imprint of his time. Materialism has to construct the theory of dialectic according to the 
newest results of the scientific research of the material world (and accordingly of man's 
thinking and of human society): it can no longer directly use Hegel's categories 
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themselves as he described them in Logic. Second, Hegel's Logic is a self-consistent 
system in its own way, and if it is re-written, it means the death of his Logic. His Logic 
is a perfect system which is like a living organism that has its own realm of habitation 
and the means of life. This can be said in a parallel sense as in the relation between 
Newtonian physics and quantum physics, for example. Each has its own world (realm) 
of descriptions, and is consistent and perfect in its own way. Materialism which is 
dialectical, acutely recognises this point: Hegel's Logic is a self-consistent, perfect 
system which cannot be re-written in any other way than it was actually written. 
Hegel's Logic is the self-explication of the self-identity of thought with itself, ' and 
therefore his Logic cannot be taken up by materialism in the same way. Hegel's Logic 
is unrevisable, in this context. Materialism has to find its own way to establish the 
theory of dialectic. 
Then, in what way can Hegel's Logic contribute to the development of 
materialist dialectic? It is the dialectical method (or speculative method, in Hegel's 
sense) of Hegel's Logic that can contribute most to the materialist theory of dialectic. In 
his Logic, Hegel systematically described the upgrading movement of categories (from 
the simple being to the absolute idea). The self-upgrading development of categories 
shows most vividly the dialectical movement of thought which is, from the materialist 
viewpoint, the reflection of the material world (reality) into man's consciousness. What 
materialism learns from his Logic is this very point of the detailed and accurate 
descriptions of the self-upgrading development of categories (especially, becoming, 
infinity, contradiction). From the materialist point of view, the grasp of the law of the 
self-movement of the subject-matter of scientific investigation is possible only when 
one tries to grasp the internal, necessary structure of the very subject-matter. On this 
point, Hegel's Logic shows the best example of the rigorous and systematic 
investigation into the subject-matter - by his dialectical method, as stated above. Marx 
made the most use of Hegel's method in the investigation into his subject-matter, the 
structure of capitalist economy. Therefore Marx's Capital became the best example of 
how to critically digest Hegel's dialectical method. Materialism, which already has a 
good example in Marx, has to pursue further the critical digestion of Hegel's Logic in 
this sense. 
However, the next question which may arise is this: having admitted the 
importance of Logic, among many works of Hegel, for materialist dialectic, can his 
3 See Chap. 8. 
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Philosophy of Nature be another major source of materialism? The answer is as 
follows. Hegel's knowledge of many sciences (natural, social) was astonishingly vast 
and deep. But what he described in Philosophy of Nature was at the level of the first 
half of the nineteenth century, of course, and therefore its detailed, specific descriptions 
of nature are, from the contemporary viewpoint, out of date and no longer appropriate 
to be directly taken up by contemporary materialism. However, the more universal 
points, i. e. his descriptions of the universal categories (e. g. space, time) are suggestive 
and thought-provoking even now, and this is the more long-lasting aspect of 
Philosophy of Nature. However, the dialectical process of the upgrading self-movement 
of categories was described most rigorously and universally (in the most universal 
forms) in his Logic. The explication of this dialectical process is the most long-lasting 
merit of his whole philosophical system, and this is exactly what materialism most 
values in Hegel: it is, to say again, the dialectical method of Hegel, and he most 
explicitly and universally developed it in his Logic. Although this dialectical method 
runs through all the works of Hegel (including Philosophy of Nature), it is most 
explicitly expressed in Logic. Briefly, only the universal aspect of Philosophy of Nature 
can be another resource of contemporary materialism, having admitted the priority of 
his Logic for the purpose of the employment of the dialectical method. And Hegel's 
dialectical method can be utilised only when one employs and develops it in the 
scientific investigations into the concrete subject-matters (economics, political science, 
history, cultural sciences, and so forth) from the materialist viewpoint. 
Finally, an important question has to be answered: why did I use the term `the 
absolute' to describe the upgrading movement of categories in Hegel's Logic whilst he 
himself described this movement of categories as that of `being' or `the concept' or `the 
idea'? This is closely connected to the above materialist viewpoint on how to critically 
digest Hegel's Logic. The core of his Logic consists in the fact that it is the total system 
of the self-movement of the material world (reality) which is also the system of the 
self-movement of man's thinking (thought). Only because man's thought is rooted in 
the material world can the thought be identical with reality. Hegel, of course, thought 
this issue the other way round. As long as materialism thinks that the material world 
self-develops of its own necessity alone, and as long as materialism thinks that thought, 
i. e. man's thinking, can correctly reflect the law of this self-moving material world into 
his consciousness, the so-called identity of thought and being is that which expresses 
the self-movement of both reality and thought which are identical in this sense; the 
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living-thinking body of man embodies this identity. `Self-developing by its own 
necessity' means that it is free, unbounded by anything other than itself. The most 
appropriate term to express this freedom is `the absolute'. And materialist dialectic 
needs the most universal and the most logically coherent term to express the self- 
movement of both reality and thought. Hegel's Logic is the description of this self- 
movement (self-development and self-explication) of the absolute, in this sense. If one 
uses the term `being', `the concept' or `the idea', to express this self-movement, it 
would show that he is still confined to Hegel's own terminology, although Hegel 
himself certainly expressed Logic as the self-movement of the idea or the concept. 
Materialism has to be free from Hegel's terminology, in this sense, to develop its own 
theory of dialectic whilst it recognises his contribution and critically digests the core of 
his Logic, i. e. the dialectical method. 
However, for the further development of theory of dialectic, more detailed 
discussions of dialectic are needed - since mere generalisation of subject-matter is not 
enough: a complete mature tree needs not only a trunk but also leaves and root -a 
trunk is the generalisation or formulation of the crucial essence of dialectic; leaves are 
the detailed discussions of countless aspects of dialectic which can be expressed as 
categories; and the root is the inquiry into the historical development of theory of 
dialectic since ancient Greece (Heraclitus, Zeno, Plato, Aristotle, etc. ), through 
Classical German Philosophy (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and above all, Hegel), up to 
contemporary (in a wide sense) Marxists or materialists (Marx himself, Engels, Lenin, 
Croce, Kojeve, Hyppolite, Ilyenkov and others), and even non-materialists (Heidegger, 
Sartre, Mure, etc. ). Without details there would be no truth. Truth, as a whole, needs 
not only form (generalisation) but also content (discussions of categories). The theory 
of dialectic, as the whole of truth in all the senses described above, can be developed 
only with further detailed discussions, which are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Epilogue 
We have now ended the first odyssey - the search for the truth, which is now known to 
be materialist dialectic. The theory of materialist 
dialectic has a long way to go for its 
maturity. But as long as we navigate with a reliable equipment, 
i. e. the accurate 
recognition of the essence of dialectic as the materialistically grasped 
identity of 
189 
thought and being, the truth, then we will never be lost in the ocean of various views. 
One who wills to know dialectic as the science of the truth itself, will also know that he 
will encounter many difficulties in dealing with not only a cosmological sum of 
documents to read, but also serious disputes with opponents, and even with other 
dialecticians who have different views. However, as long as one wills to grasp the truth 
of this real world as his own truth, there is no other way than to probe into the details of 
those difficulties. He now has to embark on the next odyssey, the re-search for the 
truth, i. e. dialectic. 
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